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This thesis investigates the Australian public right to fish. This includes an analysis 
of historical sources of the right in English law. This thesis describes evolution in the 
Australian right from those English sources. Key influences on that evolution have been 
the emergence of Indigenous rights and the adoption of fisheries management policies 
promoting sustainability and economic efficiency. 
Recent legal cases have increased uncertainty about the strength and effect of the 
Australian public right. Specific areas of uncertainty reviewed in this thesis include; the 
attitude of Australian courts to the utility of the right, the degree to which Australian law 
requires a clear intention to abrogate the right by legislative implication, the degree to 
which the right is derived from prerogative rights of the Crown, and how wholly 
abrogating (or extinguishing) the right affects the balance between competing interests in 
the marine domain. 
This thesis recommends against an overly abstract concern with the strength of the 
Australian common law right. It recommends that emphasis should be placed on 
contextual factors underlying the relationship between the public right and the legislative 
schemes involved. In providing a guide to the appropriate stance to take on the impact of 
those contextual factors, this thesis applies a natural-resource management perspective. 
This perspective emphasises the importance of management to maximise the benefits 
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CHAPTER 1: THE PUBLIC RIGHT 
A. The Public Right to Fish  
The English common law public right to fish1 is an ancient2 public right to fish in 
tidal waters and the sea. The public right extends from the high watermark outward and 
includes tidal rivers3 and the shores of those rivers (collectively termed the ‘marine 
domain’ in this thesis).4 The right has been described as the ‘paramount right to fish 
vested in the public’,5 a ‘skeletal principle’ of the law6 and ‘unquestioned law’.7 The 
unanimous decision of the High Court in 1987 in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries 
(‘Harper’)8 confirmed the reception of the right from English law into Australian law.9 
The right has a number of legal attributes that underpin the use of, and access to, the 
marine domain. In Harper, these attributes were described as: the right of fishing cannot 
be taken away without competent legislation,10 no restriction can be put upon the right by 
an exercise of the prerogative,11 the public right of fishing is not limited by concerns over 
the resource,12 the right is ‘freely amenable’ to regulation or abrogation,13 the right of the 
                                                 
 
1 The English common law doctrine of the public right to fish is referred to as ‘the right’ where the context 
makes it clear I am referring only to that right. The terms ‘the public right’ and ‘the public right to fish’ are 
used where clarity requires. 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘ancient’ refers to a time before the Magna Carta (1215). See, 
use of the term ‘ancient’ in NSW v Commonwealth (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’) (1975) 135 CLR 
337. 487(Jacobs J).  
3 But see Bernard Walrut, ‘The Public Rights to Use the Sea and Rivers’ (2003) 20 Environmental Planning 
Law Journal 423. Walrut canvases early English cases which leave open the question whether a public 
right can exist in a non-tidal navigable river. Walrut suggests at 438 that the Murray River might be 
covered by a public right to fish based on the Crown having encouraged exploitation by fishers and being 
parens patrie obliged to then protect those fishers. 
4 Under English common law, as received into Australian law, the landward boundary is the mean high-
tide mark and includes all tidal lands below this mark. Astronomical high tides which occur less frequently 
may encroach further inland, but the lands affected by them are not considered ‘tidal lands’. See Warwick 
Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) 83-4. 
5 Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314, 329 (Brennan J). 
6 Yarmirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533, 593 (Olney J). 
7 A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 170. Cited with approval in Harper (1989) 168 
CLR 314, 329 (Brennan J). 
8 (1989)168 CLR 314. 
9 Ibid, 325-336 (Brennan J). 
10 Ibid 329-30. 
11 Ibid 330. 
12 Ibid 330-1. 




owner of the soil over which tidal waters flow is qualified by the right to fish,14 the right 
is public and not private,15 and the competence of the state to regulate fishing is not 
dependent on the state having proprietary rights to the subsoil.16 
Although the existence of the right in Australia has been repeatedly confirmed, the 
relative strength of the right has been questioned. The High Court in Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr17 declined to confirm the right as a ‘skeletal principle’ of law, noting instead that 
it was ‘not profitable … to consider what principles of the legal system are, or are not, 
part of its “skeleton”’.18 The Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory noted 
that ‘they [public rights] cannot properly be described today as fundamental rights … 
whatever may have been their significance to coastal communities in earlier ages … this 
is particularly so of the public right to fish with all its attendant uncertainties.’19 The right 
has been described as being a ‘difficult question’.20 In England, the right (and other public 
rights to the foreshore) have been described in the Supreme Court as ‘more controversial 
than one may have expected’.21 In 2003, the Scottish Law Reform Commission 
recommended abolishing the public right (and other public rights) and their replacement 
with statutory rights.22  
This thesis demonstrates how different conclusions on the legal characteristics of 
right have been drawn from the different purported origins of the right. In some detail, it 
                                                 
 
14 Ibid 329. 
15 Ibid 330. 
16 Ibid. Brennan J notes that there was ‘some support’ for the proposition that the public right to fish 
might be ‘sustained’ by a right to the subsoil citing Mayor of Carlisle v Graham (1869) L.R. 4 Exch 361. In 
fact Mayor of Carlisle v Graham (1869) L.R. 4 Exch 361 does not provide support this proposition, see 
discussion below in Chapter 7 C. 
17 (2001) 208 CLR 1. 
18 Ibid, 68 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
19 (2007) 158 FCR 349, 375 (French, Finn and Sundberg JJ). See also Tom Appleby, ‘The Public Right to Fish: 
Is it Fit for Purpose?’ (2005) 16(6) Journal of Water Law 201. 
20 Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534, [49] (Barrett J). Quoted by the Full 
Federal Court of Appeal in Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349, 372. The quotation by the 
Federal Court included the statement by Barrett J that ‘it is not possible to make, with any degree of 
confidence, a complete and exhaustive statement of the common law rights of the public in relation to 
tidal waters and the foreshore’. 
21 R v East Sussex County Council [2015] UKSC 7, [28] (Neuberger and Hodge LL). 
22 Scottish Law Commission, ‘Report on Law of the Foreshore and Sea Bed (Scot Law Commission No 190)’ 




canvasses the legal history of the right and arguments over the legal consequences of the 
right.23 Questions of attributes and origin are of particular significance where the right 
conflicts with rights of a novel nature. Although the High Court in Harper24 confirmed 
the reception of the right into Australian law, it left open questions about the status of the 
right. In particular, Justice Brennan held it was unnecessary to resolve the relationship 
between the public right and the interests of the Crown.25 Instead, Justice Brennan noted 
that the fishery in dispute was ‘public property’,26 which left open whether the public 
right was dependent on Crown ownership or if it had an independent origin.  
This thesis situates the common law history of the right in a wider context to explain 
why questions about the origin of the right have proven so problematic to resolve. 
Questions of origin, and disputes over the right, can be dated back to the late 1200s.27 The 
origin of the right has been variously attributed to; the Magna Carta,28 a presumed past 
exercise of the rights of the Crown in favour of the public29 and the responsibility of the 
Crown to protect the interests and rights of its subjects.30 American authors have claimed 
that the origins of the English public right to fish lie as far back as Roman Civil Codes 
compiled in the 500s under the authority of Emperor Justinian.31 A key conclusion of this 
thesis, arising from an analysis of the sources of the right, is that a search for a single 
‘origin’32 is misguided. There are multiple sources of the right. Some, but by no means 
                                                 
 
23 See for example, A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153. 
24 (1989)168 CLR 314. 
25 And the question raised in argument as to whether the wild abalone in question were owned by the 
Crown. See, Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314, 320 (Bale QC) (during argument). 
26 Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314, 335 (Brennan J).  
27 See below, Chapter 2 C 2. 
28 Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155. A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153. 
29 Stuart Archibald Moore and Hubert Stuart Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens and Haynes, 
1903), 115. 
30 A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 169.  
31 See, e.g., Robert Abrams Haskell, ‘Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for 
the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel’ (2007) 40 University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform 861, 877; Michael C Blumm and Erika Doot, ‘Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public Rights in 
Waters, Wildlife and Beaches.’ (2012) 42(1) Environmental Law 375, 376. This approach has been criticised 
in James L Huffman, ‘Speaking of Inconvenient Truths – A History of the Public Trust Doctrine’ (2008) 18 
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 1. 
32 This thesis uses both the terms ‘source’ and ‘origin’ in describing the history of the public right to fish. 
Both refer to significant elements of the legal history of the right. Where the term ‘origin’ is used it signifies 
an emphasis on a specific event claimed as fundamental to the right’s emergence. In the case of ‘source’ 




all, of the conflict in academic and judicial opinion over the right can be reconciled once 
the assumption of a single origin is discarded. Later chapters use this insight to assist in 
the development of a guide to the application of the right. This guide takes into account 
novel developments in Australian law since the 1980s, including the recognition of 
Indigenous rights and the adoption of new legal forms of fisheries regulation. Finally, 
notwithstanding recent doubts over the strength of the Australian right, this thesis 
proposes that the right retains a useful legal role in providing a common starting point to 
guide the resolution of priorities between the many competing uses and users of the 
marine domain. 
To establish these conclusions, the first major component of this thesis, in Chapters 
2 and 3, is an assessment of the various origins claimed for the right. These chapters 
review the right’s history and highlight how the sources claimed for the right have 
changed over time. In Chapter 2 and 3, different accounts of the origin of the public right 
to fish are grouped into three broad categories: the ‘Bracton/Natural Law’, 
‘Birthright/Magna Carta’ and ‘Crown Ownership’ accounts. This thesis outlines how the 
right’s long and disputed history provides fertile ground for different conclusions to be 
drawn on its legal effect.33 Divergent authorities provide ample opportunities for the 
exercise of what legal scholar Julius Stone termed ‘leeways of choice’ in judgement.34 
For example, in the constitutionally significant case New South Wales v Commonwealth 
(“Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case”)35 on the marine boundaries of the States and 
Commonwealth of Australia,36 the public right to fish was cited as support in judgements 
in the majority37 and minority,38 with a putatively different origin asserted in each 
                                                 
 
state that ‘the right did not have its origin in Roman Law’ and that ‘Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta (1225) 
was one source of the right to restrict royal prerogatives’. 
33 Richard A Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Harvard University Press, 2001) 165, ‘(history) is almost 
always a mask, because of the indeterminacy of most historical enquiries … and behind the mask may be 
a pragmatist’. 
34 Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth (Butterworths, 1985). 
35 (1975) 135 CLR 337. Respectively, Stephen J at 421 and Jacobs J at 487. Although the public right and 
its origins were discussed in this case, this was by way of illustration of arguments in relation to the 
jurisdictional boundaries between the States of Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia. That the 
right can be cited to support opposing arguments highlights the divergence of judicial opinion on the right. 
36 On these boundaries and jurisdictional arrangements see Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4. 
The jurisdictional arrangements put in place are between the Commonwealth and the States (and 
Northern Territory of Australia) and are generally known as the ‘Offshore Constitutional Settlement’, ibid 
47-8.  
37 (1975) 135 CLR 337, 487 (Jacobs J). 




instance.39 In more contemporary terms, the history of the right provides for a wide range 
of ‘constructional choices’ open to the courts.40 The NT Fishing Cases,41 discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, provide more recent examples of a wide range of judicial opinion on 
the right and of continuing disagreement on the sources and the legal attributes of the 
right. Legal argument over the history of the right is also argument about the current 
legal effect of the right. 
The second major component of this thesis, in Chapters 4 and 5, is a review of the 
impact on the right of key developments in Australian law and policy from the late 1980s. 
These chapters focus on the effect of the recognition of Indigenous rights to the marine 
domain42 and the effects of changes in fisheries law and policy.43 The interaction between 
the right, Indigenous rights and fisheries legislation was central to legal disputes over 
access to, and use of, the foreshore and tidal waters in the Northern Territory of Australia 
that were the subject of the NT Fishing Cases.44 These disputes demonstrated the 
difficulties that arise when reconciling the public right to fish with other interests in the 
marine domain. Despite extensive litigation, a practical resolution to conflicts over long-
term access to the Northern Territory tidal zone has proven to be elusive more than 10 
years45 after the Blue Mud Bay Case.46 
                                                 
 
39 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
40 Samantha Hepburn, ‘Statutory Construction and Native Title Extinguishment: Expanding Constructional 
Choices’ (2015) 38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 587.  
41 The ‘NT Fishing Cases’ for the purpose of this thesis being: Yarmirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 
FCR 533; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2000) 101 FCR 171; Yarmirr v The Northern Territory [2000] FCA 48; 
Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (2000) 170 ALR 1; Director of Fisheries (Northern 
Territory) v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust [2001] FCA 98; Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 
FCR 457; Gawirrin Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia (No 2) [2005] FCA 1425 ; Gumana v Northern 
Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349; Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
42 Following Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
43 Referred to in this thesis as ‘rights-based management’. See a definition of and more detailed review of 
‘rights-based management’ in Chapter 4 B. A seminal document in establishing policy in this regard was 
the White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management 
in the 1990s (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989). Legislative reforms to support rights-based management 
had preceded this paper, for example the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), in particular Part IV of that Act providing 
for management plans and Schedule 2 providing for allocation of quotas under those plans. 
44 See above n 41. 
45 Gary Shipway, ‘Push to Restrict Barramundi Fishing as Parties Clash Over Inter-Tidal Fishing Access’, NT 
News (Northern Territory), 21 September 2017. 




The third and final component of this thesis is contained in Chapters 6 to 8. Based on 
the discussion of recent Australian cases in the previous chapters, these chapters assess 
the effect of those cases on the interpretation and application of fisheries law in 
Australia’s marine jurisdictions. Even if the right may now be classified as a lesser 
common law right,47 it is an accepted part of the legal background against which fisheries 
legislation has been framed.48 In some Australian jurisdictions, commercial rights to fish 
may be substantially or wholly based on statutory schemes of management, but 
recreational schemes are rarely as comprehensive. Accordingly, the rights of access of 
most recreational fishers, and that of many commercial fishers, are linked to the public 
right. The loss of the public right leaves gaps in fisheries law, particularly in relation to 
recreational fishing.  
This thesis argues that classification of the right as a lesser common law right,49 
combined with an excessive emphasis on its susceptibility to abrogation, can undermine 
consistency in the interpretation of laws governing the marine domain. Statutory 
provisions intended to emphasise the authority of the state over fisheries management can 
appear to wholly abrogate that right by necessary implication.50 Given that existing 
fisheries legislative regimes generally assume the background of the public right,51 
abrogation makes the interpretation of existing schemes less certain. The effects of 
legislative abrogation could be addressed as part of comprehensive legislative reform of 
the right as has been suggested for the United Kingdom.52 For the Australian marine 
domain — given the multiplicity of jurisdictions and interests involved — such a task 
would prove to be extraordinarily difficult. Furthermore, codification of the right can give 
rise to a further set of unanticipated consequences. 
                                                 
 
47 Dennis Pearce and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation (Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) 243-5; JJ 
Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 769. 
48 Fisheries Department of Western Australia, ‘Fisheries Management Paper No 195: Nature and Extent of 
Rights to Fish in Western Australia (2005)’ (Fisheries Department of Western Australia, 2005) 14-6; 
Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) s 3 (footnote). 
49 Pearce and Geddes, Statutory Interpretation (2014), above n 47, 243-5; Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality 
and the Clear Statement Principle’, above n 47. 
50 As will be argued occurred in the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
51 For example, Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) s 3 (footnote). 
52 For Scotland, see Scottish Law Reform Commission, above n 22. For the United Kingdom as a whole, see 
Thomas Appleby, Fisheries Law in Action: An Exploration of Legal Pathways to a Better Managed Marine 




Where the right has been wholly abrogated53 there are potential impacts beyond that 
on fisheries management. The right is a common legal starting point in the interpretation 
of multiple overlapping jurisdictions over the marine domain, which have different 
classes of users with different interests using the marine domain for different purposes. 
Over time, increases in the intensity of use of the marine domain multiply opportunities 
for disputes between users claiming different rights. As a long-standing common starting 
point for statutory interpretation of legislative regimes in the marine domain, the right has 
the potential to contribute to a more consistent and coherent legal framework for resolving 
disputes. This would provide greater clarity for establishing user priorities for access to 
and use of marine resources.  
To advance objectives of coherence and certainty, the approach to the application of 
the public right in this thesis is to favour interpretations that support it as part of a coherent 
framework of legislation, rather than to assume its abrogation. In assessing the purpose 
of legislation in the marine domain, two insights are applied from a natural-resource 
management perspective.54 Firstly, the principal objective of fisheries legislation is to 
‘strike a balance between exploiting and conserving fish’.55 Only partial abrogation is 
necessary to achieve this balance. Secondly, in due partly to the public right, the marine 
domain is generally a shared and non-exclusive domain. As a shared domain, overlapping 
rights and legislative schemes should be interpreted as far as possible to support 
management of the marine domain, not to replace or completely override each other. 
This thesis questions the utility of approaches to the right that focus on the 
fundamental nature of the right based on conclusions from the right’s history. 
Nonetheless, a consideration of the fundamental characteristics of the right can be 
appropriate where novel situations arise. Chapter 7 considers largely novel questions that 
arise from a finding of a wholly abrogated right across the marine domain. For example, 
                                                 
 
53 In this thesis, the short hand term for the effect of the judgment on the right in the Northern Territory 
— following the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24 — is to describe the right as having been ‘wholly 
abrogated’. The plurality only used the term ‘abrogated’ but emphasised the extent of that abrogation 
stating that, ‘but whether and how a person may take fish or aquatic life in the Northern Territory are 
questions to be answered by resort to the Act, not any common law public right. The common law public 
right has been abrogated.’ Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and 
Crennan JJ). 
54 See below, Chapter 1 B 2.  




for exclusive interests gained in the marine domain in the absence of the right,56 what 
happens if the original abrogatory event ceases? Does the right return? If so, what happens 
to other interests that may have arisen in the marine domain in the meantime? Even where 
the public right has been held to have been wholly abrogated, the courts have generally 
refrained from referring to it as having been extinguished.57 Another question is whether 
or not the right is a form of the prerogative of the Crown. If so, is it subject to statutory 
rules of interpretation relevant to the exercise of the Crown’s prerogative?58 If the right 
is expressed as wholly abrogated, what happens to rights of access underpinned by the 
right, for example, those of recreational fishers? In addressing these questions, the 
perspective developed in Chapters 2 and 3 is applied, namely that the right has multiple 
sources. A multiplicity of legal sources may have led to confusion over the right, but they 
have also contributed to its survival as a public right. 
In the final part of this thesis, some of its conclusions are extended beyond a narrow 
legal or resource management perspective. For example, Australian courts have generally 
been reluctant to acknowledge that the common law right to fish of Australia is now 
substantially different than that in England.59 The implications of this difference in 
relation to the future development of the right are discussed at the end of the thesis. 
                                                 
 
56 Here referring to estates that include a right to the subsoil and would give a right to an exclusive fishery, 
if not for the public right to fish  
57 Although see Akiba v Queensland (No 2) [2010] FCA 643. At [842] Finn J refers to the extinguishing effect 
of legislation in Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314 and the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24 as being case 
law on ‘extinguishing’ the public right. It is not clear whether the form of extinguishment Finn J 
contemplates is substantively different from abrogation, given the cases cited refer to abrogation rather 
than extinguishment. 
58 In particular, A-G v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd (‘De Keysers Case’) [1920] AC 508. Cited in the Blue Mud 
Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). Also cited in argument, 
Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722, [4285] [5190-
5] [5270-5], [6050-5] (Gummow J]. In particular, Gummow J at [4285] ‘[y]es, there may be a De Keyser’s 
Case lurking in the back here mainly insofar as their prerogative is the source of all of this fishing doctrine 
[my emphasis]’. 
59 For a relatively recent review of English case law, see generally Richard Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public 




B. Research Approach and Scope 
1. The Use of History  
a) Doctrinal Analysis and History 
The methodological approach of this thesis is doctrinal in nature. Legal history in a 
traditional sense60 is used to review the sources of the right in English law,61 then its 
reception into,62 and further development in, Australian law. The validity of this approach 
rests on the foundational assumption that the public right to fish draws content and 
legitimacy from judicial precedents outlining a set of rules creating and evidencing an 
underlying common law doctrine.63 It is acknowledged that the common law is not solely 
determined by the past but has an inherent generative nature. Legal history, however, is 
regularly the subject of judicial commentary and analysis.64 In the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, legal history should be regarded as an influence on judicial reasoning. In 
Chapter 5, the Blue Mud Bay Case65 is discussed in detail and it is concluded that the 
reasoning of the plurality in that case66 appears to be have been influenced by the specific 
history and facts of the underlying dispute.67  
In this thesis, legal history is used to shed light on the right, but not to seek to rewrite 
or judge the past. It is acknowledged that any analysis into the sources of the public right 
                                                 
 
60 Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press New Haven, 1921) 52, 
‘[s]ome conceptions of the law owe their existence almost exclusively to history. They are not to be 
understood except as historical growths’.  
61 It is English law that was received. Scottish law is different in a number of aspects including access to 
the marine domain by the public for recreational purposes. See discussion in R v East Sussex County 
Council [2015] UKSC 7, [117-8] (Neuberger and Hodge LL).  
62 Reception is not automatic. See generally on reception Bruce McPherson, The Reception of English Law 
Abroad (The Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2007). See also, Baldick v Jackson (1910) 30 NZLR 343. 
This New Zealand Supreme Court case found that the English Crown’s right to whales had not been 
received into colonial (New Zealand) law. 
63 Bradley Selway, ‘Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia’ (2001) 
20 University of Tasmania Law Review 129, 132; Enid Campbell, ‘Lawyers’ Use of History’ (1968) 6 
University of Queensland Law Review 1, 1; JJ Spigelman, ‘Economic Rationalism and the Law’ (2001) 24 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 200, 205; Michael Coper, ‘Legal Knowledge, the Responsibility 
of Lawyers, and the Task of Law Schools’ (2007) 39 University of Toledo Law Review 253, 253. 
64 See, A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153; Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
65 (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
66 Ibid, the plurality consisting of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 
67 For example, the special history of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) 
legislation is summarised by Selway J in Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457. See also 




to fish will face inherent limitations when attempting to establish certainty regarding the 
distant past.68 Insights from broader historical sources are used to supplement strictly 
‘legal’ sources. These supplementary sources help guard against anachronistic 
interpretations of old legal texts. As early as 1795, Dalrymple warned that, ‘[i]n inventing 
other causes we only deceive ourselves by carrying the refined ideas of our own ages into 
ages too simple to be capable of forming them’.69 For example, in Chapter 2 
archaeological evidence on English fisheries and academic opinion on the economic and 
political context of the time are used to assess the relative strength of competing accounts 
of the origin(s) of the public right. The greatest weight has been accorded to accounts of 
the source of the public right to fish that are based both in surviving legal texts and are 
consistent with other broader sources.70  
A further benefit of taking a broad approach to legal history is that it reduces the 
inherent bias in the field whereby the authority of a surviving text of a ‘legal’ nature can 
easily be overemphasised or where it can induce unduly strong conclusions. These texts 
may have survived by chance, or through past decisions on what was considered relevant 
for preservation.71 The limited nature of surviving legal archives is especially a concern 
in assessing the state of English rights to fish prior to 1200.72 Where documentary 
evidence is fragmentary, conclusions drawn from documents that have survived need to 
be weighed carefully in the context of the possible loss by chance of other (potentially 
contradictory) documents. For example, conclusions on the ‘original’ intent of Chapter 
16 of the 1225 version of the Magna Carta have been influenced by the views of Moore 
and Moore in their The History and Law of Fisheries.73 Moore and Moore base their 
characterisation of the original intent of the Magna Carta on the wording of a small 
                                                 
 
68 Douzinas usefully classifies these limitations as fourfold: forgetfulness of memory (in other words, only 
some documents survive); impurity of the archive; selection of facts by the reviewer; and the ideological 
nature of any narrative. Costas Douzinas, ‘Thesis on Law, History and Time’ (2006) 7 Melbourne 
International Law Journal 13, 25. 
69 John Dalrymple, An Essay Towards a General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain (Miller, First 
Published 1757, 1758 ed). 
70 For example, James H Barrett, M Locker Alison and Callum M Roberts, ‘The Origins of Intensive Marine 
Fishing in Medieval Europe: The English Evidence’ (2004) 271(1556) (Dec. 7, 2004) Proceedings: Biological 
Sciences 2417. 
71 See above Douzinas, above n 68. 
72 S F C Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridge University Press, 1976) 1, ‘History 
is difficult because people never state their assumptions or describe the framework in which their lives 
are lead’. 
73 Stuart Archibald Moore and Stuart H Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens and Haynes, 




selection of writs issued well after 1225.74 Additional sources cited in Chapter 2 cast 
significant doubt on their conclusions. 
The broad approach to legal history applied in this thesis can be distinguished from 
a narrow ‘legal’ approach to history. A narrow legal approach — as might be applied by 
an advocate — has a focus on a particular dispute or set of facts75 and on the ‘controlling 
past … [for] instruction on what ought to be done here and now’.76 A broad legal 
historical approach, however, is more restricted in scope than a historical approach.77 
Common law ‘history’ is not a ‘fact’ that is proved in evidence before a court, but forms 
part of the legal reasoning of the court.78 Legal history is typically used for the narrow 
purpose of assessing the development of the law and to critique judicial reasoning and 
current law. By way of an example drawn from this thesis, the purpose of the Chapter 5 
review of the Blue Mud Bay Case79 is not to prove or disprove the historical ‘facts’ cited 
by the court. It is instead a legal critique of the reasoning involved, including an analysis 
of the quality of the historical texts cited and whether they support the conclusions 
reached.80 Based on this analysis, it is argued that there is a weak basis for the conclusions 
reached by the plurality in that case, including an implicit classification of the right as a 
form of prerogative.81 
                                                 
 
74 Ibid 16-18. 
75 Too narrow an approach can also lead to a ‘teleological bias towards the history of a common law 
doctrine, narrowly focusing on only those aspects of the history that are relevant to a current question 
and interpreting the full history of the common law doctrine within that perspective. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 3, some aspects of the reasoning in 1800s cases such as Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155 
arguably suffer from this defect.  
76 Campbell, above n 63, 1. 
77Ibid. Campbell describes a historian’s approach as a comprehensive investigation as to ‘how and why 
things happened as they did’. 
78 Selway, ‘Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia’, above n 63, 
146-147. Selway’s article was cited in Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195, 223 
(Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
79 (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
80 See Helen Irving, ‘Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of History’ (2013) 41 
Federal Law Review 95. At 122, ‘[i]t [legal reasoning] does not have to be the last word in historical 
interpretation but it needs to be historically authentic’. 




b) Legal History and Origin Stories  
This thesis rejects attempts to frame the legal history of the right based on an 
assumed, if now historically obscure, single foundation for the right, what I refer to as an 
‘origin story’.82 A legal origin story suggests that there is a single and specific origin of 
the right, even if the knowledge of the origin has been corrupted or lost over time. This 
specific origin is assumed to influence the legal character of the right into the future.83 
Origin stories for the right include whether it derived from a Crown grant with a close 
association to the prerogative84 or whether it is a public right based on a broader parens 
patriae responsibility of the state to the public.85  
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that some of the conflicts over the origin of the right 
can be substantially reconciled if it is accepted that the right has developed piecemeal86 
from multiple sources. It is further concluded that it is likely that elements of the right 
came together as a bundle of public rights later referred to by the general term the ‘public 
right to fish’ sometime between 1400 and 1600.87 A further conclusion drawn from the 
review of the history of the right in Chapter 2 is that different elements of the right may 
have had different sources, which account for their different legal attributes. For reasons 
given in Chapters 2 and 3, it is the assumption of a single and simple unitary origin for 
the right that obscures its historical emergence, generates unnecessary uncertainty over 
its legal attributes and makes its contemporary application problematic. 
2. The Natural-Resource Management Perspective 
a) Objectives of Fisheries Management and Law 
The natural-resource management perspective applied in this thesis 88 proceeds from 
the axiom that there is a public interest in maximising the benefits gained from the use of 
                                                 
 
82 An origin story can be identified in the repetition of the claim that the English common law public right 
to fish descends in a lineal fashion from Roman Law — in particular the Institutes of Justinian. As an 
example, see Haskell, above n 31. 
83 See, e.g., Tim Bonyhady, (1987). The Law of the Countryside (Professional Books Limited, 1987); A-G for 
British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153; Moore and Moore, above n 73. 
84 As suggested by Moore and Moore, above n 73  
85 A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153. 
86 Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in British Waters’ above n 59, 450 ‘as a common law 
institution, the public right to fish developed piecemeal’. 
87 Just as in more recent times the ‘public trust’ in the United States of America has emerged bundling up 
the public right to fish with other public rights. See below, Chapter 1 E 4. 
88 Mark Sproule-Jones, ‘Public Choice Theory and Natural Resources: Methodological Explication and 




limited, but renewable, natural resources. It is a long-recognised defect89 of the English 
common law public right to fish that the right is not self-limiting, even where open access 
under the right would have the effect of exhausting the available resources.90 Intervention 
by the state is justified to restrict the activities of individual fishers, which together would 
otherwise lead to unsustainable outcomes. There is an overriding interest of the state91 in 
relation to regulating the use of marine resources, even where it may impact on other 
rights.92 This concern is reflected in the aims and objectives of contemporary fisheries 
legislation.93 Gullet notes that ‘[t]he core aim of fisheries law is to strike an appropriate 
balance between exploiting and conserving fish’.94 
Since 1988, new fisheries regulatory schemes have been applied in each of the 
Australian marine jurisdictions.95 They have attempted to strike a balance between 
protection and exploitation.96 Contemporary marine resource management policies 
proceed from the assumption that unowned resources with open and unregulated access 
are especially susceptible to overuse and degradation. The potential for overuse and 
degradation of unowned resources was described by Hardin in 1968 in the ‘Tragedy of 
the Commons’.97 Furthermore, a lack of private rights leads to overinvestment and 
                                                 
 
89 The English courts recognised as early as 1882 that the public’s right to fish could lead to the 
‘destruction’ of a fishery. Goodman v Mayor of Saltash (1882) 7 AC 633, 646 (Selbourne LC).  
90 Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314, 330 (Brennan J). See also comments as to problems of sustainability and 
the right in Adair v National Trust [1997] Times Law Reports (19 December 1997). 
91 The Australian states were early adopters of fishing regulation, such as the setting of legal minimum 
sizes. See, Daryl McPhee, Fisheries Management in Australia (Federation Press, 2008), 93. 
92 Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 593 (Kirby J). 
93 See, e.g., Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s (1) a, c ; Fisheries Resources Management Act 1994 
(WA) s (3) ss (2) e. 
94 Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 1. 
95 All the States of Australia, the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory.  
96 Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 1-2, 111-138. 
97 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. By using the analogy of villagers 
grazing their cattle on a village common, Hardin posited that the resources of a common would inevitably 
be degraded by overuse. Even if an individual sacrifices his or her use of the common for its preservation, 
other villagers will not do so. The result is the eventual degradation of the common, despite it being in 
the interests of that community to preserve. Hardin expressly includes fisheries in his classification of the 
commons. Although Hardin’s primary example is that of cattle grazing on a communal green, traditional 
English commons were in fact closely and carefully managed and were not a ‘free-for-all’. See Edward 




inefficient use of economic resources.98 However, common pool resources99 can be 
protected by changing the dynamics of human interactions, including the creation by the 
state of private rights to resources.100 In Harper,101 the term tragedy of the commons was 
not used by Justice Brennan, but he did note the need for intervention ‘to control the 
exploitation of a finite resource to preserve its existence’ through ‘the grant of 
licences’.102 The essential features of the natural-resource management perspective were 
referred to by Chief Justice Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron in their concurring 
judgement stating that: 
The licensing system which the Fisheries Act 1959 (Tas.) and the Sea Fisheries 
Regulations 1962 (Tas.) establish in relation to abalone fisheries in Tasmanian waters is 
not a mere device for tax collecting. Its basis lies in environmental and conservational 
considerations, which require that exploitation, particularly commercial exploitation, of 
limited public natural resources be carefully monitored and legislatively curtailed if their 
existence is to be preserved.103 
To achieve an appropriate balance of environmental and economic objectives in 
fisheries management, contemporary approaches have drawn on the field of economics104 
                                                 
 
98 See H. Scott Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource’ (1954) 62(2) Journal of 
Policy and Economics 124; Anthony Scott ‘The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership’ (1955) 63(2) The 
Journal of Political Economy 116. 
99 On the use of the term ‘common pool resources’ see Quentin R Grafton et al, Economics for Fisheries 
Management (Ashgate Publishing, 2006). There are two forms of common resources, a ‘common pool 
resource’ and a ‘common property resource’. At 143 Grafton defines a ‘common pool resource’ as ‘[a] 
resource such as a fishery where use is rivalrous (one person’s use harms other users) and the ability to 
exclude users is difficult’. It is distinguished [but not always clearly in other literature] from a ‘common 
property’ resource, which is ‘a resource over which a community or group of individuals have access to 
and to some extent are able to exclude persons from outside of the group’. The key difference is that 
some degree of ability to exclude others converts a true common pool resource into a weak form of 
property right. 
100 For comment and criticism as to the validity of Hardin’s metaphor in relation to fisheries management 
see David Feeny, Susan Hanna and Arthur F McEvoy, ‘Questioning the Assumptions of the “Tragedy of the 
Commons Model” of Fisheries’ (1996) 72(2) Land Economics 187. 
101 (1989)168 CLR 314. 
102 Ibid, 332 (Brennan J). 
103 Ibid, 325 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
104 The objectives of fisheries legislation may in some cases explicitly include a reference to economic 




(including on property rights),105 as well as incorporating perspectives from scholarship 
in disciplines such as ecology and the historical development of fisheries.106 A seminal 
document in the development of new approaches to fisheries policy in Australia is the 
New Directions White Paper of 1990.107 This paper outlined Commonwealth policy on 
the management principles appropriate for Australian fisheries and subsequently guided 
the incorporation of those principles into Commonwealth legislation. Although not a term 
used in that paper, the practice of allocating fishers more secure and predictable rights108 
has since been termed the ‘rights-based’ management of fisheries in Australia.109 There 
                                                 
 
105 See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, ‘The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interactions’ 
(2002) 26 Harvard Environmental Law Review 281; Lloyd R. Cohen, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: An 
Economic Perspective’ (1992) 29 California Western Law Review 239; Harold Demsetz, ‘The Exchange and 
Enforcement of Property Rights’ (1964) Journal of Law and Economics 11; Harold Demsetz, ‘Towards a 
Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347; Curtis H Freese, Wild Species as 
Commodities (Island Press, 1998); Eirik G Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, ‘Property Rights and Economic 
Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature’ (1972) 10(4) Journal of Economic Literature 1137; Donald R Leal 
(ed), Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005); Gerard J 
Mangone, ‘Private Property Rights: The Development of Takings in the United States’ (2002) 17(2) The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 195; Anthony Scott, ‘Property Rights and Property 
Wrongs’ (1983) 16(4) The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique 555; Anthony 
Scott, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008); Amy Sinden, ‘The 
Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution’ (2007) 78 University of Colorado 
Law Review 533; Bruce Yandle and Andrew P Morriss, ‘The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice among 
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons’ (2002) 28 Ecology Law Quarterly 123. 
106 See, e.g., James M Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine (University Press of New England, 1988); 
James M Acheson, Capturing the Commons (University Press of New England, 2003); Susan S Buck, The 
Global Commons (Island Press, 1998); Bonnie J McCay, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law 
and Ecology in New Jersey History (University of Arizona Press, 1998); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
107 Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 1990s, 
above n 43. In the foreword to this White Paper, Minister John Kerin states at iii, ‘This policy statement 
represents a blueprint for the future management of those fisheries which are under the control of the 
Commonwealth.’ The influence of this policy on the Fisheries Management Act (Cth) 1991 is reviewed in 
Chapter 6 C 1 (a). 
108 Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 1990s, 
above n 43. At x. ‘The Government will formally recognise the ongoing nature of rights in existing 
developed fisheries … existing rights in established fisheries will not be re-allocated through auctions or 
competitive bidding’. 
109 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (ed), ‘FAO Technical Paper 404/2 Use of 
Property Rights in Fisheries Management’, FishRights99 (FAO 1999). The term ‘rights-based’ was also used 




is a vigorous debate within the fisheries economics field about questions of the efficiency, 
efficacy and equity of various tools of management, especially over the allocation of 
rights in fisheries.110 Debate about the details and equity of different approaches should 
not, however, obscure the extent of a broad consensus on the need for state intervention 
and the utility of statutory intervention to create or regulate fishing rights.111 
3. Rights, Uncertainty and Utility 
As noted above, the natural-resource management approach applied in contemporary 
fisheries management assesses the utility of the public right to fish based on its 
effectiveness, amongst other objectives, for enabling sustainability and promoting 
economic efficiency. From this perspective, a high degree of certainty for rights to fish 
are desirable. Since the late 1980s the Commonwealth Government has promoted long-
term rights and has created more secure fishing rights under Commonwealth 
legislation.112 Research commissioned by Australia’s Fisheries Research and 
Development Corporation113 has highlighted that certainty in rights can maximise 
community benefits from fisheries. That research canvassed expert opinion on how to 
achieve the best possible outcomes from fisheries management. There was consensus 
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111 See for example, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, ‘FAO Technical Paper 
404/2’, above n 109; Quentin R Grafton et al, ‘Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries’ (2006) 
63 Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 699; Nicolas Gutierrez, Ray Hilborn, Omar Defeo, 
‘Leadership, Social Capital and Incentives Promote Successful Fisheries’ (2011) 470 (7334) Nature 386; 
Jonathan H Adler and Nathaniel Stewart, ‘Learning How to Fish: Catch Shares and the Future of Fishery 
Conservation ‘ (2013) 31 University of California, Los Angeles Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 150. 
112 See Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 222. This security does not extend to compensation 
rights for cancellation, see Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s22 (3). Sections 31A-31F of that Act do, 
however, provide for priority for rights holder if a replacement management plan is introduced.  
113 Ridge Partners and Deborah Wilson Consulting, ‘Evaluating Australia’s Marine Capture Fisheries: Final 
Report to the FRDC’s Resource Working Group’ (2009). For a Canadian perspective, including similar 
observations as to the importance of clear rights, see Peter Pearse and Donald M McRae, Treaties and 
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amongst 70 experts that achieving clearer rights should be the second highest priority for 
Australian fisheries management.114  
Certainty does not require a public right to fish. It can also be provided by 
comprehensive statutory management schemes implementing rights-based schemes. In 
2009, the New Zealand Supreme Court, when reviewing common law rights to fish, 
emphasised the comprehensiveness of the replacement statutory scheme in that 
jurisdiction, stating that: 
It is unnecessary to consider the existence, nature or scope of such a common law right 
[the public right to fish] as, in relation to the quota management system, it is clear that the 
Act covers the entire ground that would be occupied by such rights. In this respect the 
legislation accordingly governs all aspects of rights of the various fishing sector interests 
to the exclusion of the common law.115 
The review of Australian fisheries regimes in Chapter 6 concludes that in most 
Australian jurisdictions, replacement schemes are not comprehensive and that they 
assume the existence of an underlying public right to fish. A key complication that arises 
from the Blue Mud Bay Case116 is that the plurality held that ‘by necessary implication’117 
the public right to fish across the Northern Territory had been abrogated,118 but that the 
statutory scheme that replaced the ‘abrogated’ public right was limited in nature.119 
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115 New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council v Sanford Limited [2009] NZSC 54, 64 (Blanchard, Tipping, 
McGrath and Wilson JJ). 
116 (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
117 (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
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all fishing rights. 
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Accordingly, a potential lacuna in the law was created whereby neither a comprehensive 
statutory scheme nor the common law applied. The implications of that decision to other 
jurisdictions is uncertain given the special circumstances of the case and the lack of 
apparent support for the reasoning of the majority in later cases.120 Nonetheless, the 
judgment has not been overruled and it contributes to uncertainty in relation to the 
interpretation of fisheries legislation.  
Uncertainty undermines the objectives of rights-based fisheries management regimes 
in a number of ways. Uncertainty reduces the incentive for those involved in fisheries 
management to align their actions with the community interest. In their meta-analysis of 
the effects of rights-based management schemes, Costello et al noted the importance of 
replacing the incentives of fishers to engage in a ‘race to fish’ with ‘stewardship 
incentives’.121 Where rights are uncertain, an individual fisher’s actions to preserve the 
resource runs the risk that any benefits will be lost to that individual and will instead be 
appropriated by other parties. Uncertainty over rights can also provoke non-cooperative 
political behaviour when competing for fishing rights.122 Certainty of rights increases 
stewardship incentives, as fishers can expect to participate in the future benefits that arise 
from their investment in good management. 
Uncertainty also undermines economic efficiency by making economically 
advantageous transactions costlier. In relation to transaction costs, Ronald Coase in his 
1960 article ‘The Problem of Social Cost’123, argued that economically efficient uses can 
be achieved by market mechanisms where there is an allocation of rights.124 Social 
costs125 can be minimised without requiring direct regulation by the state. Coase pointed 
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121 Costello, Gaines and Lynham, above n 109, 1269. 
122 Such as political lobbying, see John Toohey et al, ‘Report to the Minister for Fisheries by the Integrated 
Fisheries Management Review Committee: Fisheries Management Paper 165.’ (Fisheries Department of 
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out that, regardless of the initial allocation of rights, transactions amongst the parties as 
to those rights can still lead to an economically efficient (but not necessarily just) 
outcome. A key precondition for an efficient outcome is low costs for parties contracting 
with each other (known later as ‘transaction costs’126). If transaction costs are too high, 
an economically efficient and advantageous transfers of rights will not occur. From this 
viewpoint, a clear allocation of rights reduces transaction costs and supports efficiency 
gains in resource use.127  
C. Overlapping Rights in the Marine Domain 
The discussion above focuses on competing rights to fish and access to fish, rather 
than the interaction of fishing rights with other interests in the marine domain. In the latter 
part of this thesis, discussion extends to the utility of the public right as a general guide 
to the interpretation of legislation in the marine domain. In the marine domain, rights of 
access to and use of the marine domain under the public right128 provide a common base 
from which an assessment can be made of the impact of competing legislative schemes 
over marine domain. As Gullett notes ‘[t]he management of Australia’s fisheries takes 
place in the broader context of public aquatic spaces in which numerous other activities 
also take place’.129 In 2016, the Productivity Commission found that ‘[t]here are 
justifiable concerns about the adverse impacts on fishing of coastal developments, marine 
infrastructure and the declaration of marine park areas.’130 In Australia’s marine domain, 
overlapping statutory schemes for fisheries management lead to increased risks and 
costs,131 even before one takes into account overlapping non-fishing legislative schemes, 
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such as for petroleum exploration.132 One of Australia’s most senior public servants, in a 
recent review, stated that marine jurisdictional arrangements were ‘the most flaky’133 he 
had encountered in his experience and, furthermore, that jurisdictional issues over fishing 
were ‘absurd’.134 
D. Scope of this Thesis  
1. Other Public Rights  
The common law doctrine of the public right to fish in Australia is classified as a 
public right distinct from other public rights. Different public rights have different origins 
and even different legal remedies.135 Their main point of similarity, as common law 
rights, is that they are not of a proprietary character. Their common identity is of 
relevance, albeit limited, when public rights are discussed as a class, for example in 
relation to rules of statutory interpretation.  
In the United States of America, public rights to fish and to navigate and doctrines 
as to the capture and ownership of wild animals have been grouped together within a 
‘public trust’ doctrine.136 The public trust, and particularly the approach favoured by Sax 
in a 1970 article,137 has given rise to considerable legal controversy in the United States. 
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In 2007, James Huffman estimated that more than 1700 academic articles had been 
written on the public trust.138 In Australia, the public trust has received scant judicial 
support as a legal doctrine,139 although there has been academic comment of a speculative 
nature on the possible existence of a public trust.140 In Australia, the public right to fish 
and the right to navigate are separate legal doctrines.141 The public right to fish can be 
discussed concurrently with rights — such as the public right to navigate — without the 
assertion of a common underlying doctrine, such as a public trust.142 Given the above, the 
public trust doctrine in American law is principally relevant in providing a contrast to the 
development of Australian law.143 
2.  Indigenous Rights and the Public Right to Fish 
As noted above, a key influence on the right in more recent Australian cases has been 
the recognition of Indigenous rights to fish in Australia. Chapter 5 examines the 
interaction between Indigenous rights, common law rights and fisheries legislation. 
Questions relating to Indigenous rights have been central to bringing the public right to 
fish into legal prominence in recent years. In Commonwealth v Yarmirr the High Court 
found that native title rights were inconsistent with the public rights to fish, navigate and 
to international obligations for innocent passage.144 The result is that Indigenous rights to 
exclusive access to, and use of, the marine domain are not recognised by Australian law.145 
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It is acknowledged that the impact on Indigenous rights of this restriction is significant, 
but this thesis is focused on the different question, that being the impact of Indigenous 
rights on the public right to fish. There is already a wealth of existing literature on 
Indigenous rights to fish, the degree to which these rights have been impacted by 
Australian law, the extent to which they have been recognised and the degree to which 
Indigenous rights may provide benefits to Indigenous Australians.146 
It is acknowledged that comparisons have been made between public rights 
recognised by the common law and Indigenous rights.147 This is not surprising, since the 
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test of whether legislation has extinguished Indigenous rights is expressed in similar terms 
to the test of whether the public right has been abrogated by necessary implication.148 
Given the similarity in language between extinguishment and abrogation, comparisons 
have inevitably been drawn between common law public rights and native title rights 
recognised by the common law.149 Australian courts have, however, warned against 
making too much of analogies between common law public rights and native title 
rights.150 Although native title rights are recognised by the common law, they are not 
necessarily analogous to common law rights. Rights in Indigenous fisheries are closer in 
kind to private common law rights such as a ‘common of fishery’.151 There are additional 
distinguishing features. Firstly, Indigenous rights in Australia are now generally 
supported by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the ‘NTA’) and cannot be now considered 
purely common law rights.152 Secondly, Australian courts have expressed the effect of 
legislation on the public right as being one of abrogation, whereas the question for 
Indigenous rights is whether legislation has extinguished those rights.153 
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Since the decisions of the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth154 and Karpany v 
Dietman155 it is apparent that a statutory scheme must be exceptionally clear in intent to 
extinguish Indigenous rights by necessary implication. The closest analogy is to the 
degree of clarity required for the extinguishment of proprietary rights by implication,156 
not the abrogation of public rights. Chief Justice French and Justice Crennan in Akiba v 
Commonwealth specifically rejected an analogy between the effect of abrogation by 
regulation of the public right to fish and extinguishment by regulation of Indigenous rights 
to fish.157 
E.  Existing Literature on the Public Right to Fish 
1.  Key Sources on the History of the Right 
The primary reason for undertaking the extensive review of legal sources of the right 
to fish is to inform discussion of the public right to fish as it has evolved in Australia. Due 
to the influence of their views,158 this thesis includes an analysis of Stuart Moore’s 1888 
book A History of the Foreshore159 as well as the later History and Law of Fisheries160 
with Hubert Stuart Moore (also known as H Stuart Moore), published in 1903. Stuart 
Moore’s A History of the Foreshore,161 with its detailed consideration of the English 
history of the ownership of the foreshore, was a key source for Glenn MacGrady’s 
frequently cited 1975 article on the historical development of public rights to 
navigation.162 A History of the Foreshore was cited in Attorney General of Canada v 
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‘Extinguishment of Native Title: Recent High Court Decisions’ (2016) 8(22) Indigenous Law Bulletin 28. 
157 Akiba v Commonwealth (2013), 232 (French CJ and Crennan J). 
158 See below, n 364 and accompanying text. 
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Attorney General of British Columbia.163 However, in that case the arguments advanced 
in A History of the Foreshore did not find favour with the court.164 Hubert Stuart Moore 
was also the editor of the fifth edition of Coulson and Forbes on The Law of Waters165 
and subeditor of the relevant section on fisheries in the first edition of Halsbury’s Laws 
of England. A key passage from the latter source was quoted in the Blue Mud Bay Case.166 
In Chapter 2, Moore and Moore’s views on the origin of the right can be criticised 
both on the basis of bias167 and on methodological grounds. Nonetheless, Moore and 
Moore appear to be a reliable source for relevant materials such as old manuscripts, 
charters, case reports and borough rolls. Material has been republished as part of their 
work that might otherwise have been lost to all but the most diligent of researchers.168 
Their research provides an invaluable source169 for the legal history of fishing and the 
foreshore. Their conclusions on the origin of the public right are, however, suspect given 
their particular biases.170  
Other authors of relevance to the historical analysis of sources of the right in this 
thesis are Percy Fenn on the development of fisheries in territorial waters and rivers in 
feudal Europe171 and Thomas Fulton on the evolving claims of the Crown of England 
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over the sea from the 1100s to the modern era.172 Other sources include analyses of the 
Magna Carta173 and commentary on the state of English society and law around the time 
of its creation.174  
2. Australian Commentary 
Australian cases with the public right as a central topic are scarce. This is 
unsurprising given the right received little Australian judicial attention until Harper.175 
In 2005 in Gumana v Northern Territory,176 Justice Selway went so far as to claim the 
right had been ‘resuscitated’ by Harper177 and Commonwealth v Yarmirr.178 Gullett 
attributes this lack of judicial attention to two factors.179 Firstly, there are few land grants 
to the low water mark in Australia, so disputes relating to public rights to fish over private 
property do not generally arise. Secondly, the impact of extensive fishery regulation has 
meant the potential area of operation of the right has diminished. Extensive regulation of 
the right is addressed in Chapter 6. 
This thesis adds to existing Australian literature through a description of, and 
discussion about, the Australian public right to fish to a greater extent than an article or 
book section, such as by Gullett,180 Bonyhady181 and Bernard Walrut,182 allows. With its 
focus on the public right, it is not practical to extend this thesis to fully cover other topics 
such as: Australian fisheries law, Indigenous law, the ownership of wild fish at common 
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law and the reception of English law into Australian law. There are already 
comprehensive monographs on these subjects from an Australian perspective, being 
Gullett on Australian fisheries law (including Australian constitutional and jurisdictional 
arrangements governing fishing),183 McPherson on reception184 and Bartlett on native 
title.185 Gullett and Walrut each provide reviews of common law rules on the capture and 
ownership of fish. 186 Recourse has been made to all of these for this thesis. 
Gullet’s text Fisheries Law in Australia187 is an authoritative source on Australian 
fisheries law and is used widely in this thesis to provide the general legal context to 
arguments about the public right. Gullet’s text, however, predates the decision of the High 
Court in the Blue Mud Bay Case,188 although Gullett does consider the decision by Justice 
Selway at the first instance.189 Gullett190 and Walrut191 follow a broadly similar 
methodological approach when describing the right. For example, they assess legal 
historical sources; draw on English cases from the 1800s such as Malcomson v O’Dea192; 
refer to Attorney General of Canada v Attorney General of British Columbia;193 and refer 
to the canonical statement of the elements of the right in Harper.194 Walrut provides a 
more extensive treatment of older English cases.195 Gullett in his text provides a broader 
discussion of the interaction between the right and other rights and legislative regimes196 
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and comes to the conclusion that there is a general public interest in the law being clarified 
in this area.197 
In 1987, Bonyhady198 provided an extensive review of the law in England relating to 
fish in the context of rights to hunt and fish. Bonyhady highlighted ongoing uncertainty 
as to the origin of the public right in tidal waters, but concluded on balance that the public 
right to fish is derived from the Crown, based on the line of authority arising from Hale’s 
views in De Juris Maris.199 This is one of the sources of the right discussed in this thesis, 
although for the reasons given in Chapter 2 and 3, it is likely the source with the weakest 
support from legal history. Nonetheless, this account forms part of the public right to fish 
and is discussed in Chapter 2 as part of the Crown Ownership account of the origin of the 
right. 
3. Contemporary English Sources 
Modern English cases, while confirming the existence of the public right, tend to see 
it as a common law relic.200 In a recent English Supreme Court Case, it was noted that 
‘[t]he state of law relating to public rights over the foreshore of England and Wales is 
more controversial than one may have expected’. 201 In 2011, Barnes carried out a broad 
review of the English common law right.202 Barnes noted the importance of the public 
right as part of the common law underpinning fisheries legislation. He recognised the 
relevance of exploring the development of the common law right but also that his review 
was ‘one strand of legal development and indicates the complexity that forms part of the 
legal context’.203 
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As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the interest of the Crown in England and its 
relationship to public rights to fish in England have varied over time. At different times, 
the right has been classified as: a restriction on the interest of the Crown, as evidence for 
the rights of the Crown to the ownership of the marine domain and as connected in an 
undefined way with the rights of the Crown. The current English position appears to be 
that the Crown owns the marine domain, its rights deriving from the prerogative of the 
Crown. In reviewing the law on this point in 2001, the Scottish Law Reform 
Commission204 concluded that:  
The predominant modern theory is that the Crown has a proprietary right in the seabed 
solum of the seabed and foreshore. While this derives from the prerogative, it amounts to 
full ownership of the property … while the Crown has full ownership, it is recognised that 
its proprietary rights cannot be exercised in a way which would prejudice the interests of 
the public in the sea (including the seabed) and the foreshore.205  
There are significant differences in the context for the public right to fish under 
Australian law as compared to English law. The ownership interest of the Crown in 
England is of a special kind and vested in a specialist agency, the Crown Estate. This 
body estimates that it owns over half of the shores of the United Kingdom.206 Exercise of 
the prerogative to claim the marine domain did not occur in Australia or its former 
constituent colonies prior to responsible government.207 The rights of the Crown in 
Australia to the marine domain beyond the low water mark depend on legislative sources 
of authority.208 Notwithstanding these significant differences of legal context, however, 
the reasoning of the Australian Courts still tends to assume a presumption of continuity 
with the common law of England.209 This presumption of continuity has meant that 
divergences in Australian law from English law210 have not occurred because of 
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differences arising out of Australia’s history as a settled colony, but due to more recent 
influences, including the recognition of Indigenous interests and the adoption of new 
forms of fisheries legislation and management.  
By way of contrast, there is no equivalent in the United Kingdom of Indigenous title 
nor has the adoption of new schemes of management had the same impact. The prospect 
of an analogous right to Indigenous rights emerging in the United Kingdom seems highly 
unlikely. In the case of the Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown Estate 
Commissioners,211 the United Kingdom’s High Court expressly rejected a claim by 
Shetland islanders to rights against the Crown to the land underlying the intertidal zone 
(and beyond) based on traditional or ‘udal’ law peculiar to the Shetland Islands. In relation 
to the interaction of the public right and fisheries management schemes, Barnes 
questioned whether in English law ‘regulations that effectively reduced fishing to 
exclusive private property would be permitted, and if so under what circumstances it 
would be deemed to be either politically or legally permissible’.212 For Australia, Harper 
clearly established that such regulation is indeed permissible.213  
4. The Public Trust  
As noted earlier, in the United States the public right to fish has become an element 
of a broader public legal doctrine, that of the public trust. The divergence between 
American law and English law214 (and later Australian law) can be dated back to 
American cases in the first half of the 1800s on the ownership of tidelands215, which 
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became a key support for the public trust doctrine.216 The public trust doctrine in America 
provides that ‘tideland and lands below navigable waters are owned by the state in a 
special capacity – in the public trust’.217 At its minimum, the nature of the trust requires 
clear language, and an expression of intent is required in legislation for the state to 
alienate ‘trust’ lands and waters (and even then, with difficulty).218 Goble provides a 
useful summary of the American law.219 This has been an active area of American law. 
220  
American law and Australian law appear to have a superficial degree of similarity in 
that clear legislative intent is required for the public right to fish to be abrogated. The 
public trust doctrine as proposed by Sax 221 supports judicial intervention to protect the 
right and extends the purpose of the right to cover environmental protection.222 In a 1970 
paper published shortly after Sax’s paper, William Drayton concluded that ‘[t]he common 
law of the foreshore seems to be entering a major period of reformulation’ based on 
increasing demand and fixed supply for the resources relating to tidal areas.223 Viewed 
narrowly, Sax’s view of the public trust was that there is a strong judicial presumption 
against the validity of administrative action that might substantially reduce the enjoyment 
of the ‘public trust’. Viewed more expansively, the public trust becomes a difficult-to-
surmount restriction on the legislative competence of a state. This expansive approach to 
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judicial intervention is difficult to fully reconcile with representative democracy,224 and 
would not appear to be consistent with contemporary Australian approaches to 
interpretation.225 Hope Babcock — writing in support of approaches based on Sax’s 1970 
article — stated that ‘the truth may itself be contested and often is sacrificed to achieve 
another purpose’.226 
Given the differences noted above, the law in the United States may be useful for 
providing a contrast with developments in Australia,227 but is not of general relevance to 
the public right to fish. 
5. General Relevance 
The above sections have provided a broad overview of the key legal themes of this 
thesis and the approach it takes. This thesis focuses on legal history and contemporary 
legal issues. It is, however, acknowledged that the right has significance as a ‘right’ in a 
general social, as well as in a strictly legal, sense.228 The public right to fish forms part of 
a broader narrative as to rights generally,229 including on the interaction of the public right 
and Indigenous rights.230 Although not a prime objective of this thesis, the account of the 
development of the public right to fish provides an alternative view on the history of the 
public right to fish.231 
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The public right to fish is of particular relevance to recreational fishers, who fish for 
purposes other than to engage in the market economy.232 As the analysis in Chapter 6 
demonstrates, the public right remains the basis for recreational access to and use of the 
marine domain, albeit in a highly regulated form.233 Recreational fishing is a major social 
activity for Australians, with more than three million people fishing recreationally each 
year. Nearly a quarter of Australian households include a recreational fisher and estimated 
expenditure attributed to recreational fishing was $1.8 billion over a 12-month survey 
period (in 2000).234 In Australia, private freehold is only rarely granted down to the low 
water mark,235 with tidelands and shores usually managed by or vested in a public 
authority.236 The exception in Australia is the tidal zone of the Northern Territory, as 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
Following its success in gaining exclusive possession to tidal lands in the Northern 
Territory in the Blue Mud Bay Case,237 the Northern Land Council immediately provided 
for interim access for recreational fishers, and then entered into negotiations with the 
Northern Territory government to develop a long-term regime for public access.238 The 
council may well have heeded the risk of sparking controversy (and reaction), as occurred 
in New Zealand following the decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in 2003 in 
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Ngati Api v Attorney General.239 The possibility that Maori might be able to claim 
exclusive rights to intertidal areas lead to a legislative reaction in the form of the New 
Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (NZ), aimed at securing public access. 240 This 
legislation was later substantially reformed in the Marine and Coastal Area Act (Takutai 
Moana) 2011 (NZ). That negotiations between Indigenous interests in the Northern 
Territory and the Territory government are still ongoing 10 years later is not only 
testimony to the difficulty of achieving a negotiated outcome, but also to the strong 
interest of the parties in achieving such an outcome.241 Strong community views on public 
– 
 
F. Chapter Summaries 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduces the background, overall approach and relevance of the research, 
as well as the limitations of the methodological approach and key sources used in this 
thesis. The ongoing relevance of the right is established, as well as its limitations.  
Chapters 2 and 3: Origins of the Right 
Chapters 2 and 3 set out the basis for reconsideration of the history of the right and the 
consequences for assessment of the legal attributes of the right.  
Chapter 2 provides a fresh analysis of the right from pre-Norman times to the late 1700s. 
This chapter considers various historical accounts of, and explanations for, the public 
right to fish and critically assesses them.  This re-evaluation of the history of the doctrine 
includes a re-examination of historical, archaeological and legal scholarship on the right, 
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and in some cases on fishing more generally. Chapter 2 tracks the emergence and 
development of the right in the common law of England in the period up until the late 
1500s and early 1600s. It then chronicles the transmission and development of the right 
in the late 1500s and 1600s under the influence of early concepts (post-1600) as to the 
Crown’s jurisdiction, sovereignty and ownership. From this analysis, it appears that the 
right emerged as a bundle of common law principles around 1600, and despite post-1600 
overlays, the essential elements of the right remained largely unchanged into the early 
modern era (late 1700s).  
Chapter 3 reviews the treatment of the right in relation to common law from the late 
1700s and its reception into Australian law up to the High Court’s decision in 1989 in 
Harper.242 This brings the public right to fish up to the 1980s and early 1990s where it is 
considered in the context of cases relating to Indigenous rights. Chapter 3 will review the 
issues affecting the development of the public right to fish over this period. It will 
establish how, in English and Australian law a presumption of Crown ownership of the 
seas (as claimed in the 1600s) became progressively less relevant. Chapter 3 also reviews 
how some concepts, such as the ‘public trust’, failed to find significant support in English 
law.  
Due to the paucity of relevant Australian cases over this period, reference will be 
made to developments in other jurisdictions, principally to Canada and England, with a 
particular emphasis on the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for British 
Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.243 The influence of this case can be seen in the 
leading Australian case on formulation of the right: Harper.244 Harper245 is important not 
just for its statement of the elements of the common law right in Australia, but also as a 
key modern Australian authority on the effects of fishery legislation.246  
Chapter 3 concludes with a statement of the elements of the right in Australian law 
in Harper.247 Despite substantial differences of context in which the law operated in 
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England and Australia, at least up until 1989, the right appears to have been very similar 
in its general expression.  
Chapter 4: An Australian Formulation of the Right 
Chapter 4 reviews developments in the right between 1975 and 2008. The focus in 
this chapter is the effect on the right of the recognition of Indigenous rights to fish and 
the effects of new forms of fisheries management and legislation. In Australia, the three-
way interaction between the right, Indigenous rights and legislation has effectively 
redefined the right. It will also be argued that one of the effects has been that the common 
law on the public right in Australia and England has diverged.  
Chapter 5: Judicial Treatment of the Right from 2008  
Chapter 5 focuses on the majority judgement in the Blue Mud Bay Case.248 The 
special circumstances of that case, in which the right was found to be wholly abrogated249 
in the Northern Territory are explored. The chapter outlines why the majority may have 
resolved competing rights as they did and highlights differences between their approach 
and that of the Federal Court at the first instance250 and on appeal.251 The chapter reviews 
the interpretation by the High Court of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and critiques the 
approach of the majority, including the association of the right with prerogatives of the 
Crown.252 Based on this critique, and the treatment of that judgement in later cases,253 the 
majority judgement is not a good guide to abrogation of the right in other Australian 
marine jurisdictions, raising doubt as to what the impact of fisheries legislation might be 
in those jurisdictions.  
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Chapter 5 introduces the question of whether the right is derived from the prerogative 
of the Crown and the degree to which interpretative rules associated with Attorney 
General v De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd254 should apply. 
Chapter 6: Effects of Abrogation  
In this chapter, the conclusions drawn from Chapter 5 are applied to contemporary 
Australian fisheries legislation. Each of the statutory schemes for management of 
fisheries in the States (and Commonwealth) is examined. An assessment is made as to 
whether the right survives in those jurisdictions and if so, to what extent. Where the right 
has likely been wholly abrogated, relevant legislative schemes are reviewed to assess 
whether that loss of the right leaves gaps as to the interpretation or application of that 
legislation. It is concluded that the right continues in some, but not all, states of Australia 
and certainly continues in waters governed by the Commonwealth’s Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth). Some specific consequences of the loss of the right are 
identified. The focus of discussion in this chapter is on fisheries management and fisheries 
legislation.  
Chapters 7 and 8: Public Policy and Conclusions  
These two chapters explore approaches to the interaction between legislation and the 
public right to fish from the perspective of natural-resource management, applying the 
principles of good marine resource management (including from an economics 
perspective). A central concern for the management of resources is the impact of 
uncertainty and the principle that, as a general rule, the public good arising from the use 
of a resource is maximised under conditions of greater certainty as far as rights are 
concerned. These chapters extend the discussion of abrogation beyond its effect on 
fisheries management regimes and to other interests in the marine domain. Arising from 
this analysis, a guide to improving certainty in the interpretation of marine domain 
legislation is developed. This guide addresses uncertainty arising from the Blue Mud Bay 
Case.255  
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Chapter 8 concludes by summarising key arguments made in this thesis, as well as 
proposing a restatement of the Australian public right to fish.  
G. Conclusion 
This thesis considers the history of the right to fish in detail. The analysis highlights 
the richness, complexity and unresolved nature of legal disputes over the right. Relevant 
to the contemporary application of the Australian common law right to fish, these disputes 
include; the attitude of Australian courts to the utility of the right, the degree to which 
common law will require a clear intention in legislation to abrogate the right, the ease to 
which common law will find by necessary implication that the right has been wholly 
abrogated and the degree to which the right is derived from prerogative rights of the 
Crown (and the legal consequences of this association). Not discounting the difficulties 
these unresolved issues create, this thesis concludes that emphasis should be placed on 
the contextual factors relating to the relationship between the right and the legislative 
schemes involved. This thesis does not canvas in detail the enactment of comprehensive 
legislation governing the interaction of the rights of the public and other rights in the 
marine domain. This avenue is considered unlikely given barriers to such reform in 
Australia — including substantial and unresolved jurisdictional issues.256  
  
                                                 
 









Chapter 2: The Ancient Right 
 
A. Introduction and Relevance to this Thesis 
Chapters 2 and 3 review the legal history of the right up to 1975, including its 
reception into Australian law. The principal conclusions reached in these chapters form 
the base for later chapters, which review the status of the right and make an assessment 
of the future of the right in Australian law.  
Chapter 2 provides a novel perspective on the history of the right and helps explain 
why the origin and legal attributes of the right have been such difficult questions to 
resolve. This chapter demonstrates that distinct elements of the right may have had 
different sources. Specific rights and privileges257 over public access to, and use of, 
fisheries are likely to have merged to form the common law doctrine of the public right 
to fish by the mid-to-late 1400s. Expansive claims by the English Crown to the seas and 
foreshores in the late 1500s and early 1600s gave rise to an additional account of the 
source of the right. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, different accounts of the source of the public right to fish 
will be grouped into three broad accounts: Bracton/Natural Law, Birthright/Magna Carta 
and Crown Ownership. These terms are used for convenience by grouping together 
broadly similar claims made about the origin of the public right to fish. It is not intended 
to imply by the use of these terms that this thesis is making a specific claim about the 
legal characteristics of the right. For example, the reference to the Bracton/Natural 
account in this chapter is not an assertion that the right is governed by natural law, but 
that Bracton claimed that the right was based on natural law. Where cases or authors draw 
specific assertions or draw implications based on a purported origin of the right they are 
discussed in more detail. For example, in Chapter 5 and 6 the apparent association of the 
right with the Crown Ownership account and its apparent influence in contemporary 
cases.  
The earlier parts of Chapter 2 focus on the period up to 1570 and critically assess two 
key sources of the right attributed to this era, the Bracton/Natural Law and 
Birthright/Magna Carta sources. The latter part of Chapter 2 focuses on the emergence 
                                                 
 
257 Holt, Magna Carta and Medieval Government, above n 173, 203 ‘[r]ights are things which we are 
entitled by law. Of the two, “rights” is perhaps the wider term, for “rights” may be enjoyed by custom, 




after 1570 of broad claims of ‘ownership’ of tidal areas and the seas by the monarchs of 
England. These later accounts are broadly grouped together as the Crown Ownership 
account of the origin of the public right to fish. 
B. The Public Right to Fish: Early English Sources 
1. English Fishing Activity 1000–1200  
Given the limited documentary evidence on public rights to fish prior to 1200,258 this 
thesis reviewed sources that do exist in the context of archaeological evidence of the 
fishing activities of the time, as well as academic opinion on the social and political 
context in which those fishing activities were undertaken.259 As noted earlier, analysing 
this contextual background reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of drawing 
inappropriate conclusions from a narrow base of surviving legal documents.260  
Archaeological analysis of the English diet has demonstrated that prior to 1000, most 
of the fish consumed in England were freshwater fish. It is only after 1000 that diets 
shifted to salt-water fish.261 Archaeological evidence from this time also confirms that 
weirs262 were widespread and common in rivers and estuaries.263 Weirs in tidal or 
freshwater rivers are an especially efficient means for exploiting valuable migratory 
                                                 
 
258 There is more extensive evidence from the 1300s on; see W Childs and M Kowaleski, ‘Fishing and 
Fisheries in the Middle Ages’ in DJ Starkey, C Reid and N Ashcroft (eds), England’s Sea Fisheries: The 
Commercial Sea Fisheries of England and Wales Since 1300 (Chatham Publishing, 2000). 
259 SFC Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 1 ‘[h]istory 
is difficult because people never state their assumptions or describe the framework in which their lives 
are led’. 
260 I specifically criticise Moore and Moore on these grounds. See Moore and Moore, above n 73.  
261 James H Barrett, M Locker Alison and Callum M Roberts, ‘The Origins of Intensive Marine Fishing in 
Medieval Europe: The English Evidence’ (2004) 271(1556) Proceedings: Biological Sciences 2417; Callum 
Roberts, The Unnatural History of the Sea (Octopus Publishing Ltd, 2007) 17-31. 
262 Aidan O’Sullivan, ‘Place, Memory and Identity among Estaurine Fishing Communities: Interpreting the 
Archaeology of Early Fishing Weirs.’ (2003) 35(3) World Archaeology 449, 452. Anglo-Saxon weirs (prior 
to 1066) could be very large. Some of these weirs involved fences of up to 300 metres in length and others 
enclosed an area of 3000 metres by 700 metres. Weirs are structures, in this context typically of brush or 
wood, which divert the flow of a river’s stream or the flow of the tide to trap fish. 
263 CJ Bond, ‘Monastic Fisheries’ in Michael Aston (ed), Medieval Fish, Fisheries and Fishponds in England 
(British Archaeological Reports, British Series, 182, (1988)) 69-112. Bond maps out the extensive 
connections between fisheries in the Severn Estuary and the navigable portion of that river to medieval 




fisheries such as those where salmon and eels are caught.264 Before the 800s, fishing 
activities were likely small-scale, carried out by the use of weirs, locally organised and 
largely subsistence in nature.265 Sometime between 800 and 1200, however, control over 
weirs became concentrated in the hands of lords and monastic houses.266 Large permanent 
structures affixed to the bed of a river (or the coast) would have been relatively easy to 
control by local authorities. In any event, the construction of large weirs in rivers and 
estuaries would likely have required a level of resources that was more readily available 
to large landowners.267 Fishing activity along the shores of the coast appears to have come 
under feudal control in England by 1200 (if not earlier). 268 It is a reasonable assumption 
that many of the most valuable private ‘rights’ to fishing in this period would have been 
those associated with weirs in rivers and tidal areas. 
2. Documentary Evidence of Fisheries 1050–1200 
The most significant surviving document describing fisheries in England prior to 
1200 is the Domesday Book. The Domesday Book was a comprehensive survey of 
England269 compiled in 1086, with a focus on the financial resources available to the 
Crown from the estates of England. It reveals the extensive degree to which fisheries were 
associated with manors or were the subject of feudal grants. In addition to the many 
freshwater fisheries listed in the Domesday Book, Moore and Moore identified 80 tidal 
                                                 
 
264 Ralph W Johnson, ‘Regulation of Commercial Salmon Fishermen – A Case of Confused Objectives’ 
(1964) Pacific Northwest Quarterly 141. He notes at 142 that salmon are ‘like a swarm of bees in the 
meadow, why not wait until the bees return to the hive?’ 
265 O’Sullivan, above n 262, 452. 
266 Ibid.  
267 Tom Dawson, ‘Locating Fish Traps on the Moray and Firth’ (Scapetrust, 2004) 
<http://www.scapetrust.org/pdf/Fish%20traps/fishtraps1.pdf> 12. 
268 Moore and Moore, above n 73, 1-5. Moore and Moore provide examples from the Domesday Book 
where rent for a village is given in herrings. See also Dolores M Wilson, Resources, Roles, and Conflict: 
Active Resource Management in the Anglo-Norman Kingdom (Masters Thesis, University of Houston, 
2003) 78. Wilson cites the Domesday Book returns for the village of Sandwich in Kent, also with dues 
expressed in herrings (a sea fish). 
269 See generally Clanchy, above n 173. The survey reviewed the condition of estates in three periods at 
1065, when granted by William I and in 1086. It was ‘the greatest single achievement of William the 




fisheries.270 The Domesday Book, however, provides scant detail on the feudal271 
relationships that governed these fisheries. Moore and Moore found that in only one 
instance was there clear evidence of exclusive rights over both access to, and use of, a 
fishery.272 A reference in the Domesday Book may merely have indicated the existence 
of a weir273 controlled by a local lord. Detail on the likely nature of the ‘right’ to fish at 
this time can be drawn from surviving grants, or charters, of estates. Historian CJ Bond 
described the charter of the Manor of Tidenham as ‘the most informative of all the pre-
Conquest charters’.274 The Tidenham charter covered weirs on the estuaries and rivers of 
the Severn and Wye and provided detail on how fisheries were controlled and managed. 
The charter, dated to around 1050, provides considerable detail as to the relationships 
between the lords of the manor and the local inhabitants.275  
Under the terms of the Tidenham charter, the lord of the manor at Tidenham was 
entitled to every second fish sourced from the weirs of the estate, as well as all rare fish 
(specified as porpoise, sturgeon, herring and sea fish). In addition, the lord of the manor 
was to be informed of all sales of fish when he was on the estate,276 a clause that may well 
have operated as a right to buy. It appears that the local inhabitants could fish in waters 
                                                 
 
270 Moore and Moore, above n 73, 1-5. See also Bonyhady, The Law of the Countryside, above n 83, 244. 
With minor reservations, Bonyhady concurred with this assessment, as does MacGrady, above, n 162. 
MacGrady, at 554, goes further and states that ‘Moore and others demonstrate to a reasonable certainty 
that virtually all of the English foreshore was de facto in private ownership by 1216.’ 
271 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward 
I (Cambridge University Press, 1968) 237, 594-634. Pollock and Maitland point out that terms ‘manor’ and 
‘feudal’ were not generally used in this era but were later used to describe these relationships. I use the 
term ‘manor’ to indicate a grant of land to a lord or monastic order that would typically have included a 
village (vill) and tenants who are required to provide services to the manorial owners (villeins). There may 
also have been freehold tenants who paid monetary rents. I use the common historical term ‘feudal’ and 
the ‘feudal system’ to describe the hierarchical relations in this era. These definitions are a simplification 
of the complexities and uncertainties relating to status and relations between the parties but are 
appropriate for the discussion in this chapter. 
272 Moore and Moore, above n 73, 4. 
273 Although see Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155 , 620; Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App 
Cas 135, 144. Later, the existence of weirs and fishing engines was held to be good evidence of more 
extensive rights in a fishery and supported claims of an exclusive fishery. 
274 CJ Bond, above n 18, 85. 
275 AJ Robertson, Ango-Saxon Charters: Edited with Translations and Notes (AJ Robertson trans, Cambridge 
University Press, 1956) 205, 451.  




adjoining the manor, but were restricted to less valuable fish, and had to share the catch 
from the weirs.  
The lord of the manor was also entitled to ‘much labour’, which included the 
stipulation that inhabitants of Tidenham supply wood for the maintenance of the weir.277 
This requirement of labour has particular significance in that it shows that the inhabitants 
had an inferior legal status,278 and accordingly any ‘rights’ they held would have been 
subject to feudal obligations.279 A significant problem for any proposed origin for a public 
right to fish dating from prior to 1200 is that it is likely that only a small percentage of 
the population of England were ‘free’, with the rest subject to feudal280 service that was 
incompatible with being legally classified as ‘free’.281 Given the inferior legal status of 
much of the population, there was no ‘public’ in a contemporary sense.282 That rights may 
have depended on unequal feudal relationships did not mean that no rights existed for 
those who were not free, but that those rights were of an inferior kind.283 It would be 
anachronistic to suggest, therefore, that there was a ‘public right to fish’; at best, there 
was nascent ‘rights’ that contributed to the later development of the public right to fish. 
                                                 
 
277 Ibid 205. 
278 See SFC Milson, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridge University Press, 1976) 38-9. 
279 Feudal practices of requiring service in relation to fishing activities were in evidence elsewhere in the 
medieval period. See Maryanne Kowaleski, ‘The Expansion of the South-Western Fisheries in Late 
Medieval England.’ (2000) 53(3) Economic History Review 429, 429-431. 
280 Once again, I note that I use the common term ‘feudal’ for convenience. Pollock and Maitland point 
out that ‘the terms feud and fief appear in England but late in the day … they never became a term of our 
law’. Pollock and Maitland, above n 271, 237. 
281 RH Hilton, ‘Freedom and Villeinage in England’ (1965) 31 Past and Present 3, 5; Contra Christopher 
Dyer, ‘Conflict in the Landscape: the Enclosure Movement in England’ (2007) 29 Landscape History 21, 30. 
Dyer suggests that the free proportion could have been as high as 50 per cent; but see Pollock and 
Maitland, above n 271, 431-2. Pollock and Maitland question any numerical assessments of this nature 
due to the difficulty in distinguishing general legal status (free or unfree) in the surveys on which estimates 
are based. 
282 See Hilton, above n 281, 5. Hilton points out that to be ‘free’ or ‘privileged’ in the social context of the 
Magna Carta, or among some of the social classes cited in 1100s law books, would mean ‘if not noble, at 
least aristocratic’. 
283 See Dyer, above, n 281. At the height of feudal power in England, the Statutes of Merton in 1236 
confirmed that lords had the power to enclose wastelands but, at least in theory, they still had to allow 




3. The ‘Regalia of the Crown’  
Feudalism, with its regime of lordship and vassalage, held that rights to land flowed 
from the sovereign284 in a hierarchy of rights with the sovereign at the peak.285 Reverence 
for customary rights could influence how a sovereign or lord dealt with lands,286 but in 
practice, it probably would have been difficult for tenants to assert ‘rights’ against a 
sovereign or lord. Holt has observed that ‘despite feudal custom, kings behaved on 
occasion in as arbitrary a manner as convention and immediate circumstances would 
allow’.287 As noted above, many fisheries in England were under feudal control around 
1200, but those ‘rights’ existed within a legal and social system that was oriented to rights 
and relationships in land with an emphasis on possession of land.288 Grants over areas 
permanently covered by water, such as fisheries in rivers, estuaries and the seas, were 
special privileges and prerogatives described as ‘regalia’ of the Crown.289 A sovereign’s 
power to make grants of fisheries did not appear to require, or depend on, ownership of 
the underlying soil in rivers or the sea, or prior ownership of the fisheries themselves,290 
but derived from these regalia. The extensive grants discussed above do not constitute 
evidence that English sovereigns of the 1200s asserted ownership of rivers, tidal areas 
and the sea, but merely that they asserted the power to make grants relating to them.291 It 
                                                 
 
284 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England I (first published 1766, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1st ed, 1979). At 53 ‘the great and fundamental maxim of feudal tenure is this; that all 
lands are originally granted out of the sovereign, and are therefore holden, either mediately or 
immediately, of the crown’. 
285 Moore and Moore, above n 73, 14. Moore and Moore argued that there are no public rights in this 
period that could have operated as a restraint on the Crown in relation to tidal areas. This argument 
conflates the question of the existence of rights in this period with the question of the relative strengths 
of rights that existed. 
286 Percy Thomas Fenn, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters (Harvard University Press, 
1926) 68; see also Pollock and Maitland, above n 271, 376-7. They comment that reverence for custom 
grew weaker during the 1200s. 
287 Holt, Magna Carta (2nd ed, 1992), above n 172, 81. 
288 For a discussion of the nature of property and rights in these early periods of the formation of the 
common law, see David J Seipp, ‘The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law’ (1994) 12(1) Law and 
History Review 29. 
289 See Fenn, above n 286, 67-8; Moore and Moore, above n 73, xlii. 
290 Fenn, above n 286, 78-9. At 79, Fenn notes a sovereign may own the underlying soil of public rivers, 
but he does not attribute the power to grant fisheries to this ownership. 
291 That there might have been a power to grant, but no necessary prior sovereign ownership, seems to 




appears that it was not until the late 1300s that the sovereign power to make grants 
evolved into a claim of ownership.292 
4. Rights to fish prior to 1200 
Concluding this survey of early evidence, fisheries in the form of weirs were 
substantial and widespread along tidal rivers (and most likely in tidal areas along the 
English coast) before 1200. Archaeological evidence points to the relative importance of 
weirs and of freshwater fisheries at the time. Manorial controls over these fisheries were 
extensive, but local inhabitants may still have had relatively free access to fish. The 
fragmentary nature of the surviving documentary evidence, however, means that 
definitive conclusions cannot be drawn as to the degree to which the exclusive right to 
fisheries, in terms of both access and use, was asserted by lords and monastic houses. It 
is reasonable to assume that the degree of control over access and priority of use varied 
depending on local practicalities, the terms of any grant and local custom.293 English 
rights to fish in 1200 were likely, therefore, to fall into one of four categories: those 
subject to a manorial grant, those the subject of a special grant of a liberty or privilege to 
a community,294 those arising out of a customary right later classified as a ‘common of 
fishery’295 and ‘rights’ which represented activities that were not worth the expense and 
effort of controlling.296 
C. Emergence of the Public Right 1200–1472  
After 1200, but prior to 1472, two broad accounts emerge of the source of the public 
right to fish. The first of these accounts entails the public right to fish having its origin in 
a melding of civil (Roman) law and natural law concepts, and their incorporation into 
English law. The prime source is The Laws and Customs of England, attributed to 
                                                 
 
292Fulton, above n 172, 29, ‘[i]t was not until a considerable time after the Norman Conquest that valid 
evidence is found of the English claim to sovereignty of the seas’; see also Fenn, above n 286, 79. Fenn 
called this the ‘logical and inevitable’ step. 
293 See Fenn, above n 286, 66 describing the feudal system: ‘the Law was essentially custom’. 
294 See below at n 386 and accompanying text on grants to the City of London over the Thames. 
295 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England II (first published 1766, The University 
of Chicago Press, 1st ed, 1766), 34-5. A right termed a ‘common of piscary’ (or ‘common of fishery’) was 
a common law right held by the tenants of a manor. 
296 Kenneth W Clarkson, ‘International Law, US Seabeds Policy and Ocean Resource Development’ (1974) 
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Bracton,297a royal judge of Henry III, which was compiled around 1256–1258298 The 
proposition that the public right to fish has natural law and Roman law antecedents will 
be referred to generally as the Bracton/Natural Law account. The second account depends 
on the gradual emergence in English common law of a public right to fish over an 
extended period from 1200 to 1472. The Magna Carta’s significance to this account as 
part of the foundation for the right grows stronger the closer one gets to 1472. The view 
that the public right to fish developed over this period, with the Magna Carta as a key 
influence, will be referred to as the ‘Birthright/Magna Carta’ account. 299  
1. Natural Law and Bracton 
The laws of the late Roman Empire outlined communal ownership of shores and 
rivers and are some of the earliest legal sources cited for the public right to fish.300 In 
particular, the Institutes compiled in the 500s under the authority of Emperor Justinian301 
have been cited as supporting the existence of a public right to fish.302 The antiquity of 
Roman law303 provides a level of superficial attractiveness to the view that it is the source 
of the public right to fish. The problem with this explanation is that prior to the late 1100s 
                                                 
 
297 Bracton has been described as ‘the crown and flower of English medieval jurisprudence’, Pollock and 
Maitland, above n 271, 206. Later sources, Britton and Fleta, likely published within 35 years of Bracton, 
are considered derivatives of Bracton. See LT Lauer, ‘The Common Law Background to Riparian Doctrine’ 
(1963) 28 Missouri Law Review 60, 64-72. See also, Emily Ulrich, ‘Commoning the English Common Law 
Treatise: Investigating Three Fourteenth-Century Copies of the Britton’ (2014) 7(3) Annual Review of Legal 
History and Rare Books 5, 7. 
298 Pollock and Maitland, above n 271, 206. The most likely date of compilation is around 1256–1258; See 
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299 I use the term ‘birthright’ with an eye to later chapters, as English settlers in Australia perceived that 
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see McPherson, above n 62. See also Alex Castles, ‘The Reception and Status of English Law in Australia’ 
(1963) 2(1) Adelaide Law Review 1. 
300 MacGrady, above n 162. MacGrady’s article discusses this point extensively. 
301 JAC Thomas, The Institutes of Justinian (North Holland Publishing Company, 1975), vii-xii. The Institutes 
are one of the works that attributed to Justinian together forming the Corpus Iuris Civilis. The others are 
the Code [Codex] and the Digest [Digesta] or Pandects [Pandectae]. Only the Institutes are relevant to this 
discussion on the public right. 
302 See Haskell, above n 31. 
303 See also Patrick Deveney, ‘Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis’ (1976) 1 Sea 




‘all trace of Roman law [had] virtually vanished’ for five centuries304 in Northern Europe 
in general and England in particular.  
The long break in the application of Roman law in England means there is a want of 
evidential backing for narratives that imply that the common law public right to fish 
descended in some unbroken line from the remnants of legal regimes of Roman Britain.305 
Roman law as such306 is unlikely to have had a significant influence on the development 
of English law until the late 1100s.307 A more plausible role for Roman law is as a 
collateral influence on the development of English law, but only after 1150. Certainly, 
Roman law influences are evident in Bracton’s The Laws and Customs of England.308  
As noted above, The Laws and Customs of England is traditionally attributed to 
Bracton, a royal judge of Henry III. Bracton draws on both the Institutes of Justinian309 
and on an abridgement of Roman law by the medieval writer Azo in his Summa Azonis.310 
In The Laws and Customs of England 311 Bracton outlined the nature of rights in rivers, 
seashores, ports and the sea, as well as the broad rights of the king over wildlife and fish. 
Examination of Bracton on these points shows that in the mid-1200s the Crown did not 
claim general ownership of either fish or fisheries. Bracton is less clear on the ownership 
of shores and rivers, which has implications for the ownership of the foreshore of 
England, as described in later parts of this chapter. 
  
                                                 
 
304 JAC Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (North Holland Publishing, 1976) 7. See also Paul Vinogradoff, 
Roman Law in Medieval Europe, Oxford University Press (1929) 37. 
305 For example, Haskell, above, n 31, 877. Haskell traces the right back to Roman law as if there was a 
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306 I am referring to the influence of Roman law on secular matters, rather than to clerical law. 
307 FW Maitland, The Consitutional History of England – A Course of Lectures (University Press, 1919) 11-
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308 Unless otherwise stated, references to Bracton are from the translations in Samuel Thorne, Bracton on 
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310 Fenn, above n 286, 1-93. 




In a section headed ‘Of acquiring the dominion of things’, Bracton outlined the king’s 
extensive privileges in wildlife. Bracton stated that the king has: 
[I]n preference to all others in his realm, privileges by virtue of the jus gentium [law 
of nations]. [By the jus gentium] things are his which by the jus naturale [natural law] 
ought to be the property of the finder, as … great fish, sturgeon … things said to belong to 
no-one. Also by jus gentium [things] which by natural law ought to be common to all, as 
wild beasts and undomesticated birds. 312 
Bracton outlined natural law principles on the ownership of wildlife but qualified 
them significantly — quite likely due to the reality of the extensive rights of the king at 
the time. In contrast to the king’s ownership of wildlife generally, Bracton’s examples of 
the rights of the king to fish were limited to ‘great fish and sturgeon’.313 That Bracton 
accorded fish a different legal status to wildlife in general is clear from an earlier reference 
where he distinguished the activity of fishing from hunting.314 Bracton’s differential 
treatment of fish and wildlife is good evidence that fish were not, at that point in time, 
subject to a claim of general ownership by the Crown,315 although as outlined above, the 
Crown could still grant an exclusive fishery as part of the ‘regalia’ of the Crown.  
Bracton states that ‘the sea, and the shores of the sea, as though accessories of the 
sea’ are ‘common to all’.316 This statement is consistent with Roman law and, taken in 
isolation, would suggest the existence of something analogous to a public right to fish. 
Bracton’s statement is, however, not consistent with the limited rights of much of the 
population and clear evidence of the existence of widespread feudal grants of fisheries 
over rivers and tidal areas. Senior officials of the Court must have been aware of 
widespread grants by the Crown over the shores and coasts. When describing legal 
interests in the shore (tidal areas), Bracton appears to have adapted Roman law principles 
to the realities in England at the time.317 Bracton omitted a statement from the original 
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315 The distinction between fishing and hunting still held true at a later period. See William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England II (The University of Chicago Press, first published 1766, 1st ed, 
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Institutes of Justinian318 that ‘seashores are regarded the property of no-one … as being 
the same legal status as the sea itself’.319 Roman law provided that where private 
structures were built on the shore, access to the structure on the shore was no longer 
common, but the soil itself remained in common ownership. Bracton departed from the 
Roman model and stated that structures built along a shore and the property in the soil 
under them accrued to the owner of the building.320 Finally, in describing the shores of 
the sea, Bracton used a cryptic term ‘litora’ not used by Azo nor is it in the Institutes of 
Justinian.321 Samuel Thorne, in his translation, noted that the meaning of this term ‘has 
long been a difficulty’.322  
Bracton also stated in The Laws and Customs of England  that the right to fish in 
rivers and ports was ‘common to all persons.323 Again, this statement conflicts with 
archaeological and documentary evidence of the extensive grants of fisheries in rivers, 
noted above. Bracton appears to have been prepared to modify Roman models for tidal 
areas and the shore, but less prepared to do so for public rivers and ports.324 There are 
possible explanations for this inconsistency, for example, if all the rivers Bracton had in 
mind were tidal, there might be no significant contradiction. A conclusion of this nature, 
however, would be speculative and no clear solution to this anomaly is apparent from the 
text itself.  
The Laws and Customs of England325 does not support the proposition that the public 
right to fish arose out of Crown ownership of the seas. As noted earlier, Bracton outlined 
only a limited right of ownership of fish or fisheries by the kings of England in relation 
to Royal Fish. In addition, common rights of access to fish are described as arising from 
natural law, not by virtue of a grant of privilege or liberty by the Crown. As noted above, 
                                                 
 
318 Thomas, above n 301, vii. Promulgated in 533 under Emperor Justinian. 
319 MacGrady, above n 162, 556. Moore, above n 159, 32. Moore provides a table comparing the relevant 
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320 Bracton, above n 308, 40. 
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of The Laws and Customs of England] ‘plainly seems to have been taken from Justinian and is only part of 
civil law’. 




the kings of England already had the power to grant exclusive fisheries by authority of 
the ‘regalia’ of the Crown, a right that did not depend on ownership by the Crown.  
Summing up, The Laws and Customs of England 326 is a central support for the 
argument that the public right to fish derived from principles of Roman and natural law, 
albeit for the reasons given earlier, Roman law was not a major influence on the 
development of English law prior to 1150. The Bracton/Natural Law account has, 
however, proved to be less influential in English and Australian law than the 
Birthright/Magna Carta account described below. Nonetheless, assertions based on the 
Bracton/Natural Law account continue to be made, especially in the United States where 
the public right to fish is cited as the authority for the existence of a broad public trust in 
relation to environmental management.327 
2. English Birthright: Magna Carta 
a) Introduction 
The public right to fish has also been associated with the Magna Carta (1215) by 
legal writers and academics328 as well as by authors from other disciplines and 
backgrounds.329 The Magna Carta was the key legal authority for the public right to fish 
in the 1863 decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea.330 The Magna Carta 
was also referred to by the Privy Council in 1918 in Attorney General of British Columbia 
v Attorney General of Canada.331 Justice Brennan’s judgment in Harper332 also refers to 
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the Magna Carta, as does the plurality judgement of the High Court in the Blue Mud Bay 
Case.333  
In America in the 1800s, the moral authority of the Magna Carta was a notable feature 
in the evolution of the public trust doctrine.334 In Australia, although it has no direct 
legislative authority, the attraction or mythos of the Magna Carta make it a powerful icon 
for the general community.335 Although the Magna Carta is an iconic336 document, there 
is, however, no specific mention of either fishing rights or fisheries in it. It is unlikely that 
the Magna Carta was originally intended to protect the public right to fish; nonetheless, 
the provisions of the Magna Carta provided fertile grounds for the later development of 
the right. It is appropriate, therefore, to first explore the original meaning of the text and 
then to describe how the Magna Carta was recruited as a key legal support of the public 
right to fish. 
b) Magna Carta: General Background 
After 1066, William the Conqueror, though his conquest of England, had many 
estates at his disposal with which to reward his supporters. As noted above, a central 
element of feudal relationships was that they related to land and estates. Later rebellions 
under William’s successors, William II and Henry I, created further opportunities to raise 
finance and reward supporters out of the confiscated lands of rebellious lords. As England 
became more politically settled, this source of rewards (and finance) eventually dried 
up.337 Land was, however, not the only source of rewards or finance available to the 
Crown. Privileges of the Crown could also be granted out (for reasons of patronage), or 
sold to raise finance.338 By the time of John I’s reign (1199–1216), the sale of privileges 
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involved ‘the permanent and final alienation of the rights of the crown’.339 These 
transactions included control over rivers and fisheries.340 The liberties created by the sale 
of these privileges might notionally be permanent, nonetheless the holders of these 
liberties still had to vigorously maintain and defend them against later grants or from the 
actions of the king’s successors.341 Although his predecessors also sold privileges, John I 
made a practice of exercising his royal prerogatives as ‘political weapons’; his use of the 
prerogatives of the Crown in this manner helped fuel the rebellion that eventually led to 
the signing of the Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1215.342 
Prior to the discussion of the Magna Carta below, a source of possible confusion 
should be addressed. The original Runnymede version of the Magna Carta in 1215 almost 
immediately went through a series of revisions. This proliferation of versions easily gives 
rise to confusion.343 The Charter on which Coke made his influential commentaries344 is 
not, in fact, the 1215 Charter but the Great Charter of Henry III in 1225, confirmed under 
Edward I in 1297.345 The 1297 edition of the Charter, essentially the 1225 edition, was 
the form entered in the Statute Rolls of England.346 The 1225347 version is preferred when 
considering the legal influence of the Charter. Reference to the 1215 version is only 
relevant when the ‘original’ intent of the Charter is in question.348 
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c) Chapter 16: Putting Rivers in ‘defence’  
A possible source for a public right to fish lies in Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta. 
Chapter 16 restricted the prerogative of the Crown to issue writs preventing all others 
from approaching and using riverbanks until a king had done so, called putting a river ‘in 
defence’. Chapter 16 reads: 
Nulla riparia decetero defendatur, nisi ille que fuerunt in defenso tempore regis 
Henrici ave nostril, pereadem loca et esodem terminus sicut esse consueverunt tempore 
suo.349 
No banks shall be defended henceforth, but such as were in defence in the time of 
King Henry our Grandfather, by the same place and the same bounds as they were wont to 
be in his time.350  
In the 1215 Charter, the reference to putting rivers in defence was part of Chapter 47 
(1215):  
Omnes foreste que afforestate sunt temper nostro, statim deafforestentur; et ita fiat de 
repariis351 que per nos tempore nostro posite sunt in defenso.352 
All forests that have been made such in our time shall forthwith be disafforested; and 
a similar course shall be followed with regard to riverbanks that have been placed in defense 
by us in our time.353 
Chapter 48 (1215),354 which followed, referred to the wardens of rivers along with 
other king’s officers when it spoke of restraining ‘evil customs’. Considering the political 
context in which it was written, it would appear likely that the intended effect of Chapter 
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47 (1215) was to provide relief from the exercise of royal prerogatives as to forests and 
riverbanks (or their threatened use) and the consequent exactions of royal officers in 
enforcing such prerogatives. Accordingly, Chapter 16 was likely about access to 
riverbanks, and only incidentally access to the fish in those rivers. 
The earliest reference citing Chapter 16 as a source for the protection of rights to fish 
does not come until the late 1200s in the book The Mirror of Justices.355 The Mirror of 
Justices achieved belated prominence in relation to the development of a public right to 
fish when Sir Edmund Coke (1552–1634) referred to The Mirror of Justices356 in his 
analysis of the Magna Carta.357 Coke in his Institutes of the Laws of England358 cited The 
Mirror of Justices as authority for the proposition that protection of access to rivers for 
fishing was an original objective of Chapter 16. Coke also extended the restrictions in 
Chapter 16 to cover all riverbanks and their owners, not just those riverbanks held by the 
Crown. Coke’s Institutes has been described as ‘an unhistorical but profoundly influential 
commentary on the Magna Carta’.359 Nonetheless, Blackstone360 generally follows 
Coke’s views on the effects of Chapter 16, and Coke is a key authority cited in the 
influential case of Malcolmson v O’Dea.361 Coke’s broad views on the Magna Carta have 
influenced the development of the public trust doctrine in the United States.362  
Moore and Moore questioned whether there was any relationship at all between 
Chapter 16 and fishing activities. Their account is of interest given the influence of their 
1903 text.363 Moore and Moore analysed writs exercising the prerogative referred to in 
Chapter 16 of putting rivers ‘in defence’. Based on their analysis of writs granted after 
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1215 (in 1234 and under a different king), they question whether there was an original 
connection at all between Chapter 16 and fishing.364 Moore and Moore concluded that it 
was likely that writs putting rivers ‘in defence’ related only to the prevention of 
interference with hunting, especially that of birds. Their conclusion that Chapter 16 was 
not originally intended to create or confirm public rights to fish appears reasonable, 365 
albeit based on limited evidence.  
Moore and Moore, however, carried their assertions further, and maintained that not 
only did the Crown have the original power to put rivers ‘in defence’, but that their 
analysis proved that the existence of those powers confirmed the Crown was ‘vested’ with 
the right of fishing in tidal waters and rivers. They further concluded that the ‘privilege 
for the public [to fish] at that period was a mere tacit license revocable at will’.366 Their 
argument has three key weaknesses. Firstly, as they noted themselves, the evidence is 
scant367 and their argument is speculative in nature.368 Secondly, as noted above, fisheries 
could be granted out as ‘regalia’ of the Crown and grants did not require the prior 
ownership of the Crown.369 Finally, their conclusion is not consistent with the authority 
of Bracton on the limited rights of the Crown regarding fish in the 1200s, as described 
earlier.  
Moore and Moore’s conclusions as to the antiquity of the ownership of the Crown of 
tidal rivers and fisheries depend, therefore, on an over-reliance on the wording of later 
writs putting rivers ‘in defence’ without appropriate weight given to other sources and 
historical context. Their methodology reveals the risks of a narrow antiquarian 
                                                 
 
364 Moore and Moore, above n 73, 6-18. 
365 See Duke of Devonshire v Pattinson (1887) 20 QBD 265, 272 where it was doubted that the right was 
more than personal in the King and as such could not be alienated or transferred; Neill v Duke of 
Devonshire (1882) 8 App. Cas.135, 177 where Blackburn L expressed doubt as to whether Chapter 16 had 
any great effect. 
366 Moore and Moore, above n 73, 14. 
367 Ibid. At 6 they commence the chapter on this issue with the words ‘No record appears to exist to show 
us the manner that the King exercised his prerogative (if he did so exercise it) to exclude the right of fishing 
in tidal waters’. Writs putting rivers ‘in defence’ issued prior to 1215 may merely have not survived. In this 
context, absence of evidence should not be seen as evidence of absence. 
368 Ibid, 13. 




approach370 focused on surviving legal documents, rather than a broader approach that 
takes into account a diverse set of sources. Certainly, research by Fenn into the origin of 
rights to the territorial sea371 does not support their conclusions. Moore and Moore 
themselves acknowledge that exclusive fisheries could be granted out by the Crown based 
on its ‘regalia’.372 
Moore and Moore’s conclusions on the Magna Carta and Crown ownership, although 
unsound, appear to have influenced both legal scholars373 and judges374 and may have 
misled them over the degree of ‘ownership’ by the Crown of tidal fisheries. Moore and 
Moore were cited as a source in the Blue Mud Bay Case.375 The majority judgment also 
referred to the first edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England.376 As H Stuart Moore was the 
editor of the fisheries section,377 this is effectively a citation back to the same source. In 
the influential case of Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for 
Canada,378 it is difficult not to see criticism of Moore and Moore’s approach in the 
judgment, delivered by Lord Haldane, that some of the arguments presented were ‘a 
matter of historical and antiquarian interest only’.379 
Taking into account the limitations of the surviving sources, all that can be said with 
confidence on the original intent of Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta is that the Crown was 
forced to concede its prerogative to restrict access to riverbanks. Regardless of its original 
meaning, however, Chapter 16 became a key authority for the proposition that after 1215 
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the Crown could not create private fisheries in England.380 Although not necessarily 
representing an accurate statement of the law at the time, The Mirror of Justices381 
demonstrates that, as early as the late 1200s, the argument that Chapter 16 protected the 
public right to fish was being advanced. 
d) Chapter 23: Fishing Weirs and Fishery Protection 
Another possible source for a public right to fish lies in Chapter 23 of the Magna 
Carta. The argument for Chapter 23 as a source is that it imposed a restriction on the 
construction of fishing weirs.382 This in turn prevented the creation of new private 
fisheries. Over time this specific restriction evolved into a more general right of the public 
to fish.383 
Chapter 23 provides that: 
Omnes kidelli deponanturde cetero penitus per Tamisiam et Medweyam et per totam 
Angliam nisi per costeram maris. 
All Kydells for the future shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and 
throughout all England, except upon the seashore.384 
Chapter 23 does not mention fisheries or fishery protection directly. This does not 
mean that it was unrelated to fisheries, but the prime motivation behind Chapter 23 was 
likely the removal of fishing weirs that had become an obstruction to navigation.385 The 
City of London had a clear interest in navigation on the Thames and it was a key supporter 
of the rebellion that led to the signing of the Magna Carta. Prior to 1215, the city had 
purchased rights over the Thames from Richard I, and no doubt resented that it had to 
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again pay John I to have these rights confirmed.386 Holt specifically attributed the 
inclusion of Chapter 23 to ‘the Londoners’.387 Supporting the argument that navigation 
was the principal concern of Chapter 23, an earlier document, the Anglo Saxon 
Constitution (likely written between 1150 and 1175), referred only to a royal duty to 
destroy obstructions on navigable waterways.388 Further support for the proposition that 
Chapter 23 was directed towards the protection of navigation along rivers can be found 
in the broad exemption provided for weirs on the coast.389 Given the extent and economic 
importance of weirs at the time, it is unlikely that Chapter 23 was intended to require the 
removal of all weirs. Later legal opinion was that the prohibitions in Chapter 23 were 
directed only to new weirs.390  
The question is, therefore, how did Chapter 23 come to be a support for the public 
right to fish? Anthony Scott outlined a plausible argument connecting Chapter 23 to 
public rights to fish in his book, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights.391 According 
to this account, the restriction on weirs in the Magna Carta started a chain of 
circumstances whereby a prohibition on weirs became a royal undertaking not to grant 
further rights to fish using fixed fishing apparatus (in other words, equipment fixed to the 
subsurface soil). This prohibition was progressively extended to ‘all rivers, and hence, all 
tidal waters, including coastal water’, eventually evolving into ‘a positive obligation to 
protect and enforce today’s public right of fishing’.392  
There was certainly regular legislative attention to fisheries protection from 1278 
onwards. Rights to fish developed in conjunction with developments in the regulation of 
fisheries, a point relevant to later discussions on the interaction of rights to fish and 
legislation. In part two of their text, Moore and Moore cite 14 instances of legislative 
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action to protect fisheries between in 1278 and 1558, and further observe that local courts 
of admiralty exercised jurisdiction with bylaws on mesh size, fishing engines and closed 
times in ports and rivers.393 Corporations associated with ports and rivers and lords of 
manors on the coast had similar courts.394 It was not until 1403, however, that legislation 
appeared explicitly connecting restrictions on weirs with the goal of the protection of 
fisheries.395 In 1472 legislation expressly linked the Magna Carta to both navigation and 
fisheries protection.396  
This being the case, what was the likely influence of Chapter 23 of the Magna Carta 
on the development of the public right to fish? The protection of navigation was almost 
certainly the original concern behind the inclusion of Chapter 23. Given the evolution of 
English legislation up until 1472, the logic suggested by Scott whereby Chapter 23 
evolved into a more general public right is plausible, but it is best seen as but one 
contributing element to the development of a public right to fish. Past legal authority, 
such as Malcolmson v O’Dea397, relies on Chapter 16, and legislation did not show a clear 
link between the regulation of fisheries and the Magna Carta until 1472, over two 
centuries after its signing. 
e) Access and Use: Chapters 16 and 23 
Regardless of its intent, Chapter 23 had the practical effect of protecting use rights 
to fisheries by restricting further private appropriation of fisheries through the 
construction of new weirs. A right to fish in a tidal river is of little value if extensive weirs 
have already appropriated all the fish going past. Chapter 16 was a limitation on powers 
of the Crown to restrict access to the banks of rivers, and hence protected access rights to 
fisheries. Accordingly, both rights of use and access were protected in the Magna Carta, 
if not to the degree later claimed. A narrative that proposes simplistically that the public 
right to fish was established by the Magna Carta cannot be justified, however, these 
elements of the Magna Carta provided fertile grounds for the development of the English 
public right to fish. 
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D. The Emergence of a Public Right to Fish? 
1. The Evolving ‘Public’ 1215–1500 
The development of English rights to fish from the late 1200s to the 1500s must be 
considered in the context of changes in ‘rights’ more generally. At the beginning of this 
period, the inferior legal status of many people would have meant that they did not have 
direct access to the royal courts, but only manorial courts,398 a significant disadvantage in 
claiming rights against their lord. It is only in the context of feudal relationships waning 
in importance that it is sensible to speak of a ‘general public’ in relation to rights to fish. 
By way of example, the right to a trial in the Magna Carta was initially restricted to those 
who had the status of ‘free men’, but by 1354, these rights were extended to all men of 
‘whatsoever estate’.399  
Notwithstanding a significant extension of rights by 1500, it should not be assumed 
that there was a consistent advance in rights across all areas of the law. After the Magna 
Carta was issued, some feudal powers and controls were in fact strengthened, and in the 
period up to the 1400s, general access to the wastelands of manors (land not used for 
cultivation or pasture, presumably including fisheries) may have been reduced by 
manorial lords.400 Some aspects of feudalism were maintained well into the 1500s.401 
Nonetheless, by 1286 it has been estimated that likely half the peasants of south central 
England had gained their legal freedom402 and by 1500, ‘distinctions of status still basic 
in many communities in 1348 had largely gone by 1500, together with labour service and 
other manifestations of servility’.403 
2. Emergence of public rights to fish 
Supplementing the questionable support for the Magna Carta as a source for the right 
in The Mirror of Justices,404 there is evidence by the early 1300s of the Magna Carta’s 
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emerging relevance to the protection of fishing rights. In 1302, a commission of enquiry 
was set up into the construction of weirs in Oxford, Buckinghamshire, Berks and Surrey. 
The terms of the commission specified that the weir’s impact on fish was against the 
Magna Carta.405 Thompson cites this enquiry as evidence for a ‘popular attitude’ that 
Chapter 23 and fishing were associated.406 The terms of the enquiry certainly suggest a 
link with fisheries, and the Magna Carta had some degree of credibility by this time. 
Given that, after 1297, the Magna Carta was required to be ‘read before the people twice 
a year’,407 it is plausible that novel views could have arisen in the general population as 
to the meaning of its provisions. 
In the early 1300s the Magna Carta was cited in a complaint, described by Moore 
and Moore, in an ongoing dispute over fishing and navigation rights between the citizens 
of York and the Earl of Cornwall.408 The dispute dated back at least to 1280. In 1282, the 
citizens of York received an initial verdict in their favour that ‘from time of memory they 
were free to every one of the people to fish’. The dispute did not end there. In 1314, the 
citizens of York made a further petition to the ‘king in parliament’, now with an added 
reference to the Magna Carta, stating that the river had been put into defence (made 
exclusive) against the terms of the Magna Carta (presumably, in this context, Chapter 16). 
Moore and Moore’s research did not uncover a record of the outcome of this petition, and 
the case was possibly decided against the City of York, given that they found evidence of 
rents relating to the fishery being paid until 1438.409 Regardless of the outcome, this 
dispute demonstrates that by 1314 (but possibly not as early as 1280) the Magna Carta 
was cited as supporting rights to fish.  
In summary, even if in the late 1200s The Mirror of Justices410 may not have reflected 
a widespread view as to the effect of the Magna Carta, by the early 1300s there is evidence 
that those pursuing ‘rights’ to fish were enlisting the Magna Carta as support for their 
cause. Certainly, in 1314 the citizens of York believed that a reference to the Magna Carta 
would improve their chances. Considering the limitations of historical enquiry as outlined 
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in Chapter 1, this does not prove that the law had changed, or was in the process of 
changing, but it is certainly suggestive of the latter possibility.  
3. A probable date — 1472? 
Although claims were made connecting rights to fish to the Magna Carta before 1472, 
the evidence of a legal claim is not evidence that such claims were officially or widely 
accepted. As noted above, however, in 1472 legislation specifically linked the Magna 
Carta with the goal of fisheries protection.411 Furthermore, societal and legal shifts more 
generally made it plausible that there was a ‘public’ to which ‘public’ rights to fishing 
could accrue. By 1472, therefore, two critical elements had come together; there was an 
emerging ‘public’, and an expectation that the Crown had a duty to take action (i.e. by 
legislation mandated by the Magna Carta) to protect rights to fish. The late 1400s seems, 
therefore, a reasonable date for the emergence of a public right to fish being recognised 
by the common law, in a manner consistent with the Birthright/Magna Carta account of 
the origin of the public right to fish. A date later than 1500 for the emergence of the right 
is possible, given that clear judicial support for the common law doctrine of the public 
right to fish did not emerge until the late 1600s.412 Dates later than the early 1500s, 
however, seem unlikely given that the right was apparently assumed as a generally 
accepted legal doctrine by Digges in 1567.413 
This does not mean that fishing by the public was universally or even broadly ‘free’ 
in 1472. Any public rights coexisted with the extensive private rights associated with 
manorial estates, as well as with rights to fisheries granted directly by the Crown. An 
insight as to how the interaction between exclusive rights regarding specific fisheries and 
the activities of local inhabitants might have coexisted in practice (albeit later, in 1599) 
is seen in the report of Sir John Constable’s Case. 414 In the report, Chief Justice Popham 
stated: 
I have seen weirs which at full sea are two leagues out in the sea, and which have 
always been demised … as parcel of the manor; and at low water they were clear of the 
sea, and the copyholder had the fishery there; but at full sea it is common for any man to 
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fish there as in the sea, and then neither the lord nor the copyholder has anything to do 
there.415 
This comment illustrates how coexisting uses of fisheries might have been resolved 
at a local level. The prior and exclusive legal right of the adjacent landholder to use the 
fishery by means of weirs remained, but there was coexisting access and use by local 
fishers.  
E. Crown Ownership 1472–1680 
A further possible source of the public right to fish is that it derives from an assumed, 
exercise of the prerogative of the Crown in favour of the public. No specific documentary 
evidence for such a grant has been found. There is, however, little documentary material 
of any kind on the development of the common law doctrine of the public right to fish 
from 1472 until 1570.416 The policy of the English Crown at this time was to encourage 
fishing, including that by foreign fishers. In his review of the history of the claims of the 
English Crown over sovereignty of the seas, Fulton observed that it was only in 1570 that 
he could find records of English complaints against the activities of these foreign 
fishers.417 He contrasted this relaxed approach in England with resistance to foreign 
fishing in Scotland over the same period.418  
In 1570, a new account of the source of the public right to fish emerged based on 
claims by Tudor and Stuart kings and queens to the ownership of the seas surrounding 
England. Expansive claims by the Crown in relation to ownership of the seas were to find 
their apogee in the writing of John Selden in his text Of the Dominion or Ownership of 
the Sea, published in English in 1652, but composed some time earlier.419 The theory that 
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the public right to fish is sourced in prior Crown ownership, and represents a privilege 
granted, or assumed to have been granted, by the Crown, adds to the Bracton/Natural Law 
and Birthright/Magna Carta accounts of the origin of the public right to fish. 
Notwithstanding shifts over time in English public policy,420 claims by the Crown to 
ownership of the seas were recognised by the courts and, with significant modification, 
were incorporated into later accounts of the public right to fish. 
F. Claims by the Crown 1570–1680 
1. The Crown’s Right to the Shore 
After 1570, explicit claims emerged that the Crown owned the seas, foreshores and 
tidal rivers of England. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell on the shifts in 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the seas that led to this change in public policy (and the 
subsequent contraction of these claims). These issues have been covered by others.421 
Instead, the focus of the rest of this chapter is on the aspects of those claims that directly 
influenced the development of the public right to fish.  
Thomas Digges made the first clear claim in favour of the Crown’s legal ownership 
of shores of tidal rivers and the sea in 1567 or 1568.422 Digges presented his arguments 
in a treatise entitled ‘Proofs of the Queen’s Interest in Lands left by the Sea and the Salt 
Shores Therof’.423 Digges’ position was not that of a disinterested party; he was a ‘title 
hunter’424 who, through undermining the title of others in favour of the Crown, sought to 
claim for himself title by a later grant or patent from the Crown.425 Notwithstanding the 
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historically questionable arguments made by Digges,426 English law did come to 
incorporate a presumption that the shores adjacent to estates belonged to the Crown, at 
least unless the adjacent owner could provide proof that the shore had been granted out 
prior to the operation of the Magna Carta.427 A key point for the later development of the 
public right to fish is that areas subject to Crown ownership were (or later became) subject 
to rights of public access. To the extent there was a right of access by the public to the 
shore, both the interests of the public and the Crown were aligned against private claims 
of ownership and exclusive access. It is possible that a side effect of this extension of 
Crown ownership under the Tudors and Stuarts aided the preservation and extension of 
public access to the shores of England. 
After these claims had been made, a general right of access by the public to the shore 
was asserted in 1622 in a series of law lectures on rivers and drains delivered by Robert 
Callis. These lectures had a long-lasting influence, with the last printed edition published 
some 250 years after their delivery.428 In relation to the shore, Callis distinguished English 
law from Roman law on the question of whether the shore was common to all.429 Callis, 
like Digges, held that the Crown generally owned the shore (using the Latin word 
proprietatem), but he also stated that the public was entitled to the use of the shore.430 
Callis gave as an example the right of fishers to load and unload boats and to dry their 
nets.431 He further stated that any private rights a subject could acquire in the shore by 
prescription were subject to such public use. The significance of this limitation is that for 
a private person to gain an exclusive right by prescription,432 the interest claimed must 
have been capable of having originated in a lawful grant. 
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If the Crown’s interest was limited in favour of the public in the manner suggested 
by Callis, it is only a very short step to the proposition, well accepted by the 1800s,433 
that grants from the Crown to the low watermark could not exclude rights of use by the 
public. It is possible that one of the legal attributes of the common law doctrine of the 
public right to fish — the rule that a Crown grant over the shore (to the low watermark) 
would not normally include a grant of exclusive rights — dates to this period.434  
2. The Crown’s Right to Fisheries  
In 1568 or 1569, in the course of seeking support for his (then novel) argument as to 
the ownership by the Crown of the shores, Digges also commented on property in the seas 
by stating that the Crown had: 
benne content to suffer fishermen Jure gentium … such fish as … they can in the 
Englishe Seas take, Yet haue the Kings of England for remembrance of this their favoure 
that the memoire of their propertie in the seas shoulde not be extinguished, alwaie 
res(er)ved to themselves the Chief fishe as Sturgeon Whale &c. 435 
Digges relies on the existence of a limited interest by the Crown in royal fishes 
(whales and sturgeon) to provide support for a broader claim, that of the ownership by 
the Kings of England of the English seas. Rights to fish had not hitherto been justified as 
being dependant on, or flowing from, the Crown’s ‘propertie in the seas’. This novel 
argument by Digges appears to be the first recorded instance of a new original source for 
the public right to fish, that of a right created out of Crown property.  
Later in 1611, the Crown’s rights to fisheries, and the connection to its ownership of 
tidal rivers and the seas, was considered in The Case of the Royal Piscarie of the Banne.436 
The report of the case states that:  
Every navigable river as high as the sea flows and re-flows in it is a royal river, and 
the fishery of it is a royal fishery, and appertains to the King by his prerogative … The 
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reason why the King has interest in such a river is because such river partakes of the nature 
of the sea, and is called an arm of the sea as far as it flows … the sea is of the ligeance of 
the King as of his crown of England, but it is also his proper inheritance … And that the 
King has the same prerogative and interest in the arms of the sea and navigable rivers as 
high as the sea flows and re-flows in them as he has in the high sea is manifest in many 
authorities [none actually cited].437  
This case distinguished between the rights of the king emanating from the Crown of 
England and those that are his ‘proper inheritance’, with the latter presumably closer in 
nature to private property (and hence less susceptible to supervision by parliament). The 
case is somewhat equivocal on the extent (as opposed to the existence) of such 
prerogatives. Rather than outlining the extent of such prerogatives, it found they were the 
same as in the ‘high sea’. This case was heard in a time of expansive claims over the 
extent of the powers and prerogatives of the Crown.438 Furthermore, these claims were 
made during a period of controversy over the degree to which courts were independent 
of the Crown and the degree to which the Crown was subject to the authority and scrutiny 
of parliament. The authority of this case should be considered weak on these grounds. 
The special legal status of the River Banne fishery also reduces the weight of 
authority that is appropriate to attribute to this case. The record of the case makes it clear 
that this fishery had already been granted out to a private subject by a charter from the 
Crown.439 The fishery had then come back into the ownership of the Crown440 and so was 
in this sense a ‘royal’ fishery, regardless of any broader claim by the Crown. As has been 
noted earlier, the feudal right to grant fisheries relied on the ‘regalia’ of the crown, not 
prior ownership. There is an apparent conflation in the case of questions relating to the 
Crown’s general interests in seas and rivers with the Crown’s ownership of this discrete 
fishery established by charter. Even Hale, who later supported an expansive view of the 
interests of the Crown (and referred to this case as a key support for his views), 
commented that the Banne river was a royal river as one of the ‘fluvii regales’ under the 
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king’s care and protection, rather than the river being royal due to the ‘propriety of the 
river’.441 
This case appears to be the principal, and earliest, legal precedent for later arguments 
that the Crown originally owned all fisheries in the navigable rivers of England, as well 
as fisheries in the seas surrounding England. The case is certainly evidence of the 
strengthening of claims by the Crown to fisheries in tidal rivers. The authority of this case 
for the proposition that the Crown originally owned all these fisheries is weakened by 
uncertainty as to what the dispute was in fact about. That fisheries in tidal rivers are 
inherently royal fisheries and owned by the Crown garnered little later judicial support. 
The proposition that the Crown owned the soil of the shores, tidal rivers and seabed 
around England did come to be generally accepted.442 
3. Lord Hale and De Juris Maris  
Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice between 1671 and 1676,443 was a pre-eminent 
authority of his time on English law, including the law of the sea.444 Sometime before his 
death in 1679, Hale prepared a manuscript titled A Treatise De Juris Maris et 
Brachiourum Ejusdem (‘De Juris Maris’).445 This manuscript was not intended for 
publication and was not published until 1787 by Francis Hargrave.446 The delay in 
publishing Hale’s treatise is significant in considering its influence on the law. 447 Written 
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long before Blackstone completed his Commentaries in 1769,448 delayed publication of 
De Juris Maris makes it likely that its principal legal influence occurred after the first 
publication of Blackstone’s treatises.449 Blackstone had instead followed the earlier 
approach of Coke in relation to rights to fish, and does not refer to the prerogatives of the 
Crown consistently with Hale. 
On the rights of the Crown, Hale in De Juris Maris stated that: 
In this sea the King of England has a double right, viz, a right of jurisdiction which he 
ordinarily excerciseth by his admiral and a right of propriety or ownership. The latter is 
that which I will meddle with … the right of fishing in this sea and the creeks and arms 
thereof is originally lodged in the crown, as the right of depasturing is originally lodged in 
the owner of the waste whereof he is lord, or as the right of fishing belongs to him that is 
the owner of a private or inland river.450 
It was a well-accepted English legal doctrine that rights of fishing in an inland 
(freshwater and non-tidal) river flowed from private ownership of the underlying soil.451 
Hale drew a direct analogy between these rights and the rights that the Crown452 had in 
the sea. For this proposition, Hale cited Selden in Mare Clausum453 as having provided 
authority ‘abundantly proved’ for the proposition that the sea adjoining England454 was 
part of the ‘waste and demesnes and dominions’ of the King of England.455 Hale proposed 
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an account of the source of the Crown’s rights to the sea, tidal areas and rivers,456 which 
did not depend on special rights such as the ‘regalia’ of the Crown, asserting that the 
Crown is the owner of the sea as if it were land. The cases used by Hale as authority for 
his propositions, however, do not appear to justify such a broad claim; certainly, not one 
made in such definitive terms.457 Nonetheless, Hale’s description of the public right to 
fish cited above has been influential;458 although as noted above, the influence of De Juris 
Maris should be dated to after its publication in 1787. 
Hale’s analogy to feudal lands, however, begins to fray when he describes the rights 
that the Crown, the public and private landowners have in the seas. Given that Hale took 
the position that the king owns the seas as a logical legal consequence, the common 
people of England would have a mere ‘liberty’459 to fish at will from the Crown. Hale 
does indeed classify the public right to fish as a ‘liberty’, but he then immediately 
qualifies the Crown’s interest (emphasis added): 
But though the King is the owner of this great waste, and as a consequence of his 
propriety hath the primary right of fishing in the sea and the creeks and arms thereof; yet 
the common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea and creeks of 
the sea as a publick common of piscary, and may not without injury to their right be 
restrained of it, unless in such places or creeks or navigable rivers, where either the King, 
or some particular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that common liberty.460  
Hale’s legal logic here is problematic at best. If the Crown had the primary right, then 
the Crown should not need to show it had gained a ‘propriety’ exclusive of that ‘common 
liberty’. Indeed, a presumption against the Crown is at odds with the general presumption 
in favour of the right of the Crown over the foreshore unless it had been specifically 
granted out to the owners of adjoining manors.461 
                                                 
 
456 Even Digges acknowledged that by natural law, ‘the seas are common’, above n 423. 
457 See Moore, above n 159, xxxii-xxxvi, 136-7; Moore and Moore, above n 73, xi; see also MacGrady, 
above n 162, 551-568. At 551 MacGrady comments that ‘[s]hadows begin to dim Hale’s effulgence when 
this question is researched’. 
458 MacGrady, above n 162, 551. 
459 See Holt, Magna Carta and Medieval Government, above n 257 on the difference between a ‘right’ and 
a ‘liberty’. 
460 Hale, above n 441, 377. 
461 Moore and Moore argued against this presumption in favour of the rights of the Crown against manor 




Hale’s description of the legal attributes of the interest of the Crown shows a broad 
similarity to the earlier treatment of this subject by Callis (in 1622).462 In his lectures, 
Callis stated that the Crown has ‘the property, profit and possession’ in the sea, but when 
he later provides details of that interest, he gives very limited examples, including lands 
relinquished by the sea, and ‘wreck, flotsam, jetson, ligan and great fishes’.463 Callis starts 
with a broad general statement as to the interests of the Crown, but the details suggest 
that only a limited interest was recognised at the time. 
Elsewhere in De Juris Maris, Hale describes the kind of ownership the king might 
have in the seas in significantly less emphatic terms than he used earlier:  
for he [the king] is in a capacity of acquiring the narrow and adjacent sea to this 
dominion by a kind of possession [emphasis added]which is not compatible to a subject; 
and accordingly the king hath regularly that property in the sea: but a subject hath not nor 
indeed cannot have that property in the sea, through a whole tract of it, that the king hath; 
because without a regular power he cannot possibly possess it. 464 
In this passage, Hale again appears to have acknowledged that there is a difference 
between the type of ‘ownership’ that flows from sovereignty of the sea and that ‘kind of 
possession’ which is associated with private property and private ownership.  
Hale did accept that in some circumstances a private subject could obtain an interest 
in the sea, but he limited this possibility to that part of the sea that is immediately adjacent 
to the shore, a ‘districtus maris … as he may reasonably possess’.465 Once again, if the 
king’s rights to the sea were truly the same as that of a private property owner in a river, 
there seems to be no reason at law why the king could not have granted ownership of the 
sea to a subject (notwithstanding the practical difficulties involved).  
4. Conclusions on Sovereignty and Ownership 
Four conclusions can be drawn from Hale’s exposition on sovereignty and ownership 
in De Juris Maris.466 Firstly, even under the most expansive view of the interests of the 
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Crown, there is still a public right to fish. Secondly, the prerogatives of the Crown must 
be specifically, and ‘lawfully’, exercised to exclude this public right. Thirdly, the 
language used by Hale is not consistent with a proposition that the public right to fish is 
a mere licence at will extended by the Crown. The analogy Hale makes between the public 
and a ‘common of piscary’ suggests the rights of the public are analogous to customary 
rights rather than representing mere permission through default prohibition.467 Fourthly, 
Hale recognises only a very limited private right capable of being recognised in the sea.  
Hale’s views should be read in the appropriate context. Hale’s account reconciles 
official Crown policy with what was likely already established law and practice 
surrounding the public’s right to fish. Ironically, the policy context for Hale’s views had 
radically changed by the time his text became publicly available. By 1787, English public 
policy supported the freedom of the seas and recognised very limited claims of 
sovereignty.468 In Chapter 3, the approach of English courts in the 1800s and early 1900s 
to the type of ownership the Crown might have in fisheries will be examined in more 
detail. 
G. Conclusions: The Right to 1680 
Prior to 1000, archaeological evidence suggests that the most important right to fish 
in England was the right to fish in rivers and estuaries and the right to construct weirs to 
do so. It is likely that by 1200, rights of access to and control over rivers and estuaries 
had been widely granted as part of manors. There appears to have been a degree of shared 
access, based on the Tidenham charter. At this time, however, to speak of manorial rights 
as coexisting with a ‘public right’ to fish would be premature, given evidence on the broad 
extent of grants that had been made and the inferior legal status of much of the population. 
Between 1200 and 1500, the sources of two potential accounts of the origin of the public 
right can be identified. The first of these accounts relies on Bracton/Natural Law as 
evidence of an early form of a public right to fish. Bracton wrote that the seas and shores 
were ‘common’,469 albeit he adapted Roman law to acknowledge the reality of widespread 
grants over the shore. Notwithstanding Crown assertions at the time of ownership of 
wildlife generally, Bracton described only limited rights of the Crown over fish and 
fisheries. 
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The second potential source for the public right to fish is outlined in Birthright/Magna 
Carta accounts. The Magna Carta features strongly in these accounts, either as the origin 
for the public right to fish, or as a base for the later legal development of it. There seems 
to be little evidence that the Magna Carta was originally intended to create public rights 
to fish, yet by the early 1300s there is evidence that the Magna Carta was being linked to 
‘rights’ relating to fishing. In 1472, the Magna Carta was cited in legislation directed to 
the protection and regulation of fisheries. Given rights in general had become more 
widely extended by this time, 1472 seems a reasonable date by which a ‘public’ right to 
fish can be said to have become broadly accepted as part of the common law.  
By 1570, a new account of the source of the public right to fish emerged based on 
claims of ownership by the Crown (and its supporters) over the seas and foreshores of 
England. Written in 1679, but published in 1787, Hale’s De Juris Maris supported the 
existence of a public right to fish, but now on the basis that it flowed from the prior 
ownership by the Crown. The practical effect of this new account was that, following 
Hale, claims for an exclusive fishery in tidal rivers and the sea would need to succeed not 
just against a public right to fish, but also against a presumption of prior ownership by 
the Crown.  
This survey shows that there has been a variety of disparate influences on the 
development of the right, from late Roman law to English claims to sovereignty and 
ownership over the seas. Rather than the existence of a simple narrative resting on a single 
historical source, each of these three sources contributed to the development of the public 
right to fish. Indeed, there may even be different historical sources for the different 
elements of the common law doctrine of the public right to fish.470 In later chapters, this 
nuanced view of the origins of the common law doctrine of the public right to fish will 
be applied in considering the more recent development of the right. These chapters will 
also demonstrate how later writers and jurists, by giving different weight to the three 
primary accounts for the origin of the right to fish, come to very different conclusions on 
the nature and extent of the right. 
                                                 
 
470 For example, rights of access to shores and tidal areas can be linked to Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta, 




CHAPTER 3: THE RECEIVED RIGHT 
A. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the evolution of the right from 1700 to 1975. The first part of 
this chapter focuses on developments in English law from 1700–1914 drawing on 
reported cases and key authorities. This part highlights unresolved conflicts over the 
source of the right. The second part focuses on the reception of the right into Australian 
law.471 Due to a lack of early Australian cases on the public right,472 alternative sources 
are used to demonstrate the reception of the right into Australian law. In the final part of 
this chapter, it is concluded that the public right to fish was received into Australian law 
in the 1800s with its principal features, as laid out by the Privy Council in 1914.473 
Disputes over origin and source outlined by the authors and cases cited in this chapter, 
however, were not resolved by the Privy Council nor by the High Court in 1975 in NSW 
v Commonwealth (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case’).474 Questions about the source 
and legal attributes of the right re-emerged after 1987, when novel competing interests 
arose based on Indigenous rights and new forms of statutory fishing schemes. 
In this chapter, two key contextual factors are of significance: shifting public policies 
on the ownership of the seas and the influence on the development of English law of cases 
involving ancient estates.475 Australia, in contrast with England, was colonised after 
public policy shifted to favour the freedom of the seas. Furthermore, there is no Australian 
equivalent to English ancient estates over the marine domain. These differences detract 
from the authority of case law from this period and cast doubt on the utility of relying on 
statements of contemporaneous legal writers. A key conclusion of this chapter and of this 
thesis more generally is that differences in context should be recognised along with the 
potential for Australian adaptation of the right. 
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the king’s dominions beyond the seas … the charters simply confirmed a state of affairs that already 
prevailed at law, even if the impression that the colonist’s rights came from the crown rather than the 
common law was something that the crown assiduously fostered.’ 
472 The first indirect reference is a post-colonial one by O’Connor J in Williams v Booth (1910) 10 CLR 341, 
O’Connor J at 355-6. No earlier Australian case was cited in Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case (1975) 
135 CLR 337. 
473 A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153. 
474 (1975) 135 CLR 337. 





B. The Right 1680 – 1914 
1. Political History and the Right 
As noted in the introduction, the period reviewed in this chapter saw significant shifts 
in public policy towards the interests of the state in the marine domain and on the 
ownership of the sea. Justice Jacob in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case noted that 
the history of shifts in the claims by the English Crown over the seas ‘lies not in legal 
history but in political history’.476 A full account of these shifts are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, however, some broad observations are made below to guide the interpretation 
of legal sources from this period. Over the period covered by this chapter, England 
developed into an imperial sea power and its public policy shifted from claims of 
ownership of the seas477 to support for the freedom of the seas, with limited territorial sea 
rights.478 Notwithstanding a public policy shift away from expansive claims to territorial 
rights to an emphasis on the freedom of the seas, the English Crown never formally 
abandoned its claims of ownership of the seas surrounding the British Isles.479 Much of 
the marine domain of England is held by the Crown Estate,480 and many coastal areas and 
tidal rivers are still held by private landholders whose rights derive from ancient estates. 
Finally, in reviewing cases for the period 1688–1914, it should be noted that the 
underlying dispute is often over private rights claimed to have been established by an 
                                                 
 
476 NSW v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 CLR 337, 489 (Jacob J). 
477 Famously by Selden in 1652. John Selden, Of the Dominion or Ownership of the Seas (Marchant Nedham 
trans, V Du-Gard, first published 1635, 1652).  
478 See generally Fulton above n 172; see also, DP O’Connell, ‘The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea’ 
(1971) 45 The British Yearbook of International Law 304. Although he is primarily concerned with 
navigation, see also MacGrady, above n 162. 
479 Geoffrey Marston, ‘The Crown’s Seabed Estate — a Valuable Prerogative’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law 
Journal 384; Geoffrey Marston, ‘The Incorporation of Continental Shelf Rights into United Kingdom Law’ 
(1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 13. See though, Enid Campbell, ‘Regulation of 
Australia’s Coastal Fisheries’ (1960) 1 Tasmanian University Law Review 405. Campbell at 410 states that 
proprietary claims had been ‘abandoned by the Crown’ by 1800. If the ‘Crown’ in this context is shorthand 
for the public policy of the United Kingdom, this may be correct, but those claims were successfully 
maintained by the Crown Estate in England.  
480 Described more specifically as the interests of the ‘Sovereign in the Right of the Crown’, by legal officers 





ancient royal grant.481 These cases have a focus on the extent and validity of old royal 
titles and ancient fisheries.482 This focus obscures significant political, legal and social 
changes affecting the context in which the public right to fish was exercised. These 
changes include; the devolution of the management rights of the Crown to state 
agencies,483 increasing regulation of both private and public fisheries in England since 
the mid-1830s484 and, from the 1800s, increasing interest in relation to recreational use of 
the marine domain.485 These shifts are little discussed in the cases, with Blundell v 
Catterall486 being a notable exception. 
2. English Cases 1688–1863  
a) Cases before 1787 — A Common Formula 
Chapter 2 concluded with Lord Fitzwalter’s Case in 1674 in which Lord Justice Hale 
stated that ‘the common sort of fishing is common to all’.487 The late 1600s and early-to-
mid-1700s saw further judicial elaboration on the public right to fish, and how the public 
right might be excluded.488 In none of these cases was the existence of the public right to 
                                                 
 
481 For example, The Case of the Royal Piscarie of the Banne (1611) 80 ER 540; Lord Fitzwalter’s Case (1674) 
86 ER 766; Ward v Creswell (1741) 125 ER 1165; Attorney-General (UK) v Chambers (1854) 43 ER 486; 
Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155; Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135. All these 
cases are cited in the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
482 Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
483 The history in this regard is outlined in Crown Estate Office, ‘Report on the Committee on Crown Lands: 
Appendix B Historical Background CMD 9483’ (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955); Crown Estate Office, 
‘History of the Crown Estates: Memorandum of the Second Crown Estate Commissoner’ (Select 
Committeee on the Civil List: 1971-72 CMD 29 1972). See also Mungo S Dean, ‘The Crown Estate 
Commissioners: Their Role and Responsibilities in Respect of the Foreshore and Seabed around Scotland’ 
(1986) 4 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 166; Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown 
Estate Commissioners (1991) 19 R 174. 
484 The history of the regulation of fisheries in England to the early 1900s is extensively reviewed in Part II 
of Moore and Moore, above n 73. See in particular 171-192.  
485 See, eg, Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190. For a historical review of the development of 
recreational fisheries in England in the later part of the 1800s, see Peter Bartrip, ‘Food for the Body and 
Food for the Mind: The Regulation of Freshwater Fisheries in the 1870s’ (1985) 28(2) Victorian Studies 
285. Also, Bonyhady, The Law of the Countryside, above n 83, especially Chapter 1. 
486 106 ER 1190. 
487 Lord Fitzwalter’s Case (1674) 86 ER 766. Discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 2.  
488 For example, see Warren v Matthews (1703) 91 ER 312; Warren v Matthews (1703) 87 ER 831; Ward v 
Creswell (1741) 125 ER 1165; Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127; Mayor of Lynn v Turner (1774) 98 ER 980; 
Ball v Herbert (1788)100 ER 560; Mayor of Orford v Richardson (1791) 100 E R 1106; Bagott v Orr (1801) 




fish in contention, nor was it presented as being sourced in an exercise of the prerogative 
of the Crown. Cases from this period are significant as they date to the period after the 
Glorious Revolution in England in 1688, but before the publication of De Juris Maris in 
1787.489 
Warren v Matthews in 1703,490 Ward v Creswell491 in 1741 and Carter v Murcot in 
1768492 all provide evidence of the acceptance of three key legal propositions that were 
accepted prior to the publication of De Juris Maris in 1787.493 Firstly, there was a public 
right to fish in the sea, tidal areas and navigable rivers.494 Secondly, the public right could 
only be excluded by grant or prescription.495 Finally, the public right was subject to 
regulation, for example that the public must use ‘lawful nets’.496 These propositions have 
much in common with those outlined in 1989 in Harper v Minister of Sea Fisheries 
(‘Harper’).497 
These cases do not, however, give clear guidance on the relationship between the 
rights of the Crown and the rights of the public. The cases tend to provide support for the 
proposition that the public right to fish did not derive from the Crown, but they do not 
provide unambiguous guidance on this point. Warren v Mathews is reported in both 
Salkeld’s Reports498 and the Modern Reports.499 The Modern Reports500 is the more 
detailed and in it Chief Justice Holt stated that ‘the King’s grant cannot bar them [the 
public] thereof but the Crown only has a right to Royal fish, and that the King only may 
                                                 
 
489 See above, Chapter 2 F 3. 
490 Warren v Matthews (1703) 91 ER 312; Warren v Matthews (1703) 87 ER 831. 
491 Ward v Creswell (1741) 125 ER 1165. 
492 Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127. 
493 These cases where decided prior to the publication of De Juris Maris and there is no evidence of its 
influence on them. See also discussion in Chapter 2 F 3 on Hale.  
494 Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127, 128 (Mansfield L) ‘the fishery is common: it is prima facie, in the 
King, and is public’. 
495 More than vague words in a grant plus a history of access to a fishery are required to found a claim. 
See, eg, Ward v Creswell (1741) 125 ER 1165. 
496 Warren v Matthews (1703) 87 ER 831; Ward v Creswell (1741) 125 ER 1165. 
497 (1989) 168 CLR 314.  
498 Warren v Matthews (1703) 1 Salkeld. 358; 91 ER 312. 





grant’.501 In Carter v Murcot,502 Lord Mansfield stated that ‘the fishery is common: it is 
prima facie, in the King, and is public’.503 Only Justice Yates in Carter v Murcot504 
referred to ‘ownership’ by the King when referring to seas and navigable rivers,505 but he 
also stated that those rights were both in the ‘King and the public’.506 As noted in Chapters 
1 and 2, it is only after the publication of Hale’s De Juris Maris in 1787507 that the 
proposition that the right was preceded by a property-like interest of the King received 
explicit, if conditional, judicial support. 
b) Cases between 1787 and 1863 
After 1787, Hale’s influence can be discerned in the Law Reports, both from 
arguments of counsel and in the judgments themselves.508 Hale’s De Juris Maris is 
referred to extensively in Blundell v Catterall.509 The judgments in this case were 
noteworthy for directly addressing the question of the public interest in access to the 
foreshore.510 In Blundell v Catterall, the majority declined to support a general right of 
access to the shore for non-fishing purposes (such as bathing). By doing so, it protected 
                                                 
 
501 Ibid. This case can be reconciled with later treatment if it is assumed it was based on a more recent 
grant, and as such, post-dated after the cut-off date for grants after the Magna Carta (see Chapter 2). 
502 Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127 128. 
503 Ibid 128. Mansfield L commented that the rule was the same as if it were an ‘arm of the sea’, confirming 
the approach taken in Warren v Matthews (1703) 1 Salkeld. 358; 91 ER 312 that rights to fish in tidal areas 
were of the same character and origin as rights to fish in the sea. 
504 Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127, 128-9. 
505 Referring also to The Case of the Royal Piscarie of the Banne (1611) 80 ER 540 discussed in Chapter 2 F 
2.  
506 Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127, 128-9. 
507 See above, n 445 and associated text. 
508 See Ball v Herbert (1788) 100 ER 560, 564. Buller J, after having criticised civil law authorities, goes on 
to laud Hale, stating at 564 ‘[v]ery little is to be found in the books upon the subject [the right of towing 
along navigable rivers], the whole of which down to his time Lord Hale has collected’. 
509 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190. Cited by Stephen J in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case 
(1975) 135 CLR 337. At 423 Stephen J cited with approval the assessment of the Court of Appeal in 
Brickman v Matley [1904] 2 Ch 313, 323 that the judgment of Holroyd J was ‘one of the first examples we 
have of the way in which the judgement of an English judge ought to be expressed’.  
510 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1196 (Best J) ‘[t]he reason on which my judgment is grounded 
is public advantage’. Bonyhady, The Law of the Countryside, above n 83 refers extensively to this case. At 
7, Bonyhady observed that it was the only case prior to the mid-nineteenth century that provided detailed 




the interests of private property owners in the marine domain.511 Justices Holroyd and 
Bayley did accept there was a public interest in access for purposes such as bathing, but 
assumed that bathing would be permitted in areas that had not been specifically granted 
out by the King.512 
On the relationship between the public interest and the interest of the King, there was 
a divergence of opinion in the court. All judges of the court referred to Hale and the 
ownership by the King of the marine domain, but they described the ownership by the 
King in different ways. Justice Holroyd stated that ‘by common law … the shore as well 
as the sea … belongs to the King, yet it is true the same are also … clothed with a public 
interest’.513 Justice Holroyd cited Hale as authority on ownership of the shore by the 
King,514 but he appeared to conceive of the interest of the King as being of a special and 
limited nature rather than being analogous to private ownership. In a similar vein, Justice 
Bayley stated, ‘the property [the shore] is prima facie in the King’ but qualified this by 
further stating that ‘many of the King’s rights are to a certain extent for the benefit of his 
subjects’.515 
Justice Best, in the minority, was prepared to recognise a common law right to bathe. 
At the beginning of his judgment, Justice Best stated that ‘[i]t is agreed by all, that the 
sea-shore was at first appropriated to the King, from whom the right to it must be 
derived’.516 This statement is consistent with the views of Hale in De Juris Maris. Justice 
Best, however, then qualified the interest of the King using the term ‘public trust’: 
                                                 
 
511 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1206 (Abbott CJ) ‘Public convenience, however, is, in all cases, 
to be viewed with a due regard to private property.’ 
512 Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1202 (Holroyd J), 1204 (Bayley J). 
513 Ibid, 1201. 
514 Ibid, and Hale is also cited by him earlier at 1197.  
515 Ibid, 1203 (Abbott CJ). Abbott CJ did not express an opinion on the source of any purported public right, 
rejecting the public right to bathe principally on the legal ground that it was a novel proposition 
unsupported by the common law. At 1205, ‘If the right exist now, it must have existed at all times; but we 
know that sea bathing was, until a time comparatively modern, a matter of no frequent occurrence.’ 




it [the shore] was holden by the King, like the sea and the highways, for all his subjects. 
The soil could only be transferred, subject to this public trust; and general usage shews that 
the public right has been excepted out of the grant of the soil.517  
Justice Best found that any grant from the King would, by ‘general usage’, be subject 
to the foreshore being ‘left open as a common highway between the sea and the land’.518 
It appears he had in mind a general interpretative rule to be applied to grants. Justice 
Best’s use of the term ‘public trust’ is of interest, given its similarities to the language 
used in American cases from this period519 on the ownership of the shore and tidal waters. 
It is possible that, if the views of Justice Best had prevailed, the foundations for the 
development of a public trust doctrine might have been more firmly outlined in English 
law. 
Despite differences in approach, each of Justices Holroyd, Bayley and Best found 
that there was material difference between the nature of the interest of the King and that 
of the private owner.520 The nature, if any, of the Crown’s ownership is relevant to the 
issue raised in later chapters as to whether the public right is sourced in the prerogatives 
of the Crown, and subject to limitations of the prerogative, or is a public right of a broader 
kind.  
3. United Kingdom Cases: 1863 to 1914 
a)  Of a ‘Legal’ Origin 
The three cases from the early 1700s discussed above confirm the existence of a 
public right to fish.521 Furthermore, it was clear that for those intending to exclude the 
                                                 
 
517 Ibid, at 1197. It would appear that in relation to cases reported in the English Law Reports that this 
statement by Best J is the earliest use, or one of the earliest uses of, the phrase ‘public trust’. Similar 
language was also used by Heath J in the earlier unreported decision of Kelsey v Baker (1803), a case 
referred to in Bonyhady, The Law of the Countryside, above n 83, 244-5. This early case is referred to by 
Geoffrey Marston, The Marginal Seabed: The United Kingdom Legal Practice (Clarendon Press, 1981) at 
18, but does not seem to have been regularly cited, or to have directly influenced the development of the 
law. It is evidence that Best J’s usage was not wholly novel. 
518 Ibid, at 1193. 
519 See for example Martin v Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 367 (1842) where at 410 Taney CJ expressly 
referred to Blundell v Catterall and at 411 stated the nature of the interest of the King in navigable waters 
as ‘a public trust’.  
520 Abbott CJ did not consider this point to any extent and his main concern was with encroachments on 
private property. 
521 Warren v Matthews (1703) 1 Salkeld. 358; 91 ER 312; Warren v Matthews (1703) 6 Mod. 73; 87 ER 831; 




public, the onus of proof was on them to demonstrate an exclusive private right.522 The 
reported judgments, however, did not set out in detail the evidence that might be required 
to establish an exclusive private right. This issue was central to the dispute in Malcomson 
v O’Dea.523 Up until the decision of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea,524 it was 
a legally tenable argument525 that a royal grant of an exclusive fishery might have been 
valid up until the late 1600s and early 1700s.526 For example, in De Juris Maris, Hale 
referred to grants of private fisheries in the present tense, as if the king still had the power 
to grant them.527 The first of the tests applied in Malcomson v O’Dea528 was that there 
had to be evidence that a private fishery had been in existence for a long time. Secondly, 
that there was the possibility a royal grant had been made before the Magna Carta. 
Together these are the test of whether or not the fishery had a ‘legal origin’.529 The 
evidence required by the House of Lords to meet this test of a ‘legal origin’ does not seem 
to have been particularly rigorous. In this case the House of Lords found that a grant 
before the time of Henry II was possible, notwithstanding that the earliest unequivocal 
written evidence of a grant was under Elizabeth I. The court construed the earlier evidence 
by ‘the light of subsequent user’. The House of Lords noted that there was ‘no 
                                                 
 
522 Warren v Matthews (1703) 1 Salkeld. 358; 91 ER 312, 312. Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127, 129. Lord 
Fitzwalter’s Case (1674) 86 ER 105, 106. 
523 Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155. The requirement of a ‘legal origin’ in Malcomson v O’Dea was 
soon repeated in the case of Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable (1865) 11 ER 1305. The court reaffirmed 
that a legal origin must be able to be presumed, and that long-time use alone was insufficient to establish 
an exclusive private right, even where evidence both showed an ancient lease and that fees had been 
charged over an extended period for the right to moor. Incidentally, this case showed that a lease below 
the low watermark could be of a legal origin, though it was subject to public rights of navigation. Rights 
below the low watermark are an issue in R v Keyn (1876) 2 Ex D 63; NSW v Commonwealth (Seas and 
Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
524 (1863) 11 ER 1155. 
525 If perhaps unlikely. In Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190 at 1198, Holroyd J noted that an exclusive 
grant must be dated to Edward I. Holroyd J did not, however, refer to the Magna Carta, but to a different 
source, the ‘Statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, tempore Edw 1’.  
526 Any alienation from the Crown Estate after 1700 could only occur with the approval of parliament. See 
generally on the Crown Estate RB Pugh, The Crown Estate: An Historical Essay (London, 1960). For the 
Crown Estate in an earlier period see BP Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History: The Crown Estate 
in the Governance of the Realm from the Conquest to 1509 (Allen and Unwin, 1971).  
527 Hale, above n 441, 370. 
528 (1863) 11 ER 1155. 




improbability’ of an even earlier appropriation by the ‘Ostmen’ (Vikings) or Irish 
princes.530 
Given there are no old royal grants in Australia, ownership based on such grants 
would merely be of antiquarian significance, except that this case touched on the 
underlying nature of the interest of the Crown in the foreshore, tidal waters and out to the 
sea.531 The requirement for an exclusive fishery to have its legal origin in an ancient 
Crown grant was confirmed by the Privy Council in 1914 in a Canadian case.532 The 
requirement of a ‘legal origin’ to support a claim for an exclusive fishery has had a 
significant impact on Australian law and has limited the recognition of exclusive 
Indigenous rights to the marine domain.533 This point will be considered in detail in later 
chapters. 
The judgment by the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea534 is consistent with the 
Birthright/Magna Carta account of the origin of the public right,535 whereby the power of 
the Crown to restrict a pre-existing public right to fish was restrained by the Magna 
Carta.536 There is no reference by the Court to the Bracton/Civil Law account of the origin 
of the right,537 nor to the public right being sourced in a presumed past exercise of the 
prerogative.538 Later chapters will explore the implications of these different accounts of 
the public right to fish, for example, whether the public right to fish can revive after 
                                                 
 
530Ibid. 
531 For example, the High Court in NSW v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 
CLR 337. In his minority judgment in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1 Mc Hugh J pointed out at 
70 the problem of consistency between NSW v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 
135 CLR 337 and the recognition of rights that are based in the common law below the low watermark. In 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1 the majority Gleeson CJ and Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
at 47 formally declined to decide generally on the extent of common law rights beyond the low watermark 
and considered only the ‘narrower’ question of recognition of Indigenous rights in the common law. 
532 A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153. 
533 See Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 67 (Gleeson CJ and Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
Dissenting on this point at 129 (Murphy J). Merkel J, in a dissenting judgment in Commonwealth v Yarmirr 
(2000) 101 FCR 171 at 284-306 came to the view that the law of Australia can accommodate an exclusive 
Indigenous fishery. 
534 (1863) 11 ER 1155. 
535 See discussion above, Chapter 3 B 3. 
536 Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155, 1165. 
537 See for example the discussion of Bracton in Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1195-6 (Best J), 
1198-9 (Holroyd J), 1205-5 (Bayley J), 1206 (Abbott CJ). 




having been wholly abrogated. For the time being, it is relevant that one of the most 
influential cases539 on the right rests solely on the Birthright/Magna Carta account of its 
origin. 
b) Malcomson and the Magna Carta 
As noted above, the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea540 held that it was the 
Magna Carta that restricted the power of the Crown to create exclusive fisheries. A valid 
private right of an exclusive fishery in tidal waters had to trace its lineage to a grant from 
the Crown created before the end of the reign of Henry II (1189).541 That a ‘legal origin’ 
had to date to before 1189 is of significance to the question of which chapter of the Magna 
Carta the House of Lords was relying upon. 1189 is the year that Chapter 16 (1225)542 
declared relevant to the prohibition on the closure of riverbanks.543 Chapter 23 (1225) 
acted only prospectively from the date of the Magna Carta.544 Accordingly, if the right 
arose out the removal of weirs, then the relevant date would be 1215, the date of the first 
edition of the Magna Carta. This does not mean that the provisions relating to weirs have 
been irrelevant to the development of the right, merely that the earliest legal origin of a 
restriction on the Crown is associated with Chapter 16 (1225).  
Tracking legal title to a fishery back to 1189 appears to present a high evidential 
burden, however, in practice this meant only that some form of documentary evidence 
was required to support a ‘legal’ grant; there did not need to be an unbroken documentary 
chain of evidence extending back to before the Magna Carta. On this point, the Court 
stated that:  
If evidence be given of long enjoyment of a fishery, to the exclusion of others, of 
such a character as to establish that it has been dealt with as of right as a distinct and 
                                                 
 
539 Malcomson v O’Dea is cited as authoritative in later cases on the right, notwithstanding that in each of 
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uncritical reliance on the Magna Carta. See, eg, Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135, 138-
9 (Selborne LC); A-G for British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 170 ‘unquestioned law’. In each 
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the Magna Carta, see Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135, 17-8 (Blackburn L); A-G for 
British Columbia v A-G for Canada [1914] AC 153, 170. 
540 Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155, 1165-66.  
541 Ibid.  






separate property, and there is nothing to show that its origin was modern, the result is, 
not that you say, this is a usurpation, for it is not traced back to the time of Henry II, but 
that you presume that the fishery being reasonably shown to have been dealt with as 
property, must have become such in due course of law, and therefore must have been 
created before legal memory.  
As noted in Chapter 1, the public right to fish has been associated with the Magna 
Carta, as part of the Birthright/Magna Carta account, since the early 1300s. The House of 
Lords stated that the Magna Carta was the source of a prohibition on the restriction of the 
right, but did not claim it was the source of the right itself.545 In Malcomson v O’Dea the 
House of Lords held that the public right was separate to the ownership interests of the 
Crown, such as of the soil under tidal rivers, but that it coexisted with such interests.546 
The historical accuracy of the views expressed in Malcomson v O’Dea,547 
particularly on the significance of the Magna Carta, was criticised by Lord Blackburn 
some 20 years later.548 Lord Blackburn put forward the argument, later outlined by Moore 
and Moore in detail,549 that the Magna Carta was not originally intended to have such a 
wide-reaching effect.550 Lord Blackburn noted that Hale spoke in the present tense of the 
right of a King to give a grant to a subject, as if the King still had that power at that 
time.551 Lord Blackburn, however, concluded that the matter had been settled552 by 
Malcomson v O’Dea,553 and considered himself bound by it. 
c) Rejection of Ownership of the Seas 
The late 1800s saw the zenith of English judicial recognition of imperial policies as 
to the freedom of the seas and their impact on claims by the Crown to the seas around 
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549 Chapter 2 C 2 (c).  
550 Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135, 177-7 (Blackburn L). It is not clear from Blackburn 
L’s judgment, after disposing of the Magna Carta hypothesis, how he believed the public right arose.  
551 Ibid, 176-8. 
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England.554 Chief Justice Cockburn stated in 1876 in R v Keyn that these ‘vain and 
extravagant pretences [of the Crown to the seas]’555 had been swept away. The views 
Chief Justice Cockburn expressed did not ultimately prevail, as is demonstrated by the 
survival of the extensive interests of the Crown Estate in the seas around the United 
Kingdom. Nonetheless, R v Keyn was a key precedent cited in the majority in the 
constitutionally significant Australian case, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case,556 
and accordingly, its later treatment warrants discussion. 
If read narrowly, R v Keyn557 only decided that the criminal law of England did not 
extend below the low watermark.558 Read more widely, it is authority for the proposition 
that the realm of England, and its common law, stopped at the low watermark.559 
Supporting a narrow reading of this case, it had little apparent impact on cases in the late 
1800s and early 1900s on the ownership of the seabed beyond the low watermark,560 for 
example, in 1904 in Parker v Lord Advocate.561 This was a decision of the House of Lords 
on appeal from the Scottish courts. At issue was the right to grant exclusive mussel beds 
in Scottish waters.562 In the course of deciding this issue, the House of Lords commented 
on the interests of the Crown in the soil below the low watermark, and the relationship of 
the interests of the Crown to public rights to fish. The House of Lords affirmed the 
Scottish Court’s decision 563 that held that the Crown owned the soil under the estuary of 
the Clyde River,564 and hence the mussel beds affixed to that soil. As the beds were within 
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555 R v Keyn (1876) 2 Ex D 63, 175. 
556 Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
557 R v Keyn (1876) 2 Ex D 63 
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(Buckley J). See also the dissenting judgment of Stephen J in NSW v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged 
Lands Case) (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
561 [1904] 1 AC 367. 
562 It is perhaps symptomatic of the contemporary views of the courts of the supremacy of the common 
law over legislation that it was only after extensive commentary on the common law did Kincairney L note 
that the Mussel Fisheries Scottish Act (1847) provided a statutory base for the Crown’s position in any 
event. See, Parker v. Lord Advocate [1904] 1 AC 367. 
563 Parker v. Lord Advocate [1904] 1 AC 367, 373 (Kincairney L), 373-4 (Kinross LP). 
564 Parker v. Lord Advocate [1904] 1 AC 367. At 373, Kinross LP stated that the rights of the Crown to the 




an estuary, this case could have been distinguished on the basis that it related to internal 
waters and not the sea. The decisions of the Scottish appeal courts565 did not draw such a 
distinction, and the analysis by the House of Lords on this point proceeded as if the rights 
to the estuary were of the same nature as the rights of the Crown extending to the limit of 
the territorial sea.566 Although technically a Scottish and not an English case, Lord 
Chancellor Halsbury declared there was not ‘any difference in law applicable to those 
Crown rights between the laws of England and the law of Scotland’.567 It appears from 
the report that at no stage in the proceedings was the general existence of the public right 
to fish, or its extension to the three-nautical-mile limit, questioned. The relevant question 
was a narrower one, the public right to fish mussels attached to the soil of the seabed. 
R v Keyn568 and Parker v Lord Advocate569 therefore set out contradictory 
propositions. On the one hand, the extent of the realm of England for the purposes of the 
common law is limited to the low watermark, and the public right beyond that 
demarcation must then have other sources of authority. On the other hand, the Crown 
owned the underling soil and the seas above in a proprietorial sense,570 although this was 
subject to the public right. In the second case, the public right to fish might be more easily 
classified as arising from a past exercise of royal prerogative in favour of the public.571 A 
partial reconciliation of these conflicting sources can be achieved through the recognition 
of the special legal status of the English Crown Estate. The Crown Estate is an interest in 
the foreshores, tidal areas and seas that falls somewhere between private property and 
property of the state (held by the Crown). Accordingly, the English Crown’s interest in 
the marine domain partakes of both a private (proprietary) and public (state) character.572 
For English law, the relevant aspect appears to depend on the legal question being 
considered. 
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4. Conflicting Texts from the 1800s and 1900s 
As noted above, the courts of the United Kingdom in the 1800s and early 1900s 
expressed contradictory views on the source of public rights, and the nature and 
geographic extent of the rights, of the Crown. Legal texts of the 1800s and early 1900s 
also reveal a diversity of opinion on the public right to fish, especially on its source and 
relation to rights of the Crown. A brief review of these texts is warranted given that 
several these writers have been cited in recent cases, for example Moore and Moore573 in 
the Blue Mud Bay Case574 and Angell575 in Gumana v Northern Territory.576 
Consideration of these texts also helps to pinpoint when English and American legal 
approaches to the public right to fish diverged, as noted in Chapter 1. These texts are 
considered in a chronological order below, but this does not imply that the law developed 
consistently over this time or that the more recent texts are necessarily preferred or more 
authoritative. 
Schultes, first published in 1811, read judicial, royal and scholarly expressions of 
‘supreme dominion’ to mean merely ‘jurisdiction’ over the sea, and wrote that the ‘free 
and universal right’ to fishing and navigation originally (in this context, prior to feudal 
restrictions) belonged to the subject under the Crown’s jurisdiction and protection.577 
Schultes rejected the view that the public right to fish depended on a past grant or 
franchise of the Crown578 and stated that such a theory was an ‘imaginary principle’.579 
Chitty, writing in 1820 on the prerogatives of the Crown, included in those 
prerogatives property in the soil (or solum) under public waters. More specifically, 
however, he rejected the view that public rights to fish were derived from some ‘regal 
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franchise’ holding that the seas, tidal waters and foreshores had never been ‘vested 
exclusively’ in the Crown in the first place.580 
Hall in 1830 581 generally followed Hale’s views on the ownership of the seas and 
shores by the Crown. On the question of the origin of the public right, Hall canvasses 
three possible options. These are that the right was granted by the King; the right had 
always been held by the people and that the right was a ‘natural and necessary right’.582 
These propositions align broadly with the three principal accounts of the right in this 
thesis: the Crown Ownership account, the Bracton/Natural Law account and the 
Birthright/Magna account. Hall stated that the question of origin was ‘immaterial’, as the 
conclusion was the same — that ‘in point of title it is admitted to be held and enjoyed by 
common right, i.e. by the common law, and the custom of the realm’.583 Hall’s equivocal 
views on the nature of ownership by the Crown are demonstrated in his discussion on the 
private ownership of the marine domain. Hall stated that the presumption against private 
ownership in favour of the Crown was justified on the basis of ‘pro bono publico’.584 
In 1849, Phear took a similar approach to Justice Best in Blundell v Catterall585 
stating that for tidal waters and the shores ‘it would seem that the Crown simply represents 
the public: the Crown is in fact its subjects’ trustee’.586 Phear was critical of those 
elements of the reasoning of the majority in Blundell v Catterall587 that placed too much 
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emphasis on Hale’s metaphor of the King being the owner of the soil as if he were a 
manorial lord.588  
Woolrych writing in 1850589 acknowledged that there was a difference in opinion 
between those who believed the right had originally emanated from an exercise of the 
regalia of the Crown (in other words, an exercise of prerogative) and those who believed 
it had always been a public right (‘jus publicum vel commune’). Woolrych comes down 
on the side of the latter on the basis that there is no evidence it was at any time exclusively 
vested in the Crown.590 Accordingly, he stated that the waters of the sea and navigable 
rivers were ‘the birthright of all his majesty’s subjects’.591 
A shift in opinion on the public right to fish and the interests of the Crown in the 
1800s can be observed in successive editions by the American writer Angell. Angell 
wrote first on this issue in 1824.592 A text covering similar material was published in 
1826593 and was cited by Justice Selway in Gumana v Northern Territory.594 Angell in 
1826 emphasised the authority of the American legislature over the public right to fish 
since: ‘The legislature, in fact, are the public, and no one can deny the authority of the 
public to relinquish what belongs to them, without at the same time denying that it does 
belong to them.’595 The 1847 edition, however, omitted this passage, and although not 
limiting the power of the legislature, stated that ‘If there are no words in a patent from the 
government showing an intention to grant an exclusive fishery, it still remains public.’596 
Furthermore, in the 1847 edition, the effect of regulation on the rights of a subject was 
expressly limited ‘to the extent of its clearly expressed intention’.597 The preface to the 
1847 edition drew attention to American cases between 1824 and 1847,598 as well as the 
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views of English writers Woolrych, Hall and Schultes, which are all cited,599 as is Blundell 
v Catterall.600 
The influential views of Moore and Moore601 are discussed in Chapter 2. Moore and 
Moore were of the view that the Crown did originally own the foreshore, but that the 
Crown had disposed of much of the foreshore, and its rights in adjacent tidal fisheries, to 
private interests at a very early time. As discussed in Chapter 2, Moore and Moore in 
1903 rejected the idea that the public right to fish was established by the Magna Carta 
and postulated that it must have had its origin in an exercise of the prerogative of the 
Crown in favour of the public, whether real or assumed.602 
C. Summary of Cases and Texts to 1914 
In summary, little certainty on the fundamental nature of the right is to be found in 
the cases cited above or in legal commentaries of this period. A wide variety of opinions 
exist from this period on the source of the right and its relationship to the state and the 
interests of the Crown. It is arguable that, taken together, they add little additional 
certainty to that provided by Lord Mansfield in 1768 that the right is ‘in the king, and is 
public’.603 The Birthright/Magna Carta account was strongly favoured in Malcomson v 
O’Dea.604 References to ownership by the King such as in Blundell v Catterall,605 
however, support the  Crown Ownership account. The purpose of the preceding section 
was not to reconcile these different views, but to highlight the contested nature of the 
jurisprudence in this period.606 As noted in Chapter 1, the confusion and conflict that 
ensues from this diversity of opinion remain a subject of comment by English and 
Australian courts. Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis suggest how some of these conflicts can 
be reconciled to provide a more coherent conceptual base for the public right to fish in 
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Australia. Such a reconciliation should not obscure that, at the time, these issues were 
contested, without a clear consensus emerging. 
Although a degree of uncertainty existed in English law between 1800 and 1914 on 
the source of the right, the right’s existence was not in question. The next section deals 
with evidence that the right to fish was received into the law of the Australian colonies, 
and then the law of Australia. This section also covers the decision of the Privy Council 
in Attorney General of British Columbia v Attorney General of Canada in 1914.607 
Although this is a judgment on the law of Canada, for the reasons given below it also 
provides an authoritative guide to the public right to fish under Australian law.608  
D. Early Colonial Evidence of the Right  
As noted above, early direct evidence of the public right to fish in Australian cases 
is limited. On the foundation of the colony of New South Wales, it was accepted that the 
statutory and common laws of England applied to the colony.609 On limited self-
governance being granted in 1823, the application of the common law was reconfirmed 
in New South Wales Act 1823 (4 Geo. IV c.96). Section XXIV of that Act stated that laws 
made in New South Wales must: 
[N]ot [be] repugnant to this Act, or to any Charter or Letters Patent or Order in Council 
which may be issued in pursuance hereof, or to the Laws of England [emphasis in original], 
but consistent with such Laws, so far as the Circumstances of the said Colony will admit.610  
Elements of the Crown’s prerogative that had a particularly English historical 
character never applied to the colonies in Australasia (including New Zealand), such as 
the reservation of royal fish like whales.611 The reference to the laws of England is 
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relevant given the different nature of the laws in Scotland. For example, in Scotland, 
salmon were reserved for the Crown as royal fish, just as whales were in England.612  
As noted above, there is a general paucity of early Australian cases directly related 
to the public right to fish, and no significant Australian case prior to 1975 has been 
identified by academic commentators.613 Other sources of evidence do exist, however, 
that show that colonial officers in Australia and the United Kingdom presumed that the 
public right applied. These sources include; early legislation, colonial instructions on 
settlement and legal opinions provided in a dispute in colonial Western Australia over 
exclusive licences in the mid-1800s.  
The care taken by colonial authorities in the preservation of public access to shores 
and rivers provides indirect evidence for the assumed application of the public right to 
fish. Early New South Wales ordinances balanced the need for practical measures relating 
to the management of oyster beds and the preservation of public rights. New South Wales 
Ordinances 1828 Clause XXIV provided that, although it was an offence to steal from 
another’s oyster bed ‘being the property of another person’, floating fish above the beds 
were excepted.614  
Furthermore, colonial instructions provided for extensive government reserves above 
the intertidal zone. A reasonable implication is that the area below that buffer zone was 
subject to public rights, and access was protected from private encroachment through 
government grant. Early colonial orders on the disposition of Crown lands in the colony 
of New South Wales in 1828 provided that ‘the government will further reserve to itself 
all land within 100 feet of the high-water mark on the sea coast, creeks, harbours and 
inlets’.615 A later reservation in 1831 modified the earlier regulation by providing that the 
Crown could make private grants for ‘commerce and navigation’.616 
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The original instructions in 1826 to Colonel William Light in relation to land surveys 
for the foundation of the colony of South Australia provided for extensive reserves above 
the high watermark on both the coasts and the banks of rivers. In this instance, the 
instructions made it explicit that the purpose was for the public interest by dedicating the 
reservation for a ‘public road’.617 
Finally, a dispute in the 1850s over the executive power of the governor in Western 
Australia provides evidence on the views of both the colonial legal profession, and of the 
colonial office in London, on the public right to fish. The circumstances of the dispute 
are outlined in documents collected in the British Parliamentary Papers.618 In early 1851, 
Governor Fitzgerald granted an exclusive licence to fish for pearls within Sharks Bay, a 
deeply indented bay off the coast of Western Australia. This lease was then of some 
controversy. After the governor issued these licences, the Advocate General in Western 
Australia, G F Moore, formally advised Governor Fitzgerald on 9 July 1851 that:  
I consider that the right to take shell fish in the open sea or on the sea-shore one of 
those ‘jura publica or communia,’619 those public rights which cannot now be granted to an 
individual to the exclusion of British subjects … I am not aware that the fact of recent 
settlement of this territory would make any difference in the application of the law as 
established in England, but I would suggest the propriety of a reference to the Secretary of 
State on these two points; whether the Crown can now make a grant in this colony of an 
exclusive right of fishing; and 2ndly, whether it would be advisable to exercise such a 
power should it be considered to exist.620 
G F Moore was clearly of the view that the colony had the power to legislate fishing 
licences, but that such regulation could not be warranted given the lack of knowledge as 
to the status and extent of the fishery.621 The governor requested further advice from the 
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colonial authorities in London. Lord Grey, the Secretary of State, on 12 December 1851 
responded and stated that:  
it was not considered that a licence duty [relating to the exclusive grant] could be 
imposed except by means of a local law. That opinion is in accordance with the conclusion 
which has been arrived at by the Advocate General of your government. 
In further correspondence on 6 January 1852, Lord Grey reiterated his position, 
stating that ‘you will at once have withdrawn any exclusive permission to particular 
persons to fish for pearls. You will leave the right open to the public [emphasis added]’.622  
The records of this dispute demonstrate that both imperial authorities and colonial 
legal officials believed that a colonial public right to fish existed and, furthermore, that 
the right could not be abridged by means of a prerogative grant by the Crown. The right 
was; nonetheless, open to regulation by a competent local jurisdiction.623 Certainly, the 
preservation of public access to shores and the banks of rivers at the time was of sufficient 
public importance that additional buffers of Crown land were added.624 In 1910, Justice 
O’Connor 625 commented on colonial policy relating to public rights and stated that: 
It must be remembered also that the Colony was then in its infancy; all ungranted 
lands belonged to the Crown, and the responsibility of managing them in the best interests 
of a young and growing community rested with the Crown. Having regard to the public 
use of the lagoon for fishing, and its possibilities for other public uses in the future, I think 
the surrounding circumstances tend strongly to rebut the inference [that policy intended 
the lagoon and shore to be covered by the original grant]. 
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These three strains of evidence — legal advice on the powers of the Governor of 
Western Australia, reservations of Crown land along the coast and colonial legislative 
practice — all support the proposition that the public right to fish was part of the law of 
the Australian colonies. The position taken by the Advocate General in Western Australia 
is consistent with the English case law discussed above, and indeed the judgment by 
Justice Brennan in 1989 in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries.626 Regardless of later 
controversies over the extension of the common law beyond the low water mark,627 it 
would also appear that the public right to fish extended offshore, at least in the opinion of 
colonial authorities. 
The practice of the colonies (and then later the States of Australia) in not granting 
out the foreshore provides a partial explanation as to why there is such a paucity of 
Australian case law prior to 1975.628 Since coastal lands and the banks of rivers were 
retained primarily in the hands of the Crown, there was much less scope for the conflict 
between the rights of private owners (or lessees) and the public right to fish that generated 
many of the cases in the United Kingdom in the 1800s and early 1900s. 
E.  1914: The Crown as Parens Patriae 
The Privy Council in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for 
Canada629 reviewed the public right to fish in considerable detail. The Privy Council 
considered laws relating to public rights to fish in the context of Canadian constitutional 
arrangements over tidal and non-tidal rivers, the foreshore, tidal waters and the sea. 
Although the case involved constitutional questions of a particularly Canadian nature, the 
relevance of the decision to Australian law is enhanced by its consideration of these 
matters free of the confounding issue of old royal grants in the United Kingdom.630 The 
judgement delivered by Lord Chancellor Haldane was cited in later Australian cases 
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including the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case,631 Harper v Minister for Sea 
Fisheries,632 Commonwealth v Yarmirr633 and Blue Mud Bay Case.634 
The issues in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada 
635 centred on competing rights between the Provinces of Canada and the Canadian 
national government (the Dominion of Canada).636 The Supreme Court Act 1906 of 
Canada (c 139) provided that constitutional law questions could be referred directly to 
the Canadian Supreme Court. The meant that the Privy Council on appeal was obliged to 
consider matters of law on a broad basis, rather than on a narrow basis as it might have 
done had the case turned on facts that related to a specific fishery.637 A key issue in the 
case was the relationship between public rights to fish and the powers of the Colony of 
British Columbia over fisheries in both tidal waters and non-tidal waters. The judgment 
delivered by Lord Chancellor Haldane, for the Privy Council, also touched on associated 
questions such as the authority of R v Keyn638 and historical controversies over the right’s 
source and character. 
The Privy Council in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for 
Canada639 set out a number of the right’s legal attributes, firstly, that an exclusive fishery, 
whether in tidal or non-tidal waters, could only be brought about by a grant or 
prescription, but not by custom.640 Secondly, in tidal waters (the foreshore, estuaries and 
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tidal rivers), no new exclusive or private fishery could be created since the Magna Carta, 
and this proposition held for British Columbia as well as England.641 Finally, the Privy 
Council concluded that no such private fisheries had been created in tidal areas in British 
Columbia as ‘no rights there existing [in British Columbia] could possibly date from 
before the Magna Carta’.642 Applied literally, such a determination would mean that 
exclusive use, even with evidence showing the active exclusion of others, could never 
form the legal basis for an exclusive private fishery in common law, as no royal grant to 
them could have possibly occurred.643  
The Privy Council noted that the ‘legal character’ of the public right to fish was ‘not 
easy to define’.644 The judgment delivered by Lord Haldane referred to De Juris Maris as 
support for the existence of a public right to fish645, but rejected Hale’s description of the 
King being ‘the owner of this great waste’.646 On controversies over the ultimate source 
of the right and its association with the Magna Carta, the Privy Council criticised the 
view, held by Moore and Moore, that the Magna Carta had no relevance to the public 
right to fish.647 Lord Chancellor Haldane, delivering the judgment for the Privy Council, 
however, concluded that these questions ‘of historical and antiquarian interest only’,648 
holding that the right, whatever its source, was now protected by the Crown as ‘parens 
patriae.649 Consistent with the approach of the House of Lords in Malcomson v O’Dea,650 
the Privy Council held the right to fish was a general right held by the public.651 
Effectively, the Privy Council sidestepped a definitive assessment of the character of the 
right based on its history to focus on the specific effects of the right in that case. 
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The Privy Council rejected the view that the Crown owned the seabed of adjoining 
seas in a private or proprietorial sense. The description of the public right by the court 
was that it was a ‘paramount title which is prima facie in the public’.652 In the Privy 
Council’s opinion, the public’s right to fish originated in the sea, later having been 
extended shoreward to the shores, tidal rivers and estuaries. This is consistent with some 
older cases cited earlier653 where, regardless of the terminology used to describe the 
interests of the Crown, the public right to fish was described as an extension of the public 
right to the seas.654 Even when the interests of the Crown to the foreshore were asserted 
to their full extent in the 1500s, they were still based on an asserted right of the Crown to 
the seas, not the right of the Crown to the lands of England.655 Finally, the Privy Council 
explicitly stated that ‘the right of the public to fish in the sea … does not depend on … 
any title in the Crown to the subjacent land’.656 The Privy Council did note the ‘conflict 
of judicial opinion which arose in R v Keyn’ on the ownership of the seabed out to three 
nautical miles.657 
Notwithstanding having earlier dismissed controversies over the right as being of 
antiquarian interest, Lord Haldane presented the Privy Council’s own account of the 
origin of the public right to fish.658 He stated that the right to fish in the seas had been 
enjoyed ‘from time immemorial’ and then extended by common practice from the sea to 
the foreshore and tidal areas ‘continuous with the ocean’. The Crown, as parens patriae, 
protected that right and, over time, it became ‘a legal right enforceable in the courts’.659 
This explanation of the source of the right fuses elements of both the Birthright/Magna 
Carta account and the Bracton/Civil Law accounts. The Privy Council did not expand on 
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how, and more importantly when, the right evolved in such a fashion. The statement by 
the Privy Council that fishing had been enjoyed by the public in the oceans from ‘time 
immemorial’ is not fully compatible with the Birthright/Magna Carta account. The 
Birthright/Magna Carta account provides that the public right emerged out of competition 
over the shore, estuaries and tidal rivers, not as an extension landwards of rights of the 
public in the ocean.660 
F. Commonwealth and State Jurisdictions and the Right 
After the decision of the Privy Council 1914, and up to 1975, there were no 
Australian cases directly confirming the reception into Australian law of the public right 
to fish. There was, however, significant legislative activity taking place. As outlined by 
Gullett, during this period significant legislation was enacted regulating the management 
and control of fisheries.661 The existence of a public right to fish, however, does not 
appear to have been at issue. 
In 1969, questions of constitutional significance as to the geographical extent of the 
interests of the State and Commonwealth below the low watermark were raised in Bonser 
v La Macchia.662 Gullett concluded663 that at the time it was generally assumed that the 
territorial limits of the Australian colonies (and their successors, the states of Australia) 
extended three nautical miles outward from the low watermark.664 In a series of cases 
culminating in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case,665 the territorial limits of the 
states were held by the High Court to end at the low watermark.666 This case was 
described as ‘momentous’ by the editors of the Australian Law Journal.667  
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The Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case668 is the first high-level Australian judicial 
authority that supports the right. Justice Jacobs formed part of the majority and Justice 
Stephen was in the minority, and yet both concurred on the existence of the public right 
to fish. In his judgment, Justice Stephen referred to the rights of the Crown to the 
foreshore as being proprietary in nature, but subject to the public right to fish.669 Justice 
Jacobs held that the common law did not extend below the low watermark.670 This 
conclusion depended in part on R v Keyn,671 a decision also given prominence in Chief 
Justice Barwick’s judgment.672 If the common law finished at the low watermark,673 and 
the public right to fish is a common law doctrine, then the right should not extend beyond 
the low watermark. Justice Jacob resolved this geographic limitation on the public right 
by holding that the right to fish beyond the low watermark had been statutorily extended 
from the land outwards by the ‘Great Charters’,674 which limited the King’s claims to the 
seas. Justice Jacobs’ conclusion in this regard is in direct contrast with the historical 
evidence cited earlier in both this chapter and the previous chapter that the public right 
was traditionally associated with rights to fish in the sea. A narrow geographical 
limitation on the reach of the common law below the low watermark was rejected in 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr, 675 which is discussed further below. 
G. Key Conclusions to 1975 
Firstly, the key legal attributes of the public right to fish appear to have remained 
stable over the period 1700 to 1975,676 even though the origin of the right was 
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contested.677 As noted in Chapter 1, the emergence of novel competing interests brought 
the right back to prominence in Australia in 1987. The rise of these competing rights and 
their impact on the public right is considered in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Secondly, there is a need for caution when citing sources from this period. 
Consistency and coherence in the law is not apparent, not least because of conflicts 
between public policies favouring freedom of the seas and the English Crown’s historical 
claims to ownership of the seas surrounding the British Isles.  
Finally, the English Crown claimed678 both ownership and sovereignty679 of the 
marine domain surrounding the British Isles. It did not make such a broad claim to the 
marine domain surrounding the Australia colonies.680 There is no evidence that the 
prerogative right of the Crown to claim ownership of the marine domain of Australia was 
ever exercised.681 Certainly, there is no Australian legal equivalent of the Crown Estate. 
Accordingly, the rights of the state to the marine domain in Australia are substantially 
different to those in the United Kingdom. If differences in history and context are given 
their full due, there is a strong argument for a greater degree of flexibility in the Australian 
adaptation of the right than is apparent in cases such as Harper.682 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AUSTRALIAN RIGHT  
A. Introduction 
Chapter 3 outlined the reception into Australian law of the public right to fish up to 
1975, including NSW v Commonwealth (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case’).683 In 
1989 the High Court considered the relationship between the public right and new forms 
of statutory fishing rights in Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (‘Harper’).684 As 
outlined below, Harper confirmed that the public right to fish was part of the law of 
Australia and outlined key attributes of the right. Harper also confirmed that new forms 
of statutory fisheries management had abrogated the public right to fish and replaced it 
with statutory rights. The leading judgment of Justice Brennan outlined the legal attributes 
of the right in Australian law, drawing heavily on English law precedents, and the Privy 
Council case Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.685  
The decision in Harper was handed down in two key Australian Indigenous rights 
cases, Mabo v Queensland [No 1](‘Mabo [No 1]’)686 in 1988 and Mabo v Queensland 
[No 2] (‘Mabo [No 2]’)687 in 1992.688 The introduction of new forms of statutory fisheries 
management and the recognition of Indigenous rights were broadly contemporaneous 
events in Australian law. The final part of this chapter introduces the effect of the 
recognition of Indigenous rights on the public right to fish. Yanner v Eaton (‘Yanner’)689 
in 1999 demonstrated a shift in the interpretative stance applied to statutory management 
schemes for wildlife following the 1992 recognition of native title in Mabo [No 2].690 The 
effect on the public right to fish of statutory management schemes is a central topic of 
this thesis. The discussion of Yanner in this chapter also sets up the context for the in-
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depth discussion in Chapter 5 of the three-way interaction between Indigenous rights, 
statutory rights to fish and the public right. 
B. The Australian Right to Fish  
1. Australian Adaptation? 
Under the doctrine of reception, only the relevant elements of a common law right 
are received into the law of a colony.691 As noted in Chapter 3, there are substantial 
differences in the context in which the public right to fish operates between Australia and 
England. Notwithstanding these significant differences, the description of the Australian 
right in Harper closely follows English precedents. The leading judgment of Justice 
Brennan drew directly on English authorities692 and the Privy Council’s decision in 
Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.693 Justice 
Brennan in Harper closely followed the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General 
for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.694 The one exception in Harper is 
a small variation in the language used by Justice Brennan when describing the interaction 
of the right with statute law. Justice Brennan referred to the right as being ‘freely 
amenable’ to regulation.695 Although the reasons for this variation are not clear from the 
judgment, the effect appears to have been to weaken the right.696 
Following Harper, the possibility that a significantly adapted right might have been 
received into Australian law appears to have been forestalled. As will be argued in 
Chapters 6 to 8, there would be advantages for consistency and coherence in Australian 
law if there was an explicit recognition that the Australian right has evolved in a different 
direction to the English right. 
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2. Australian Fisheries Management in the 1980s 
a) Changes in Australian Fisheries Management  
Up until the early 1980s, the principal focus of Australian fisheries management was 
the prevention of commercial overfishing, typically achieved through a combination of 
restrictions on fishing gear and limitations in the number of commercial vessel licences 
issued.697 The decision in Harper was broadly contemporaneous with the widespread 
adoption from the mid-1980s of new fisheries management techniques.698 In Australia, 
these new approaches have been described as ‘rights-based’ or as ‘rights-based 
management’.699 One of the characteristics of such schemes is the move from regulating 
public access to a resource towards creating private rights of access to that resource.700  
Rights-based approaches were intended to resolve perceived defects in older styles 
of fisheries management. These defects included; overfishing, excessive vessel numbers 
and overcapitalisation. Separate articles by Gordon and Scott (in 1957 and 1958 
respectively)701 outlined how, in the absence of private rights, there are increases in 
fishing efforts until it is uneconomic for fisheries to continue fishing. Although each 
fisher would be acting rationally in his or her best interest, the overall outcome is 
economically inefficient. Economic waste will occur even if a fishery does not collapse 
from overfishing, in other words, even if the management of fish stocks is effective. 
According to this narrative, economic rents are dissipated through overinvestment in 
vessels and equipment as new fishers enter the fishery and each fisher seeks to appropriate 
for themselves a bigger share of the resource. Although the economic rationale behind 
rights-based approaches had been raised in the 1950s, it was not until the 1980s that more 
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economically sophisticated mechanisms, such quota-management schemes, saw large-
scale application (particularly in Iceland and New Zealand).702 
In the 1970s a number of Australian states took steps towards implementing rights-
based management schemes for commercial fisheries through the introduction of limited-
entry fisheries regimes.703 These limited-entry schemes restricted the entry of new fishers, 
limited the size of vessels and specified the fishing equipment that was allowed. 
Economic benefits provided by such management measures can, however, prove to be 
temporary. For example, even if vessel numbers are strictly limited, existing participants 
have an economic incentive to increase their individual share of the catch through 
investment in other factors of production, such as better vessels and adoption of new 
technology. This still represents a diversion of resources of the community away from 
more productive ends. Furthermore, even if a limited-entry fishery is tightly managed, an 
increase in potential effort can still be of concern, as small errors in management can 
readily lead to overfishing.704 
In the 1980s, Australian fishery managers began experimenting705 with management 
schemes that created tradeable rights to fish, including giving fishers a right to a specific 
share of the expected catch of a fishery.706 In Australia, where a fisher has an interest in 
a specified share of a catch, it is typically described as a ‘quota fishery’ or a ‘quota 
scheme’ of management. The intended outcome of a fishery quota is to provide economic 
incentives that encourage fishers away from economically wasteful activities and 
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investment.707 From an economic perspective, transferability is important in achieving 
efficiency objectives by allowing rights to be sold to those fishers who can make the best 
use of them.708 All other things being equal, the more clear and comprehensive rights are, 
the more those rights become economically efficient, as well as valuable to the holder of 
those rights. Valuable commercial rights to harvest abalone were the subject of the dispute 
in Harper.709 
The relevance of these changes is that for statutory rights of this kind to meet their 
intended economic and sustainability objectives, they must limit the public right to a 
significant extent. Statutory schemes that merely restrict new entrants by limiting the 
number and type of commercial vessels are compatible with a public right, albeit a highly 
regulated right. It becomes, however, progressively harder to classify fisheries 
management schemes as merely regulatory the more comprehensive these schemes 
become. In Harper, it was held that the public right to fish abalone in Tasmania had not 
merely been regulated but had been abrogated and replaced with private statutory 
rights.710 
b) Regulation of Abalone Fishing in Tasmania  
The dispute in Harper was over government charges on the lucrative abalone fishery. 
The Tasmanian commercial fishery had grown to become the largest wild abalone fishery 
in the world.711 The fishery, with its minimal incidental take of other species, was 
especially suitable for the introduction of a quota scheme. An overall total allowable 
commercial catch was determined, with shares (quota units) allocated to fishers, ending 
competition between commercial fishers for access to the resource. A total allowable 
commercial catch was first set for the fishery in 1985. Initially, catches were divided 
equally amongst the then-commercial participants. Informal trading arrangements soon 
emerged whereby quotas could be leased out. Formal trading rules allowing quotas to be 
transferred permanently were not put in place until 1991.712  
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Contemporaneously with the introduction of the commercial quota scheme, there was 
a substantial increase in the market price of abalone. The combined effect was an increase 
in the profitability of abalone fishing and subsequent increases in the value of commercial 
leases for abalone quota. Complaints followed that the result was the enrichment of a 
small number of fishers.713 The Tasmanian government attempted to raise additional 
revenue from the commercial abalone fishery. From 1987–9 various schemes were 
devised to raise revenue while still providing for fluctuations in prices and catch levels.714 
C. Harper and the public right to fish  
1. The Decision in Harper 
The lead judgment in Harper was delivered by Justice Brennan.715 Justice Brennan 
provided a detailed exposition on the public right to fish and its application to Australia 
and outlined the key legal attributes of the right. Justice Brennan also commented on 
related issues such as the ownership by government of the living resources of the sea and 
foreshore. 
The principal proposition put to the court by counsel for Harper was that the various 
legislative schemes implemented by the Tasmanian government to raise substantial 
revenues through licence fees on commercial abalone fishers were unconstitutional.716 
Section 90 of the Australian Constitution provides that the Australian states, such as 
Tasmania, may not levy excise duties.717 The High Court had previously found that 
licence fees levied against a Western Australian fish-processing licence were a duty of 
excise, and hence unconstitutional.718 Counsel for the commercial abalone fishers in 
Harper argued that catching abalone was the first step in processing and, consequently, 
state licence fees to catch abalone were similarly invalid.719 The submissions made by the 
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Commonwealth and the States of Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia placed 
significant emphasis on the pre-existing ownership of sedentary marine resources by the 
Crown by reason of ownership of the soil of the seabed by the defendant.720 For example, 
counsel for Tasmania argued that abalone, due to their degree of attachment to the soil, 
were owned by the Tasmanian government721 pursuant to the Coastal Waters (State Title) 
Act 1980 (Tas).722 If Tasmania had succeeded in this argument then, as it already owned 
the abalone, licence fees would be classified as a royalty, not a tax, and accordingly 
Section 90 would not apply, regardless of the level of fees.723 The relationship between 
the public right to fish and the purported ownership of fish by the state was not raised as 
an issue in argument. 
Although the court could have settled the question of Crown ownership, it found it 
unnecessary to do so.724 Justice Brennan noted that the fishery ‘can be truly said to be 
public property whether or not the Crown has radical or freehold title to the resource’.725 
Justice Brennan observed that if title was required to support the statutory schemes of 
fishery management, then legislative arrangements between the Crown and Tasmania 
have already demonstrated ‘the consent of the Crown to the creation of those rights [rights 
created under statute]’.726 Justice Brennan focused on the legal characteristics of the 
statutory scheme, which had abrogated public rights and replaced them with statutory 
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rights, rather than on the resolution of the question of the ultimate source of the rights 
involved.  
In reviewing the statutory scheme set up by Tasmania, Justice Brennan emphasised 
the limited nature of the resource and its susceptibility to commercial overexploitation.727 
He concluded that: 
The public right of fishing for abalone in State fishing waters is thus abrogated and 
private statutory rights to take abalone in limited quantities are conferred on the holders of 
commercial and non-commercial abalone licences. The Regulations thus control the 
exploitation of a finite resource in order to preserve its existence. They seek to achieve this 
end by imposing a general prohibition on exploitation followed by the grant of licences for 
the taking of limited quantities of abalone. The only compensation, if compensation it be, 
derived by the public for loss of the right of fishing for abalone consists in the amounts 
required to be paid by holders to obtain abalone licences under the Regulations.728 
Justice Brennan classified these statutory rights as ‘akin to a profit a prendre’, and 
characterised the licence fees for those rights as a ‘charge for the acquisition of a right’; 
accordingly those charges were to be distinguished from licence fees charged where there 
was no underlying resource.729 It was integral to the internal logic of Justice Brennan’s 
argument that the public right to fish was abrogated in this manner and not merely 
regulated. If the right had been merely regulated, then he would still have had to address 
the question of whether licence fees for abalone might constitute a tariff prohibited by the 
Constitution.730 
a) An ‘Entitlement of a New Kind’ 
Justice Brennan acknowledged the public right to fish could lead to overexploitation. 
He referred731 to the judgment of Lord Chancellor Selborne in Goodman v Mayor of 
Saltash,732 which recognised the risk of significant depletion of fish stocks where ‘there 
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is a general public right of fishing’.733 Risks of overfishing arising from unrestricted 
access had also been raised in Neill v Duke of Devonshire.734 Lord Chancellor Selborne 
recognised the risk that fishing under the public right could lead to overexploitation. He 
furthermore pointed out that the appellants were engaged in drift fishing, a method he 
described as being ‘of recent introduction’ and which was ‘beyond comparison more 
destructive to the fish’.735 Effectively, the appellants in that case were engaging in what 
would be recognised in contemporary terms as an unregulated commercial fishery.736 By 
the 1800s, English fisheries had become subject to increasing regulation,737 although the 
need for regulation to protect offshore sea-fish resources from overexploitation was 
questioned.738 
Harper, therefore, did not break new ground in recognising that the public right 
allowed unsustainable fishing, nor in judicial recognition of the need for regulation to 
address that defect. What was new was the recognition of the High Court that legislative 
action to protect fisheries had gone beyond regulation of the public right to fish. Justice 
Brennan held that the new system created new ‘private statutory rights’ which ‘abrogated’ 
the public right’.739 Chief Justice Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron further 
emphasised the break with the past in the creation of these statutory rights. In their 
judgment they stated that: 
What was formerly in the public domain is converted into the exclusive and controlled 
preserve of those who hold licences ... it is an entitlement of a new kind created as part of 
a system of preserving a limited public natural resource in a society which is coming to 
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recognise that, in so far as such resources are concerned, to fail to protect may destroy and 
to preserve the right of everyone to take what he or she will may eventually deprive that 
right of all content ... [U]nder this licensing system the general public is deprived of the 
right of unfettered exploitation of the Tasmanian abalone fisheries.740 
Although the public rights to fish in Harper were held to be abrogated, none of the 
judgments in that case referred to those rights as having been ‘extinguished’, a point 
relevant to later discussion. 
b) Individual Elements of the Right to Fish  
Justice Brennan in Harper provided a detailed description of the attributes of the 
public right to fish relying substantially, but not wholly, on the decision of the Privy 
Council in Attorney General for British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.741 He 
mentioned the following elements as being part of Australian law (listed for 
convenience): 
• English law was settled, and since the time of the Magna Carta, no public 
right of fishing could be taken away in relation to the foreshore, estuaries, 
creek and tidal rivers without competent legislation.742  
• No restriction can be put upon that right of the public by an exercise of the 
prerogative in the form of a grant or otherwise.743 
• The right is public and not private in nature.744 
• The public right of fishing in tidal waters is not limited by the need to preserve 
the capacity of a fishery to sustain itself. ‘The management of a fishery to 
prevent its depletion by the public must be provided for, if at all, by statute.’745 
• The ‘paramount’ public right to fish qualifies the right of the owner of the 
soil to enjoy the exclusive right of fishing over it (whether the owner be the 
Crown or not).746 
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Justice Brennan both confirmed the public right to fish was part of the contemporary 
law of Australia, and provided a comprehensive list of the legal attributes of the right.747 
His description generally followed the Privy Council in Attorney General for British 
Columbia v Attorney General for Canada.748 Justice Brennan, however, added that the 
right was ‘freely’ [my emphasis] amenable to abrogation or regulation by a competent 
legislature’.749 The addition of the word ‘freely’ was an apparent innovation and is 
discussed further below. 
2. Implications of Harper  
a) A ‘Freely’ Abrogated Right  
As noted above, the only substantial divergence in Justice Brennan’s judgment from 
English law750 precedents was in stating that the right, ‘being a public not a proprietary 
right, is freely amenable to abrogation or regulation by a competent legislature’.751 In the 
two cases cited by Justice Brennan as authority,752 the adverb ‘freely’ was not used in 
conjunction with the power to modify the right by legislation.753 It is not clear from the 
text in Harper why Justice Brennan added the modifier ‘freely’ to describe the potential 
abrogatory effects of legislation. A number of possible explanations are listed below, 
however, it might simply have been that Justice Brennan had no particular intent in mind 
when he used the adverb ‘freely’. 
The first possibility is that ‘freely’ was intended to emphasise the lack of any 
constitutional impediment to the Tasmanian legislature abrogating or modifying the 
public right to fish as it saw fit. In Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for 
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Quebec (1921)754 the Privy Council noted potential constitutional limits on the regulatory 
powers of the Canadian Federal Government in relation to fishing. 755 Nowhere in that 
judgment was the adverb ‘freely’ used in conjunction with the regulation of the right. The 
use of the word ‘freely’ by Justice Brennan may have been intended to emphasise that, 
under Australian law, there was no impediment to a competent legislature abrogating the 
public right to fish, rather than intending to diminish the right itself.  
A further possibility is that ‘freely’ was intended to indicate that fisheries legislation 
should be read free from old common law interpretative rules favouring public rights 
against general words in statutes.756 Older rules of statutory construction provided that 
common law public rights should only be abrogated by statute where there are ‘express 
words or [by] necessary implication’,757 referred to as the principle of legality.758 As noted 
in Chapter 1, Spigelman has suggested that, in reality, the rules of construction that once 
applied to old common law rights now have little weight, whereas other rights now 
classified as fundamental rights have the greater weight in statutory interpretation.759 To 
subject fisheries regulation to restrictive interpretative rules on construction would defeat 
its purpose.760 Given Justice Brennan’s view on the defects of the public right in relation 
to conservation, it is plausible that it was his intention to clarify that Tasmanian fisheries 
legislation should be read free of any restrictions based on the principle of legality. 
Finally, the word ‘freely’ might have been intended as a signal that the right itself 
should now be considered a generally weak right in Australian law, for example, that it 
should be given little weight when considering legislation governing grants to the 
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seashore.761 It is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with Justice Brennan’s statement 
that grants of land to the low watermark were subject to the ‘paramount right to fish vested 
in the public’.762 The word ‘paramount’ suggests that Justice Brennan was of the view 
that grants of land should continue to be subject to the common law public right to fish, 
unless the right was clearly excluded. 
In summary, Justice Brennan confirmed the public right to fish as part of the law of 
Australia and provided a comprehensive list of its elements. He also emphasised its 
susceptibility to statutory abrogation. Why Justice Brennan decided to emphasise that the 
right could be freely abrogated cannot be resolved by reference to the text alone, but 
certainly, later judgments have given prominence to the word ‘freely’.763 
b) Harper and the Origin of the Right  
As noted earlier, a majority of the High Court in the Seas and Submerged Land Act 
Case764 found the limits of the common law and of the States of Australia ended at the 
low watermark, with different views advanced for the source of the right in the seas.765 In 
Harper, Justice Brennan held that the fishery was in tidal waters,766 making a decision on 
its extension to the seas (below the low watermark) a moot point.767 Given the views of 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case majority768 that the common law of England 
ended at the low watermark, it was a tenable argument769 that no ‘common law’ public 
right to fish could exist below the low watermark. Of the majority in the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act Case, only Justice Jacobs directly addressed the inconsistency 
between the majority view of the common law and the existence of a public right to fish 
beyond the low watermark. He did so by associating the public right to fish beyond the 
law water mark with the ‘great charters’, which restrained the prerogatives of the King of 
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England to the seas.770 Justice Jacobs appears to have drawn on the Crown Ownership 
source of the right for waters above the low watermark and the Birthright/Magna Carta 
source for the seas below the low watermark. 
Justice Brennan held that there was a public right to fish in the seas as well as in tidal 
waters, citing the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General for British Columbia 
v Attorney General for Canada.771 Given the prominence attributed by Justice Brennan 
to that case, as well as his sceptical position on questions of title and ownership in the 
seas (and sea bed), his general approach supports the proposition that there is a one right 
applying across the marine domain, favouring — but not definitively so — the 
Birthright/Magna Carta and Natural Law/Bracton accounts of the source of the right. 
c) State Ownership of Fisheries  
The submissions to the Court in Harper by the Commonwealth, Tasmania, Victoria, 
Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales or Queensland (as summarised in 
the Commonwealth Law Reports) focused on prior ownership of fisheries by the Crown, 
not the public right to fish.772 On the issue of state or federal ownership of fisheries, 
Justice Brennan did not use the term ‘ownership’, and instead described the abalone 
resource as ‘a limited natural resource which is otherwise available for exploitation by 
the public and can be truly said to be public property whether or not the Crown has radical 
or freehold title to the resource’.773 Justices Dawson, Toohey and McHugh characterised 
abalone as a ‘public natural resource’.774 The brief joint reasons provided by Chief Justice 
Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron referred to abalone as a ‘limited public natural 
resource’.775 Although, as noted above, the question of state ownership was raised in 
argument, no judge expressed the view that fisheries were owned by the state.  
Although Justice Brennan found that the competence of the state to regulate fishing 
was not dependent on it having proprietary rights to the subsoil, he acknowledged that 
there was ‘some authority’ that the public right to fish might be ‘sustained’ by the state 
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having such a right,776 citing Mayor of Carlisle v Graham777 as support. In 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr778 Justice Merkel referred to this citation by Justice Brennan 
as support for the view that the public right rested upon the Crown’s ownership of the 
subsoil.779 In fact, Mayor of Carlisle v Graham780 is qualified evidence for a different 
proposition; that public rights are independent of the ownership of the soil, whether by an 
individual or the Crown. That conflict in that case was between the public right and a 
private fishery claimed in a tidal river which had changed its course. With the change in 
course of the river, it now flowed over what had been private land. Chief Baron Kelly 
held that the river, now over private land, would be subject to the public right as ‘the 
rights of the Crown and of the public [my emphasis] may come into existence and be 
exercised in what has thus become a portion of a tidal river or of an arm of the sea’. 781 
He further held that ‘if at any time thereafter the ... river again change[s] its course, 
leaving the new channel dry, the soil becomes again the exclusive property of the owner, 
free from all rights whatsoever in the Crown or in the public [ again my emphasis].782 
The judgment does not support a contention that there is one set of rights, that of the 
Crown and that it is only as a consequence the public right comes into operation. Instead 
the use of ‘and’ and ‘or’ implies two sets of right in operation.  
Reading Justice Brennan’s judgment as whole, he placed little weight on Crown 
ownership as the foundation for the right. He relied heavily on Attorney General for 
British Columbia v Attorney General for Canada783 in his description of the right. The 
Privy Council in that case rejected the ownership account. Furthermore, the case he cited 
as authority does not support such a proposition. Given the above, Harper should not be 
considered support for the Crown Ownership account of the right’s source and its 
subsequent legal attributes.  
d) Summary of Harper and the Right 
The Australian public right to fish, as outlined in Harper, generally retains its English 
legal character, notwithstanding the different context in which the right is exercised. The 
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key difference is the susceptibility of the right to abrogation by regulation. This 
susceptibility is unlikely to be shared by the English right. In England, with the marine 
domain subject to both extensive private rights and the Crown Estate, the loss of the 
public right could potentially lead to significant loss of public access. It would also be 
contrary to current English public policy — as evidenced by legislation — to protect and 
extend public access over public and private lands.784 
The significance of Harper to native title in the marine domain can be illustrated by 
way of a counterfactual speculation; in other words, to consider what might have 
happened if the case had not been decided at this point in time. If it were not for Harper, 
there would have only been limited judicial recognition of the Australian public right to 
fish before native title rights came to be recognised by the High Court.785 But for Harper 
is possible that the High Court might have been more amenable to finding that Indigenous 
rights in the marine domain had the capacity to exclude the public right.  
3. Indigenous Rights to Fish 
a) Harper and Indigenous Rights 
Harper is the first, and arguably the only, substantial judicial analysis of the public 
right to fish in Australia. The decision in Harper reviewed the impact of regulation on the 
right. The balance of this chapter explores the relationship between the right as described 
in Harper and Indigenous interests. The judgment in Harper was handed down786 
between two key cases on Indigenous rights in Australia: Mabo [No 1]787 and Mabo [No 
2].788 Together, these two cases established the recognition of Indigenous rights (by way 
of native title) under the common law of Australia, and the protection of those rights by 
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) from discriminatory appropriation. The 
recognition in Mabo [No 2] of the survival of Indigenous interests under Australian law 
has been described as a ‘judicial revolution’.789 Given that the judgment in Harper was 
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handed down between Mabo [No 1] and Mabo [No 2], it would be inconceivable that no 
thought had been given to consistency across these decisions. As noted above, Justice 
Brennan refers in Harper to the distinction between a ‘radical or freehold title to the 
resource’ [my emphasis].790 The contrast between a radical and a legal title was central 
to Justice Brennan’s judgment handed down in Mabo [No 2].791 It seems unlikely that 
Justice Brennan saw a fundamental inconsistency between the public right to fish in 
Harper, the interests of the Crown and of Indigenous interests. 
The latter part of this chapter will assess the impact of the recognition of native title 
in Mabo [No 2] on the High Court’s interpretation of statutory schemes of management 
for wildlife and, in particular, the authority of Yanner v Eaton.792 A more detailed account 
of the three-way interaction between native title, statutory schemes of management and 
the public right to fish will be considered in Chapter 5. A key issue is the degree to which 
the statutory abrogation of rights is analogous to the extinguishment of Indigenous rights.  
b) Indigenous Rights and Yanner v Eaton  
Harper was decided at a time of flux in Australian law, when common law 
Indigenous rights to land and resources were in the process of being recognised. The 
decision in Mabo [No 2]793 (together with Mabo [No 1]794 and Wik Peoples v 
Queensland795) established Indigenous rights in the form of ‘native title’ as part of the 
common law of Australia. In Mabo [No 2], Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan, 
Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh all stated that extinguishment did not occur 
automatically on acts of settlement by the Crown, but required specific further acts of 
appropriation by the Crown.796 A key aspect of Justice Brennan’s judgment797 was a 
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contrast between radical and legal title.798 Radical title was gained automatically by the 
Crown on settlement, with legal title only being gained by the Crown (or private persons) 
through specific alienation by the Crown.799 The alternative proposition put forward by 
Justice Dawson, that ‘colonial lands which remain unalienated were owned by the British 
Crown’, was rejected.800 The language used by a number of the Justices of the High Court 
spoke directly and emphatically about moral reasons underpinning their decision to 
recognise Indigenous rights to land in Australian common law.801 Nonetheless, although 
it was now clear that the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) protected native title from 
extinguishment from 1975 onwards, native title was still susceptible to extinguishment 
by valid acts before 1975.802 
After Mabo [No 2], judicial assessments of the interaction between common law 
public rights and statutory schemes in the marine domain also had to take into account 
potential interactions with Indigenous rights. The rest of this chapter reviews the impact 
of the recognition of Indigenous interests after 1992 on the interpretation of statutory 
management schemes for wildlife. On their face, these statutory management schemes 
appeared to have the potential for both the extinguishment of Indigenous interests and the 
abrogation of the public right. The High Court in Yanner v Eaton,803 however, found that 
even an assertion of state ownership would not extinguish native title rights, in apparent 
contradiction to earlier authority in Walden v Hensler.804 The common law public right to 
fisheries is different to that of common law doctrines on wildlife, and it is only with due 
caution that analogies should be made between the treatment of wildlife and fisheries. In 
this instance, such analogies are reasonable. At issue was the proper interpretation of 
natural-resource management legislation in the form of a general prohibition on take 
coupled with a licencing or exemption regime. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, 
contemporary fisheries legislation is often in this form. 
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c) Indigenous Interests and Assertions of Crown ‘Ownership’  
In each of the cases of Walden v Hensler805 and Yanner v Eaton,806 Indigenous 
defendants had been charged with hunting wildlife without a permit and contrary to the 
Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). That Act prohibited hunting generally, then allowed 
it only with a licence. This prohibit–licence approach to regulation has some similarities 
with the legislative approach taken in Tasmania in Harper. The Fauna Conservation Act 
1974 (Qld), however, went a step further and Section 7(i) specifically vested the 
‘property’ of all wild fauna in the Crown. Significantly, this Act was passed prior to 1975, 
and accordingly was not at risk from invalidation by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth), even if it implemented a discriminatory expropriation of native title interests. 
In Walden v Hensler, Walden was unsuccessful in his claim to a defence under the 
Queensland Criminal Code of an honest claim of right in property807 based on his belief 
in his right to hunt and take wildlife ‘according to Aboriginal law’.808 By contrast, in 
Yanner v Eaton, Yanner successfully claimed that his Indigenous common law rights had 
survived Section 7(i) of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). Although the issues 
differed to a degree,809 the same argument was made by Queensland in each case, that 
Section 7(i) had extinguished Indigenous rights to hunt and replaced those rights with a 
statutory scheme.810 Although the High Court did not formally overrule the earlier 
decision, the judgments delivered in Yanner v Eaton show that a substantial shift in 
judicial approach to statutory interpretation had taken place after Mabo [No 2].  
As noted above, at issue in both of these cases was whether Indigenous rights had 
survived an assertion of Crown ‘property’ in wildlife by Section 7(i) of the Fauna 
Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). In Walden v Hensler, Justice Brennan (in the majority) was 
of the view that property rights of the Crown under Section 7(i) had indeed ‘eliminated 
any right that Indigenous people may have had at common law’.811 Justices Gaudron and 
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Toohey (in the minority) did not directly accept this view on extinguishment. Their 
separate judgments in favour of the defendant, however, each depended on the 
effectiveness of Section 7(i) in converting fauna into ‘property’,812 so that the Indigenous 
defendant could sustain a defence of an honest claim of right in property. Implicitly, their 
judgments accepted that the state had created a form of property under that Act and had 
not merely regulated existing rights.813 
In Yanner v Eaton, Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne in 
their joint majority judgment814 found that there was a sufficient degree of flexibility in 
the interpretation of the word ‘property’815 under the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld) 
to allow for the continuation of native title rights to hunt and fish. The plurality 
characterised ‘property’ as a term that could signify a ‘wide variety of different forms of 
interest’.816 The plurality further found that the reference in Section 7(i) to property 
should be interpreted as describing the aggregate of state rights over wildlife, and 
accordingly, that section did not have the effect of extinguishing Indigenous rights.817 
Their judgment referred with approval818 to the judgment of Chief Justice Vinson in the 
US Supreme Court Case of Toomer v Witsell.819 In that case, Chief Justice Vinson found 
that: 
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The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction 
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to 
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.820 
On the potential effect of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld), Chief Justice 
Gleeson and Justices Gaudron Kirby and Hayne JJ found that native title rights and 
interests were a ‘socially constituted fact’ and that Indigenous people had a ‘spiritual and 
social connection with the land’.821 This connection was not severed by regulation of 
access or by requiring licences such as ‘a permit to be held to hunt or fish’. 822 The 
plurality referred to the right as being at risk of being extinguished. Justice Gummow, in 
his concurring judgment, also referred to the risk of it being extinguished, but also used 
the word ‘abrogate’ or ‘abrogated’.823 He held that ‘legislative regulation … did not 
abrogate the native title right. Rather, the regulation was consistent with the continued 
existence of that right’.824 Whether the test for ‘extinguishment’ of Indigenous interests 
was the same as that for ‘abrogation’ of the public right to fish created significant 
confusion825 until apparently settled in the negative by the High Court in Karpany v 
Dietman826 and Akiba v Commonwealth.827 This issue is discussed in more detail in 
Chapters 5 to 7.  
In Yanner v Eaton the majority drew support from Section 211 of the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth). Section 211 of the Native Title Act supports Indigenous rights to hunting and 
fishing by providing that certain State and Territory laws did not apply to Indigenous 
persons exercising native title rights engaging in hunting and fishing.828 In the event that 
certain criteria are met,829 Indigenous persons are not subject to laws expressed in the 
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‘Recognition of native title interests in water’. (2000) 4(9) Native Title News 160.  
826 Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507. 
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form of a general restriction associated with a system of conditional permissions. Only 
prohibitions of universal effect, for example, totally protected wildlife or similar bans 
would apply.830 The majority found that the operation of Section 211 necessarily assumed 
the continued coexistence of native title where regulatory schemes involve such a 
‘conditional prohibition’.831 
The decision in Yanner v Eaton revealed a shift in approach to Indigenous rights832 
and the interpretative stance to the effect of legislative schemes of management. The 
plurality in Yanner v Eaton justified a different outcome to that of Walden v Hensler on 
the basis that the issues discussed in Yanner v Eaton were ‘radically different’.833 These 
differences are not explained in detail. The only specific difference cited by the plurality 
in Yanner v Eaton was the passage of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’). A 
reasonable interpretation of the plurality’s ‘radically different’ comment is that it was a 
reference not just to the legal impact of specific provisions of the NTA, but to a shift in 
interpretive approach due to a combination of statutory, social and judicial changes of 
which the NTA was the culmination. 
The Full Federal Court in Akiba v Commonwealth834 also emphasised the influence 
of the NTA, and especially Section 211, on the interpretative approach applied in Yanner 
v Eaton. On appeal to the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth,835 the plurality, 
however, rejected the emphasis placed by the Full Federal Court on the connection 
between Section 211 and Yanner v Eaton. Akiba v Commonwealth confirmed the general 
authority of Yanner v Eaton on the legal characterisation of expansively worded 
regulatory regimes for natural-resource management.836 The importance of Yanner v 
Eaton to the public right to fish lies in the approach taken by the majority to the 
interpretation of legislative provisions asserting rights to, and control over, wildlife. 
Whereas in that case, the majority held that wildlife legislation should be read down as 
being regulatory in nature; in Harper the court found that the legislative scheme was 
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834 Commonwealth of Australia v Akiba (2012) 289 ALR 400, 427. 
835 (2013) 250 CLR 209. 
836 (2013) 250 CLR 209, 243-4 (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). On the broad applicability of Yanner v Eaton, 




sufficiently comprehensive so as to abrogate, and not merely regulate, the public right to 
fish.  
A comprehensive assessment of the effect of fishery management schemes on the 
public right needs to reconcile Yanner v Eaton with Harper and Akiba v Commonwealth. 
In Akiba v Commonwealth Chief Justice French and Justice Crennan made the explicit 
distinction between the abrogation of the public right and extinguishment of Indigenous 
rights.837 There is nothing inherently contradictory in the High Court finding that the 
effect of statutory provisions potentially extinguishing Indigenous rights is different to 
the abrogatory effect of statutory provisions on public rights to fish. Indigenous rights 
are recognised by the common law as a form of private interest in land or waters, or at 
least a communal right analogous to such an interest.838 There is a strong presumption in 
favour of such rights not being extinguished.839 The public right to fish does not give rise 
to private rights. In Harper, Justice Brennan contrasted public rights with proprietary 
rights when noting that the public right was ‘freely amenable to abrogation or 
regulation’.840 Elements of the public right, such as the rule in relation to private grants 
to the low watermark, are more properly compared to other public rights rather than 
private rights. In some ways, this public nature makes the right fragile, in other ways, 
such as the potential for it to revive after abrogation, the right’s public nature makes it 
more potentially robust.  
Notwithstanding differences between public and private rights, a degree of confusion 
between the abrogation of a public right and the extinguishment of Indigenous rights is 
understandable. Each of those rights will be affected where there is a ‘necessary 
implication’ to do so in legislation.841 In a 2010 article, Goldsworthy suggests an approach 
that, if applied, could provide a clearer guide to interpretation of management schemes 
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to all interests imposing a presumption against expropriation of existing rights, in particular, without 
compensation.’ 
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for natural resources.842 Goldsworthy suggests that there are two potential meanings for 
‘necessary implication’. The first is whether the implication is necessary for the provision 
to have effect. The second is whether the author had a ‘certain communicative intention’ 
that is ‘in the circumstances obvious’.843 The first of these meanings focuses on the 
effectiveness of the specific legislative scheme being reviewed, the second on broader 
considerations as to what is ‘obvious’. It is possible for the same legislative words in 
fisheries legislation to give rise to a necessary implication that the public right to fish has 
been abrogated, whereas for broader considerations such as the potential for interaction 
with Indigenous rights, the words might not contain sufficient intent to extinguish 
Indigenous interests.  
Nonetheless, this distinction is a fine one.844 A regulatory scheme for fisheries 
management expressed in general terms would need to be ‘just right’ to have the effect 
of abrogating the public right to fish (and creating exclusive private rights) but, on the 
other hand, not appear to intend to extinguish Indigenous rights to fish. The High Court 
was faced with this issue in the Blue Mud Bay Case.845 Although the Blue Mud Bay 
Case846 has not recently been cited in more recent fisheries cases before the High Court, 
neither has it been overruled.847 For the reasons given in Chapter 5, the interpretative 
stance taken by the majority in the Blue Mud Bay Case848 is unsatisfactory. Some of the 
problems that arise in applying the case to current fisheries legislation will be discussed 
in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 it is concluded that The Blue Mud Bay Case is of limited utility 
in the interpretation of fisheries legislation and to the relationship between that legislation 
and the public right.  
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4. Conclusions  
The decision in Harper is the first substantial analysis of the public right to fish by 
an Australian court. Harper confirmed the reception of the right from English law and 
the key characteristics or attributes of the right. A novel feature of Harper was the explicit 
recognition of public policy considerations behind new legislative approaches to fisheries 
management, and the abrogation of common law rights. The case, although confirming 
the public right to fish, also emphasised its susceptibility to abrogation by statute.  
Yanner v Eaton presented what superficially appeared to be a different approach to 
the effects of wildlife legislation and fisheries legislation. Conditional prohibitions of the 
kind common in fisheries legislation were found not to have an extinguishing effect on 
Indigenous rights in that case. The reconciliation of Harper with Yanner v Eaton is 
complicated by the fact that Harper was decided in the absence of consideration of 
Indigenous interests. The three-way interaction between Indigenous rights, statutory 





CHAPTER 5: THE ABROGATED RIGHT 
A. The Right and The Blue Mud Bay Case 
The Blue Mud Bay Case849 in 2008 was the last in a series of cases over fishing rights 
in the tidal zone850 of the Northern Territory (collectively the ‘NT Fishing Cases’851). The 
significance of the Blue Mud Bay Case to this thesis is that, but for this case, Australian 
law in relation to the public right to fish appeared to have been relatively settled. The 
general legal characteristics of the Australian public right to fish having been outlined in 
Harper,852 the appropriate stance to take to the interpretation of wildlife legislation set 
out in Yanner v Eaton853 and the interaction between Indigenous rights and the public 
right outlined in Commonwealth v Yarmirr.854 Based on these cases, comprehensive 
regulation could abrogate the right and replace it with a statutory right. Natural-resource 
management legislation of the prohibit–licence variety, however, could generally be 
interpreted as regulatory in nature, and not intended to wholly abrogate or extinguish 
other rights.855 Furthermore, due to the common law right, exclusive Indigenous claims 
to the marine zone based on common law native title would not be recognised under 
Australian law.856 
In the Blue Mud Bay Case, however, the plurality decided that provisions of the 
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) which were expressed in a prohibit–licence form abrogated the 
                                                 
 
849 Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
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854 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1. 
855 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. As applied to the interpretation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) see 
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public right across the Northern Territory by ‘necessary implication’.857 This left the 
public only such rights as could be sourced in the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).858 On its face, 
this prohibit–licence legislative scheme did not appear to be different in kind from the 
legislative scheme found to be only regulatory in effect in Yanner v Eaton.859 
Furthermore, the approach of the plurality emphasised the susceptibility of the right to 
abrogation. As a result of that abrogation, the plurality held that ‘[n]o question arises of 
any intersection between a common law right to fish and rights given by the grants under 
the Land Rights Act’.860 
The key question explored in this chapter is the degree to which the approach of the 
plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case represents a reliable guide to the effect of fisheries 
legislation on the public right to fish in other jurisdictions.861 This chapter proposes that 
the plurality adopted a ‘narrow and shallow’ approach to adjudication. Their approach — 
whether intended or not — limits the utility of the plurality’s reasoning as a general guide 
to the interpretation of fisheries legislation. The limited authority of the Blue Mud Bay 
Case as a guide to statutory interpretation of fishing legislation can be demonstrated in 
more recent High Court fishing cases. In neither Akiba v Commonwealth 862 or in Karpany 
v Dietman863 was the Blue Mud Bay Case cited in the judgments, or in oral argument 
before the court. Nonetheless, the Blue Mud Bay Case has not been formally overruled or 
distinguished as relevant only to the special circumstances applicable to that dispute in 
the Northern Territory. The plurality’s approach increased uncertainty over the effect of 
fisheries legislation on the public right. These matters are explored further in Chapters 6–
8. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on the different accounts of the source of 
the public right raised in judgments in the NT Fishing Cases.864 Of particular interest is 
the degree to which the public right to fish has been associated with prerogatives of the 
Crown, and by implication with the Crown Ownership account of the source of the right. 
As highlighted in earlier chapters, from a legal historical perspective the Crown 
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Ownership account is the weakest of the three sources for the right, the other two being 
the Birthright/Magna Carta and Bracton/Natural Law accounts. A close association 
between the public right to fish and prerogatives of the Crown carries the legal implication 
that the right is subject to the general legal rules governing the prerogative.865 
B. The Tidal Zone in the Northern Territory  
1. Introduction  
The preceding chapter dealt with the recognition of Indigenous rights under the 
common law of Australia, and their reinforcement by the passage of the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth) (the ‘NTA’). The degree of recognition of Indigenous rights is limited by the 
recognition of common law rights to fish and navigate.866 These common law rights 
preclude the recognition of exclusive Indigenous interests in the marine domain.867 A 
successful claim for an exclusive Indigenous fishery would need further support, such as 
that provided in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (the ‘LRA’). The LRA was not based on common law native 
title, having been created in a period when it was thought that such rights to land were 
incapable of recognition under the common law of Australia.868 Under the LRA, titles to 
land and waters were granted in ‘fee simple’869 to Land Trusts, those trusts being 
administered by Land Councils, Indigenous corporate bodies established under the 
LRA.870 Along the coast the geographical boundaries of LRA title extend out to the low 
watermark 871 including the foreshore when exposed by tides, waters between the high 
and low watermarks, tidal rivers, and estuaries (for the purposes of this chapter ‘the tidal 
zone’).872 As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, such an extensive geographic extension of private 
property in the form of fee simple title down to the low watermark is exceptional in 
Australian law. Whether the LRA title provided a sufficient statutory basis for exclusive 
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Indigenous rights in the tidal zone would, however, depend on the interaction of the LRA 
with both fisheries legislation in the Northern Territory and with the public right to fish.  
2. The LRA and the Tidal Zone  
The proportion of the Northern Territory coast subject to LRA title has been variously 
estimated as between 80 per cent873 and 88 per cent.874 For the most part, this title covers 
areas that were administered as Aboriginal reserves prior to the commencement of the 
LRA. Justice Woodward outlined a history of those Aboriginal reserves in 1974 in his 
Second Report of the Aboriginal Lands Commission.875 Justice Woodward described this 
history as ‘a complicated history of proclamations, revocations, fresh proclamations, 
resumptions in part for other purposes and so on’.876 There had been a longstanding 
dispute in the Northern Territory over whether commercial fishers had a right of access 
to tidal waters and foreshores along the coastline of Aboriginal reserves.877 Justice 
Woodward noted the existence of a dispute over ‘estuaries and tidal flats’, and concluded 
that these areas ‘have generally been regarded as being part of reserves and therefore out 
of bounds to commercial fishermen’.878 He recommended that ‘Aboriginal land ... should 
include both offshore islands and waters within two kilometres of the low tide zone’.879 
Justice Woodward intended that fisheries laws of general application should continue to 
apply to this area.880 
The legislative scheme recommended by Justice Woodward was not implemented in 
the LRA. Legislative endeavours to implement Justice Woodward’s recommendations 
commenced under the Whitlam Labor Government — which commissioned his report — 
but the LRA was finalised under the Fraser Liberal–National Coalition Government in 
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1976. The final version of the LRA provided for the grant of fee simple titles, but only 
down to the low watermark. Below the low watermark, the LRA provided for future 
declarations of exclusive zones of access out to two nautical miles, but under 
complementary Northern Territory legislation (‘sea closures’).881 Each of these separate 
statutory regimes had the potential to limit the public right to fish, but in different ways. 
Under the LRA, fee simple title was granted to the tidal zone, but the LRA did not 
explicitly address public access to the tidal zone. Sea closures from the low watermark 
outwards to two nautical miles could exclude public access, but without an accompanying 
grant of title. The Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory noted the LRA was 
the result of a ‘legislative compromise’.882 
A lack of clarity on public access to areas below the high watermark set the scene for 
further conflict, in particular, between the public right to fish in the tidal zone and the 
LRA’s statutory regime of control over LRA title areas. Section 70 of the LRA restricted 
non-Aboriginal access to Aboriginal land. Depending on the definition of ‘land’, when 
the tide was out, the surface of the tidal zone might be considered land. When the tide 
was in, the same area would be considered water. In other words, public rights of access 
would ebb and flow with the tide over LRA land.883 By reason of the public rights to fish 
and navigate, non-Aboriginal fishers could range far inland along tidal rivers, 
undermining one of Justice Woodward’s original objectives, which was to provide for the 
‘privacy’ of Indigenous communities.884 Although the proposition that rights can move 
in and out with the tide has some historical885 and legal support,886 it seems implausible 
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that obscure English legal history had influenced the legislation’s preparation. 
Furthermore, an anomaly would be introduced if the public right was retained over the 
tidal zone and then a sea closure was granted outward from the low watermark. There 
could potentially be exclusive Aboriginal access to LRA land above the high watermark, 
an exclusive zone of Aboriginal access seaward below the low watermark, and public 
right of access over the tidal zone, retained over LRA title. Accordingly, there would be a 
public right of access sandwiched between the high watermark on one side, and a two-
nautical-mile sea closure from below the low watermark on the other. 
3. Access to the Northern Territory Tidal Zone 
Access to the tidal zone in the Northern Territory was not in question in 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr887 due to the circumstances of the case and the litigative 
choices made by the participants and courts in earlier proceedings. At first instance, 
Justice Olney held that the claim before him excluded coverage of LRA title in the tidal 
zone.888 As a result of the exclusion of the tidal zone, the three-way interaction between 
fisheries legislation, public rights and Indigenous rights under the LRA was not at issue, 
only the two-way competition between native title rights under the NTA and the public 
right to fish. On appeal, the Federal Court declined to add the impact of LRA title to the 
matters at issue.889 The result was that the question of the effect of the LRA on the public 
right was not before the High Court on appeal. 
Given that access to the tidal zone was unresolved, the Arnhem Land Aboriginal 
Land Trust commenced litigation in Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of 
Fisheries.890 This litigation addressed the three-way interaction between the LRA, the 
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and the public right to fish. The Land Trust disputed the claim 
by the Northern Territory that the combined effect of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and the 
                                                 
 
887 (2001) 208 CLR 1. 
888 Yarmirr v Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533, 545 (Olney J). It was not, strictly speaking, 
necessary for the claim to be framed in this way to avoid potential extinguishing effects of LRA title on 
native title recognised under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). See Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 47, 47A, 
47B. For an explanation how these various provisions work together to have this effect see Gumana v 
Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349, 378-391 (French, Finn and Sundberg JJ). 
889 Yarmirr v The Northern Territory [2000] FCA 48 , [10] (Beaumont, Von Doussa and Merkel JJ) ‘The Trust 
was not then a party and did not then, or ever, seek to intervene in these proceedings to contradict the 
appellants’ claim in any respect … In the absence of any attempt by the Trust to contradict the appellant’s 
claim to those waters, no basis exists for us to disturb his Honour’s conclusion’. 




public right was to ensure access to the tidal zone above LRA title.891 At first instance, 
Justice Mansfield concluded that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) regulated, but did not 
wholly abrogate, the public right to fish.892 He also held that the public right to fish 
continued in effect over the LRA title, however, he excluded estuaries and inland tidal 
waters from the geographic extent of the public right to fish on the basis of an ‘implied 
prohibition under the LRA’.893 This exclusion, unsupported by authority,894 represented 
an innovative compromise that allowed public access to the tidal zone along the coast 
while allowing for the privacy intended by Justice Woodward to prevail over public 
access in rivers and estuaries.895 On appeal, the Full Federal Court decided on technical 
grounds to quash Justice Mansfield’s judgment.896 Justice Sackville did state that ‘without 
expressing a final view’, the public right to fish prevailed over LRA title.897 
4. The Blue Mud Bay Case 
With an inconclusive result following the decision of the Full Federal Court in 2001, 
full consideration of public access to the tidal zone in the Northern Territory was left to 
The Blue Mud Bay Case.898 A fresh case commenced before Justice Selway in Gumana v 
Northern Territory.899 Hearings before Justice Selway were held concurrently under both 
the LRA and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) to avoid some of the technical problems that 
troubled earlier litigation. This ensured that the three-way interaction between Indigenous 
rights, fisheries regulation and the public right to fish in the Northern Territory could be 
fully addressed. Justice Selway held that, on authority of the Full Federal Court in 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr, the public right to fish applied to the tidal zone and allowed 
commercial and recreational access to the tidal areas granted under the LRA.900 Justice 
Selway stated, however, that if not bound by authority he would have characterised the 
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public right as merely ‘the common law principle that a person can do that which is not 
prohibited’.901  
On appeal in Gumana v Northern Territory,902 the Full Federal Court focused on the 
interpretation of provisions of the LRA. The Court did comment on the public right to 
fish, 903 but declared its final conclusions were based on the ‘text and context’904 of the 
LRA rather than on its views on the public right.905 The Court held that both the public 
right to fish and the operation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) were excluded from the 
tidal zone by operation of the LRA.906 The Court held that not only did the public right to 
fish not apply to LRA titles, but also that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) ‘had no 
application’907 to areas under LRA title, in part based on limits on the Northern Territory’s 
power to create rights affecting LRA title. 908  
As noted above, the High Court plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case adopted a 
different order of questions to consider than that adopted by the Full Federal Court. The 
plurality held that the relevant preliminary question was whether or not the Fisheries Act 
1988 (NT) had abrogated the public right.909 Having concluded that the public right had 
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Australia (No 2), [2005] FCA 1425 (Mansfield J). 
902 (2007) 158 FCR 349 (the court being comprised of French, Finn and Sundberg JJ). 
903 Ibid, 372. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Ibid. 
906 Ibid, 376-7. 
907 Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349, 376-7.  
908 Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349, 376-7. Although the Northern Territory has a 
substantial degree of self-government, it does not have the constitutional status of a State under 
Australian law. Northern Territory delegated powers of legislation are expressly subject to limitations 
imposed by the Commonwealth, including those in the LRA. See Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 
1978 (Cth). Section 67 of the LRA specifically states that ‘Aboriginal land shall not be compulsorily acquired 
or forfeited under any law of the Northern Territory’. See further discussion of legislative competence in 
Heather Ahlstrom Coldwell, ‘Fee Simple Estate and Footholds In Fishing: The Australian High Court’s 
Formalistic Interpretation Of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act’ (2010) 19(2) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
303, 324-6. 




been abrogated across the Northern Territory,910 only then did the plurality consider the 
LRA and its interaction with fisheries legislation.  
C. The Blue Mud Bay Dispute  
1. Context and the Interests at Stake  
Prior to considering the Blue Mud Bay Case in further detail, it is useful to first review 
the economic, political and resource management context of the dispute. This section 
assesses possible reasons why the plurality might have been attracted to the adoption of 
an approach that has been described as a ‘narrow holding’911 in which competition over 
rights was ‘not fully resolved’912 and in which the Court ‘refrained from spelling out in 
comprehensive terms what legal entitlements the traditional owners hold over the 
intertidal zone’.913 The plurality was largely silent on the policy and economic issues 
involved in this case.914 The analysis below, therefore, explores the issues through the 
submissions made by the parties in oral argument. In addition, this review of the issues 
clarifies some misconceptions in academic commentary on the case as to the value of 
competing commercial rights in the Northern Territory.915 
The proportion of the Northern Territory coast subject to LRA title has been estimated 
at between 80 per cent916 and 88 per cent917. Although the area involved is extensive, 
some sources have overestimated the size of the economic interests directly affected, 
especially of the commercial fisheries involved.918 These fisheries were described as ‘rich 
natural resources’919 and the commercial fishing industry’s assets have been described as 
‘immense’.920 The value of all fisheries in the Northern Territory appears to have been 
                                                 
 
910 Ibid, 58. 
911 Coldwell, above n 908, 396. 
912 Shoanne Labowitch, ‘Integration and Reconciliation of Social, Legal and Environmental Interests under 
Indigenous Land Rights Sea Claims’ (2010) 27(3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 189, 201. 
913 Brennan, Sean, ‘Wet or Dry, It’s Aboriginal land: The Blue Mud Bay Decision on the Intertidal Zone.’ 
(2008) 7(7) Indigenous Law Bulletin 6. 
914 Kirby J, being more forthcoming, Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 69-71 (Kirby J). 
915 Especially Coldwell, above n 908, 304, 329. See also Sean Brennan, above n 913. 
916 Northern Land Council, above n 873.  
917 Expert evidence led by the Northern Territory estimated 84–88 per cent cited at Northern Territory of 
Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 721 at [50].  
918 See Brennan, above n 913; Coldwell, above n 908, Labowitch, above n 912. 
919 Brennan, above n 913. 




conflated with the value of the fisheries of the tidal zone.921 Public claims of the fishing 
industry may have helped create an exaggerated impression of the scale of the interests 
involved.922 In reality, although the inshore area covered by LRA title is extensive, the 
commercial fisheries affected are low-value fisheries. In 2008, the principal fisheries 
impacted were a commercial barramundi fishery and a commercial mud crab fishery. In 
2010, the total annual lease value of all commercial fisheries under LRA title was 
estimated to be ‘well under $3 million per year’.923 The more economically lucrative 
fisheries in waters off the Northern Territory tend to be offshore.924  
Recreational fishing is an important social activity in the Northern Territory 
community925 and of significant importance to the Northern Territory economy.926 
However, generating fee income from recreational fisheries is problematic. If the 
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) was excluded from the intertidal zone, Indigenous organisations 
would have legal control of access to the tidal zone,927 but would also need to manage 
access and activities without recourse to the machinery of state created under the 
provisions of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).928 An audit of Land Councils in 2008 showed 
that in 2005–6 it cost the Northern Land Council $49 to process a permit for access under 
                                                 
 
921 Labowitch, above n 912, 192. 
922 Such as a claim by the Northern Territory Fishing Industry Council that over AUD$1.4 billion was 
invested along the Northern Territory Coast. Reported in Coldwell, above n 908, 329.  
923 Chris Calogeris, John Christoferson and Ken Baulch, ‘Indigenous Consultation, Engagement, Economic 
Development and Co-Management in the Northern Territory Fishing and Seafood Industry’ (C-Aid 
Consultants, 2010), 32.  
924 Such as the Northern Prawn Fishery managed under Commonwealth legislation. The offshore regime 
under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) is significantly less advantageous to Indigenous interests. See, 
Bartlett (2015), above n 185, 615. 
925 GW Henry and JM Lyle, ‘The National Recreational and Indigenous Fishing Survey: FRDC Project 99/158’ 
(2003). 
926 See Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries, ‘Fishery Report No.111: Recreational Fishing Status 
Report 2011’ (Northern Territory Government, 2011). The economic value of recreational fisheries can be 
easily overstated and estimates of the value of recreational fisheries should be treated with caution. See 
generally, Tor Hundloe, Valuing Fisheries: An Economic Framework (The University of Queensland Press, 
2002). 
927 Potentially under a combination of common law trespass and provisions of the LRA such as Section 70, 
which restricts non-Aboriginal access to Aboriginal land. 
928 Permit conditions could assist in creating a legal regime for management, but the practical difficulties 




the LRA.929 This is just the cost of processing applications. If the Full Federal Court’s 
orders restricting the application of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) had remained in place, 
then in order to enforce access restrictions, Land Councils would have had to rely on 
common law trespass or look to the provisions of the LRA to set up a separate system for 
enforcement and management.930 Licensing, management and enforcement can be 
expensive activities.  
One profit-maximising strategy would be to optimise net income by imposing high 
fees while reducing costs by substantially restricting access. A high-fee, limited-access 
strategy may be economically viable for Indigenous ventures targeting high-end game 
fishing,931 but would likely exclude many recreational fishers.932 It is significant that the 
immediate response of the Northern Land Council to success in the Full Federal Court in 
2007 was to set up a unilateral scheme providing for the automatic free issue of permits 
to recreational fishers and to assure recreational fishers of future access through 
negotiation with the Northern Territory government.933 The Northern Land Council 
ensured that management responsibilities remained with the Northern Territory 
government while claiming fees and other assistance from the Northern Territory in return 
for non-Indigenous access, which was consistent with a pragmatic assessment of the risks 
and benefits. 934 As of late 2017, this strategy has showed some success,935 but after nearly 
                                                 
 
929 Office of Evaluation and Audit (Indigenous Programs), ‘Performance Audit of the Northern Territory 
Land Councils’ (Department of Finance (Cth), 2008).  
930 ‘Canberra Not Needed to Protect Fishing Rights: Henderson [then Chief Minister of the Northern 
Territory]’, ABC News Website (online) 1 August 2008 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-08-
01/canberra-not-needed-to-protect-fishing-rights/460668>  
931 In 2010, The Tiwi Land Council split from other Land Councils on a combined position on permits and 
applied its own licensing regime, David Wood, ‘Fishing Rights Extended’, NT News (Darwin), June 20 2011. 
See also, Chris Calogeris, John Christoferson and Ken Baulch, ‘Indigenous Consultation, Engagement, 
Economic Development and Co-Management in the Northern Territory Fishing and Seafood Industry’ (C-
Aid Consultants, 2010). At 39 they stated that access to a Tiwi fishing camp was set at $55 per visit. 
932 See Brennan, above n 913. He notes a ‘torrent of negative responses’ to previous decisions where it 
appeared that there would be ‘an impact on an activity as dearly regarded by non-Indigenous Territorians 
as fishing’. 
933 See Brennan above, n 913; Labowitch, above n 912, 197-8; Northern Land Council (Press Release), 
above n 873. 
934 Paul Henderson, ‘Practical Plan to Resolve Blue Mud Bay Issues’ (Media Release, Office of the Chief 
Minister 30 July 2008). 





10 years on from the decision by the High Court with no long-term arrangements in place, 
the prospect for further conflict remains.936 
Arguments by the parties before the High Court in The Blue Mud Bay Case are best 
understood against this backdrop of complex issues relating to the costs, benefits and 
practicality of future arrangements. Noting these issues, it is unsurprising that all parties 
were of the view that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) should apply to the tidal zone.937 While 
the parties agreed that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) covered the tidal zone, they disagreed 
on the degree to which the public right to fish survived regulation under the Fisheries Act 
1988 (NT). Counsel for the Northern Territory, the Commonwealth and commercial 
fishing interests asserted that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) had the effect of regulating 
rights to fish, but did not wholly abrogate the public right to fish.938 Counsel for the 
Indigenous parties argued that the statutory scheme had wholly abrogated the public right 
to fish of commercial fishers, but did not argue that the public right to fish by recreational 
fishers had been abrogated.939 The principal arguments advanced on behalf of Indigenous 
interests focused on the exclusion of non-Indigenous access under Section 70 of the LRA, 
and on whether commercial licences under the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) could authorise 
access to the tidal zone.940 In essence, the parties accepted that the public right to fish 
extended over LRA to some degree; disagreed on the extent to which the public right to 
fish had been abrogated by the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT); and differed markedly on the 
effects of the LRA and the interaction of that Act with licences under the Fisheries Act 
1988 (NT).  
In relation to the effect of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and LRA on fisheries 
management, Mr Walker QC stated: 
                                                 
 
936 Shipway, above n 45. 
937 This appears to have been a position of long standing for the Northern Land Council. The Northern 
Land Council (technically its predecessor the Northern Council) did not seek special exemptions for 
Aboriginal people from laws of general application that protected fish stocks in the original Woodward 
Commission. See Woodward, above n 869, 81. 
938 Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 721, [1320-65] 
(Jackson QC), [1830-1895] (Perry QC),  
939 Ibid, [3665] (Walker QC). Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) 
HCA Trans 722 [5155-60] [5280] [5540—5] (Walker QC) 





They are aquatic resources, they are subject to the legislative stewardship of the 
Territory and licences can be granted for the taking of it. If it is the grazier [earlier using 
the analogy of a grazier that had private land] who gets the licence that is all he or she 
needs, but if it is anybody else then of course there has to be an arrangement. The Fisheries 
Act does not purport to alter private property, why should it be seen as altering Aboriginal 
land. 941 
From a natural-resource management perspective it is advantageous that fishery 
management schemes are as comprehensive as possible, covering all users. This becomes 
a difficult task when fish stocks straddle jurisdictional boundaries.942 In the absence of 
tight integration with the Northern Territory’s statutory schemes for the management of 
fisheries, practical problems for sustainable management would likely emerge from the 
exclusion of the operation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) from the tidal zone. The 
emphasis placed by Counsel on ‘legislative stewardship’ is consistent with the purposive 
approach to the interpretation of fisheries and natural-resource management legislation 
taken in Harper943 and Yanner v Eaton.944 
In summary, if the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) had been excluded from the tidal zone, 
the Land Trust’s rights to the tidal zone would have been clear and well defined, but 
problematic from the perspective of management effectiveness and of questionable value 
from an economic perspective. The Northern Territory would have been left without clear 
legislative authority to manage fisheries along much of the Northern Territory coast. Any 
legislative attempt to resolve ensuing problems of access, management and sustainability 
would have undoubtedly faced significant political risk and uncertainty.  
2. A Strained Construction? 
In The Blue Mud Bay Case, the plurality945 took a different approach to that taken by 
the Federal Court at the first instance, the Full Federal Court on appeal or indeed of 
                                                 
 
941 Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722, [5100-5]. 
942 See generally, Productivity Commission,’ ‘Marine Fisheries and Aquaculture, Final Report’ (Productivity 
Commission, Canberra 2016). See in particular Section 6, 187-214. 
943 Harper (1989) 168 CLR 314. 
944 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
945 Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. The plurality consisting of Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and 
Crennan JJ. Kirby J expressed general agreement with the plurality’s reasons and orders at 67. Heydon J 
focused on the effect of the LRA but referred to ‘lawful exercise of the rights of fishing and navigation’ at 
82-3. Kiefel J, at 99, decided it was not necessary to resolve whether a person had a right to fish because 
of the principle at common law that a person is free to do anything not forbidden by law applied and that 




counsel in oral argument before the High Court. The plurality’s first step towards 
resolving the three-way interaction between Indigenous rights, statutory schemes of 
management and the public right was to assess whether or not the Fisheries Act 1988 
(NT) had comprehensively abrogated the public right to fish in the Northern Territory. 
This approach made the effect of fisheries legislation on the public right fundamental to 
their judgment.946 In essence, the plurality’s judicial approach was novel in its treatment 
of the public right, not in its treatment of Indigenous rights under the LRA. It was only 
after concluding that the right had been abrogated that the plurality considered the LRA. 
The result was that the effect of the public right on LRA title was not at issue in the 
plurality’s judgment. This sidestepped the need to resolve a more controversial question, 
that being priorities between the public right and Indigenous rights under the LRA. This 
was an issue that the legislature had left open notwithstanding Justice Woodward’s clear 
recommendations on access to the tidal zone.947 
The plurality held that by ‘necessary implication, the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) (and 
in particular ss 10 and 11) abrogated any public right to fish in tidal waters in the Northern 
Territory’.948 Having decided that the public right had been abrogated, they held that it 
was unnecessary to decide the question of whether or not LRA title excluded the right. 
The plurality’s findings led to an — apparently unintended949 — impact on the Fisheries 
Act 1988 (NT), which was the loss of access by non-Aboriginal fisheries to most of the 
tidal zone of the Northern Territory. Legislation intended to support the ability of the 
Northern Territory to develop and manage fisheries led to a significant reduction of the 
area in which the vast majority of recreational and commercial fishers could fish, at least 
without permission from LRA title holders.  
In assessing the effect of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) on public rights, the plurality 
stated that, ‘[t]he statutory abrogation of a public right may appear not only from express 
words but by necessary implication from the text and structure of the statute’.950 The 
                                                 
 
946 A point the plurality emphasised in their judgment. Ibid, 55 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and 
Crennan JJ.). 
947 Woodward, above n 869, 80-1. 
948 This approach to the case having been foreshadowed in oral argument, see Northern Territory of 
Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722 [5275] (Gummow J). 
949 Particularly in relation to recreational fishing. In the Second Reading Speech, introducing this 
legislation, the Minister instead stressed the increasing importance of recreational fishing to the Northern 
Territory. Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, 13 October 1988, 4569-74 (Michael Reed, Minister 
for Primary Industry and Fisheries).  




plurality’s apparent characterisation of arguments by Counsel for the Northern Territory 
and commercial fishers that explicit words were required to abrogate the right cannot be 
reconciled with the record of oral argument before the Court. Counsel for those parties 
only argued that there needed to be a clear statutory intent to abrogate a public right,951 
an orthodox view of authorities relating to public rights such as in Potter v Minahan.952 
A finding of a necessary implication would have been sufficient to satisfy a test of clear 
intent. At issue was whether a finding of necessary implication was required in the first 
place.  
On its face, Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) appears to have been an 
unexceptional example of a conditional prohibition in natural-resource management 
legislation of the type referred to in Yanner v Eaton.953 The Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) is 
less comprehensive than the statutory provisions referred to in Yanner v Eaton.954 In that 
case, the requirement to hold a licence to hunt wildlife was not subject to exemptions for 
personal use; there was a legislative history of removing exemptions for Indigenous 
hunting and there was a provision vesting property in wildlife in the Crown.955 The Blue 
Mud Bay Case plurality did not explain why the relevant provisions of the Fisheries Act 
1988 (NT) were not a conditional prohibition that was regulatory in nature, especially 
considering earlier Federal Court decisions had supported such an interpretation of the 
Act.956  
  
                                                 
 
951 Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 721. Mr Bennett 
QC at [3360] ‘a statute will not be taken to override common law rights unless it does so with great clarity’. 
Ms Perry QC at [1700] referred to the need for an ‘express or clear intention’. 
952 Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277. Although possibly an outdated view on common law. See Harrison 
v Melhem (2008) 72 NSWLR 380, [2] (Spigelman CJ). See also Chief Justice of New South Wales JJ 
Spigelman AC ‘Legitimate and Spurious Interpretation’ (speech delivered at the McPherson Lecture Series, 
University of Queensland, 12 March 2008) 
<http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/Pre-
2015%20Speeches/Spigelman/spigelman_speeches_2008.pdf>. 
953 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, 373 (Gleeson CJ and Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
954 (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
955 Ibid. 
956 See, for example, the conclusion that the relevant legislation was regulatory in nature in Yarmirr v 
Northern Territory (No 2) (1998) 82 FCR 533, 599 (Olney J); Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Director 




Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) states that: 
(1) Subject to this Act or to an instrument of a legislative or administrative 
character made under it, a person shall not: 
(a) take any fish … unless the person does so under and in accordance with a 
licence ... 
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the taking of fish … by a person for 
subsistence957 or personal use only (and not for the purposes of sale), within such limits (if 
any) relating to numbers, quantity, size, weight, methods, types and amount of fishing gear, 
and periods of time (including closed and open seasons), as may be prescribed for any such 
fish. 
The plurality’s construction of Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) is valid 
only if its interpretation of ‘nothing in this section’ in Section 10(2) is viewed as non-
literal. Otherwise the limitation ‘nothing’ would also apply to the abrogatory effect of 
Section 10(1). Only a very limited meaning of ‘nothing’ supports the plurality’s 
interpretation that Section 10(1) applied to create a general prohibition that is only 
relieved by statutory exemption under Section 10(2). Indeed, Gullett cited Section 10(2) 
of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) as evidence of a positive intent by the Northern Territory 
to preserve the public right to fish.958 
Furthermore, although the plurality initially characterised the Fisheries Act 1988 
(NT) as a form of comprehensive statutory regulation,959 it later emphasised the 
limitations of regulation under the Act. On questions of access, the plurality concluded 
that ‘the Fisheries Act does not deal with where persons may fish. Rather, the Fisheries 
Act provides for where persons may not [emphasis in the original] fish’.960 On this basis, 
it held that licences under the Act did not provide a right of access to the tidal zone under 
LRA title.961 According to the plurality, therefore, the effects of the Fisheries Act 1988 
(NT) were so comprehensive that they abrogated the public right to fish, but were limited 
                                                 
 
957 Specific exemptions for Indigenous take are provided elsewhere in the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT). 
958 Gullett, ‘Up the Creek and Out at Sea’ above, n 179. 
959 Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).  
960 Ibid, 60. 
961 The plurality thereby also avoided the need to answer questions of the legislative competence of the 
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in relation to the rights of licensees under the Act. The result, as noted above, was that, 
‘by necessary implication’, legislation intended to further the legislative authority of the 
Northern Territory led to a reduction in the area over which rights under that Act could 
be exercised without the approval of the holders of LRA title.  
Goldsworthy has suggested that there are two kinds of ‘necessary implication’. The 
first is an implication that is necessary for a statutory provision to have its intended effect, 
and the second is where there is a ‘certain communicative intention’ that is ‘in the 
circumstances obvious’.962 The necessary implication in this case appears unlikely to have 
been of the first kind. Such a finding would be directly contrary to Yanner v Eaton,963 that 
a regulatory scheme does not require abrogation or extinguishment of prior rights to have 
effect. Indeed, the plurality did not refer to Yanner v Eaton at all. The necessary 
implication here appears to be of the second kind, a conclusion based on obvious intent 
as drawn by the plurality from the words of the statute.  
The plurality, however, did not explain why it found there was such a necessary 
implication, although it did note the susceptibility of the public right to abrogation.964 In 
the reasons given for their interpretation of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), the plurality 
compared the Act to regulation of prerogatives of the Crown citing965 Justice McHugh in 
Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal of New South Wales; Ex Parte Defence Housing 
Authority.966 The plurality also cited Attorney General v De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd (‘De 
Keyser’s Case’)967 amongst others as authority for the proposition that the Fisheries Act 
1988 (NT) abrogated the public right to fish in the Northern Territory.968 The importance 
of De Keyser’s Case,969 to the reasoning of the plurality is emphasised by its repeated 
                                                 
 
962 Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Implications Revisited’, above n 842, 19. 
963 (1999) 201 CLR 351 (Gleeson CJ and Gaudron Kirby and Hayne JJ). Indeed there was no reference to 
this case by the majority, despite it being cited in oral argument, Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem 
Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722, [6730] (Jackson QC). 
964 Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 57 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
965 Ibid, 58 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
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statutory scheme laid down by the Parliament’ (McHugh J). 
967 [1920] AC 508. 
968 Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 




reference in oral argument by Justice Gummow.970 De Keyser’s Case is more typically 
cited as an authority for the proposition that prerogative powers cannot coexist with 
legislation.971 In this case, the issue was the impact of legislation on a public right. It is 
not clear whether the plurality was proposing a new ‘necessary implication’ rule based 
on De Keyser’s Case,972 a specific rule relevant to this legislative scheme only, or a rule 
relevant because of a loose association of the public right to fish with the prerogative. 
Possibly a mixture of all the above. As the High Court noted in the same year, the canons 
of statutory interpretation ‘jostle for acceptance’.973 Chapter 7 considers the wider 
implications of the association of the public right to fish with the prerogative and the rule 
in De Keyser’s Case. For the purposes of this chapter, it is relevant only that there was a 
degree of association in the plurality’s judgment between prerogatives of the Crown and 
the public right to fish, and that this association appears to have influenced the weight 
given to the public right by the plurality. 
The plurality did not address the question of whether the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) 
might also extinguish common law native title rights by ‘necessary implication’974 (in 
particular, extinguishment prior to 1975975). The possibility of extinguishment was drawn 
to the Court’s attention by Counsel for the Northern Territory.976 Such a question is 
natural given that the test for extinguishment has been expressed in terms broadly similar 
                                                 
 
970 Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722, [5190-5] 
[5270-5], [6050-5] (Gummow J]. In particular at [4285], Gummow J: ‘Yes, there may be a De Keyser’s Case 
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972 [1920] AC 508. 
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974 For example, extinguishment, such as in Western Australia v Ward (2003) 213 CLR 1 
975 1975 being the date of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). See generally, Dietman v Karpany 
[2012] SASCFC 53.  
976 Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (2007) HCA Trans 722, at [6750] 
(Jackson QC). See also Graham Hiley, ‘Is Native Title as Fragile as the Public Right to Fish?’ (2008) 8(10) 




to the test claimed for abrogation of the public right.977 Prior to the decisions of the High 
Court in Akiba v Commonwealth978 and Karpany v Dietman,979 a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme for fisheries management would have needed to be ‘just right’ to 
wholly abrogate the public right and to avoid the potential to extinguish common law 
native title rights.980 In 2012, the Supreme Court in South Australia held that state 
fisheries legislation had the effect of extinguishing native title.981 Although reversed on 
appeal in the High Court in Karpany v Dietman,982 the South Australian Supreme Court’s 
decision showed the difficulty of consistently applying a test that is, on its surface, similar 
for both abrogation of the public right and extinguishment of Indigenous rights. 
In summary, the problematic elements in the plurality’s reasons include: 
interpretation of the literal words of Section 10(2) so as to make them subject to Section 
10(1); no engagement with previous authority on the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT);983 a novel 
application to the public right of a rule of statutory construction relating to the prerogative 
(De Keyser’s Case); a questionable characterisation of the arguments of counsel on 
statutory interpretation; and a failure to reference Yanner v Eaton984 as a key authority on 
the interpretation of natural-resource management schemes. The implication found by the 
plurality escaped the observation of prior courts in the NT Fishing Cases series.985 Taken 
                                                 
 
977 See Wik v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR1, 185 ‘The expression “clearly and distinctly” in relation to the 
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Chapter 1, this previously unexceptional interpretation was supported in Gullett, Fisheries Law in 




together, these elements suggest the plurality did indeed apply a ‘strained construction’986 
to the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).  
3. A Narrow and Shallow Approach 
In applying a strained construction to the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), 
the plurality adopted what can be characterised as a narrow and shallow approach in their 
judgment.987 A narrow and shallow approach is attractive to the judiciary where there is 
a desire to decide in a certain way, but without courting unnecessary controversy nor 
making a wider change in the law than necessary. 988 This does not mean that a wider 
construction might not be adopted by later courts, but rather that the original court 
refrained from propounding a broader legal principle than necessary. The High Court had 
before it a complex and politically sensitive dispute989 of broad public interest. It was a 
dispute the legislature had left unresolved in the LRA. Native title and Indigenous rights 
have been a controversial issue in Australian political and legal circles.990 Pierce, in Inside 
the Mason Court Revolution, describes the negative reaction in Australian judicial circles 
to perceived judicial activism in the High Court under Chief Justice Mason, not least in 
relation to native title and Indigenous rights.991 Former Chief Justice French, writing extra 
curially — although not directly criticising past courts — publicly disavowed judicial 
activism as a basis of High Court jurisprudence.992 The Blue Mud Bay Case decision 
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involved an issue of Indigenous rights that touched directly on the recreational activities 
of a significant percentage of the non-Indigenous population.993 Public access to the 
foreshore is included in the NTA, although those provisions are of questionable effect.994 
In 1998 the Liberal–National conservative government passed amendments to the NTA 
that purportedly confirmed that native title rights were subject to fisheries laws.995 In 
those amendments, the tidal zone between high and low waters was designated as being 
subject to the ‘offshore’ NTA rights regime, a regime significantly less favourable to 
Indigenous rights than the ‘on-shore’ regime.996 By contrast to the NTA, the 
Commonwealth legislature — whether intentionally or not — left open the question of 
the interaction between the public right and the LRA. 
In the Blue Mud Bay Case, the plurality’s discussion of the legislation is shallow in 
that it does not refer to the policy considerations found relevant in interpreting natural-
resource management legislation in Harper997 and Yanner v Eaton.998 The High Court has 
emphasised the need to consider context999 and to determine legislative effect.1000 There 
was, however, no in-depth analysis by the plurality of the legislative history of the 
Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).1001 That the approach applied was narrow is further indicated 
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by the final orders of the Court. After noting that the declarations made by the Full Federal 
Court were ‘framed too widely’, the final orders were that: 
Sections 10 and 11 of the Fisheries Act (NT) do not confer on the Director of Fisheries 
(NT) a power to grant a licence under that Act which licence would, without more, 
authorise or permit the holder to enter and take fish or aquatic life from [LRA title over the 
tidal zone]1002 
These do not make a declaration on the status of the public right to fish. Indeed, they 
do not mention the public right to fish at all. The words ‘without more’ almost invite 
future argument as to what that ‘more’ might be. By way of example, the decision might 
be less relevant to authorisations for state-managed fisheries with more narrowly defined 
limits, such as gulfs or bays, compared to the wide-ranging licences across the whole of 
the Northern Territory coast referred to by the plurality.1003 The judgment of the plurality 
shows signs of a narrow and shallow approach to adjudication.1004 
4. Question Order and Path Dependence 
In addition to reasons given above, the judicial methodology adopted by the plurality 
to the order of questions resolved in this three-way dispute over fishing rights provides 
further evidence of a narrow and shallow approach to adjudication. The reason why the 
first question considered by the plurality was the abrogatory effect of the Fish Resources 
Act 1988 (NT) was not made explicit, although the plurality drew attention to the 
importance of their choice of question order.1005 This lack of explanation opens up 
additional opportunities for alternative approaches to the resolution of conflicts between 
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multiple rights in the marine domain without an explicit overruling of that case.1006 This 
point can be illustrated in the history of the NT Fishing Cases1007 themselves. 
The NT Fishing Cases1008 demonstrate the possibility of different outcomes 
depending on the choice of the order in which questions are considered. For example, in 
Gumana v Northern Territory (2005),1009 Justice Selway deferred to an earlier decision 
of the Full Federal Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr1010 and resolved that the 
substantive question to be addressed was whether the public right to fish prevailed over 
otherwise exclusive Indigenous rights under the LRA.1011 In other words, the assessment 
was first made between the public right and the LRA. Explicit, but not fully developed, in 
his argument was that the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) regulated, but did not wholly abrogate, 
the public right to fish.1012 
On appeal, the Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory1013 applied a 
different order of questions. Drawing on the history of the LRA, the Court first held that 
it was the LRA that excluded the public right, then decided that the Fisheries Act 1988 
(NT) did not apply over LRA title.1014 The Court’s conclusion that the Fisheries Act 1988 
(NT) did not apply to LRA title turned on its interpretation of the LRA and the limits on 
the legislative powers of the Northern Territory legislature, and not on the construction 
of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT). The Full Court, although it also doubted the weight that 
should be afforded the public right to fish, emphasised that its construction of the LRA 
did not turn on the prerogative approach to the characterisation of the public right to fish 
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preferred by Justice Selway.1015 The order of the questions it posed had the effect of 
making that assessment unnecessary.1016 
Whereas the Federal Court, on appeal, focused first on the effect of the LRA in The 
Blue Mud Bay Case; as noted above the plurality resolved the questions by first looking 
at whether the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) abrogated the public right to fish. There was then 
no need to undertake a pairwise assessment of priorities between the public right to fish 
and the LRA. Differences in outcome in these cases can be partly, or largely, attributed to 
the order in which the questions were asked. Arguably, the plurality in The Blue Mud Bay 
Case did not overrule the Federal Court’s interpretation of the effect of the LRA on the 
public right,1017 but rather, by making a different methodological choice, it came to a 
different conclusion.  
The plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case did not explain the order it chose to address 
questions of priorities between different rights. Nor did they indicate what, if any, policy 
considerations might have influenced them in their choice. Without explicit guidance on 
the methodological choices made, future High Courts do not need to explicitly overrule 
The Blue Mud Bay Case to exercise wide discretion over the adjudication of rights in the 
marine domain. It is significant that neither the Blue Mud Bay Case nor De Keyser’s Case 
were cited in the judgments of the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth1018 or Karpany 
v Dietman.1019 Instead, Yanner v Eaton,1020 with its purposive approach to the 
construction of natural-resource management legislation, was cited. This difference in 
approach to statutory interpretation of natural-resource management legislation is 
discussed in the ensuing section.  
5. Is the Blue Mud Bay Case a Useful Guide? 
As noted above, the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case appears to have adopted a 
strained construction to the provision of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and a narrow and 
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shallow approach in its reasoning. Given this, the authority of the case on the question of 
the abrogation of the public right may be especially susceptible to limitation through 
standard judicial techniques of non-citation, re-interpretation or distinguishing. Indeed, 
as Sunstein points out,1021 one of the attractions of a narrow and shallow approach is that 
it defers to a more broadly applicable finding at a later date. Furthermore, The Blue Mud 
Bay Case involved special contextual factors, including the unique legislative history of 
the LRA and the limited jurisdictional competence of the Northern Territory.  
The question is then the precedential authority that should be placed by other 
jurisdictions on the Blue Mud Bay Case plurality’s construction of the Fisheries Act 1988 
(NT) as abrogating the public right by necessary implication. As noted by Pearce and 
Geddes, ‘binding precedent has a different significance in this area [statutory 
interpretation] of the law than in other areas’.1022 They summarised the law as: 
The result flowing from this difference [between statute law and common law] is that 
if a court is seeking the meaning of a particular legislation, it cannot be bound by the 
interpretation placed on like words in other legislation by another court. Since the latter 
court was only saying what the words before it meant, its decision cannot be conclusive as 
to the meaning of another similar provision1023  
By way of a recent example in Sea Shepherd v Western Australia,1024 at issue was 
the construction of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA). Analogies had been 
made in argument to South Australian fisheries legislation and the decision of the South 
Australian Supreme Court in Dietman v Karpany.1025 Justice Edelman noted the limited 
value in such analogies, stating that ‘nothing was said [in the High Court in Karpany v 
Dietman1026] concerning any analogy with the Western Australian legislation. An 
observation which is unsurprising given the forceful expression from the High Court 
bench of the risks of drawing analogies from other legislation in Karpany v Dietman.1027 
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The question then is not whether the finding by the plurality of a ‘necessary 
implication’ in the Blue Mud Bay Case is binding in other jurisdictions, but the degree to 
which its approach to interpretation is influential. The later treatment of the case is the 
best guide to the degree of influence that it should be accorded. In 2013 the High Court 
delivered two judgments1028 on the impact of fisheries legislation on native title rights 
that suggest that relatively low weight should be accorded to the interpretative approach 
of the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case.  
In Akiba v Commonwealth,1029 the High Court decided on the appropriate test to 
apply in assessing the extinguishing effect of a fisheries management scheme on native 
title rights. The plurality held that ‘the central point made in Yanner … is that a statutory 
prohibition on taking resources … without a licence does not conclusively establish 
extinguishment of native title rights and interests’.1030 Chief Justice French and Justice 
Crennan stated that, since the rights of Indigenous fishers in the Torres Strait were 
‘common law property rights’, extinguishment will occur only where ‘no other 
construction is reasonably open’.1031  
In Akiba v Commonwealth,1032 the court made it clear that the test for extinguishment 
of native title rights should not be compared to the test for abrogation of common law 
public rights in Harper.1033 There was, however, no explicit guidance provided on the test 
of when the public right might be abrogated. Nonetheless, the high prominence in Akiba 
v Commonwealth1034 of Yanner v Eaton provides support for the proposition that, 
generally, natural-resource management legislation in the form of a general prohibition 
coupled with a licencing regime should be interpreted as a form of conditional 
prohibition. As noted earlier, in Yanner v Eaton, natural-resource management schemes 
in general were classified as being in the form of conditional prohibition, not just a form 
of conditional prohibition with respect to questions relating to native title rights.1035 
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An emphasis on Yanner v Eaton was also a feature in the decision of the High Court 
in Karpany v Dietman.1036 In that case, the High Court overturned a decision of the South 
Australian Supreme Court1037 that past Fisheries Acts had extinguished native title based 
on fishing rights in South Australia.1038 The High Court cited Yanner v Eaton as authority 
for the proposition that legislation of this kind was in the form of a ‘conditional 
prohibition’, 1039 and ‘regulated, but was not inconsistent with, the continued enjoyment 
of native title rights’.1040 The High Court did not restrict its comments to native title 
interests, stating that the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA) ‘read as a whole … regulated rather 
than prohibited fishing’, pointing to provisions of the Act that provided for statutory 
mechanisms whereby fishing would be permitted.1041 The Court concluded that ‘the [Act] 
did not generally prohibit non-commercial fishing’, not merely Indigenous fishing.1042 It 
is difficult to reconcile the approach reached by the Court in this case with the plurality’s 
finding of abrogation by necessary implication in the Blue Mud Bay Case.  
The authority of the Blue Mud Bay Case as a general guide to the interpretation of 
fisheries legislation is weakened by its non-citation in the two fishing-related cases before 
the High Court in 2013 discussed above. Nonetheless, the Blue Mud Bay Case has not 
been overruled, and the implications of the plurality approach to statutory interpretation 
in that case is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
6. The Prerogative and the Public Right  
A separate, but related, question to when legislation will give rise to abrogation by 
necessary implication, is the question of the weight to be given to the ‘principle of 
legality’ and the degree to which legislation should be read with an assumption that the 
legislature did not intend to abrogate public rights. Associations between the right and 
prerogatives of the Crown suggest that a low weight should be given to the right. As noted 
in Chapter 1, questions about the origin and source of the public right to fish are, in effect, 
questions about the weight to be afforded to the right and the legal effects of the right. 
The three accounts of the right’s source identified in this thesis are the Bracton/Natural 
Law account, the Birthright/Magna Carta account and the Crown Ownership account. Of 
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these three, the Crown Ownership account provides the weakest support for the right. As 
a right derived from a presumed past grant by the Crown by exercise of prerogative 
powers, it might be subject to the same tests and disabilities as a prerogative power. 
There is support for the Crown Ownership account in the Blue Mud Bay Case. The 
plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case implicitly associated the public right to fish with 
prerogatives of the Crown through its reference to De Keyser’s Case.1043 It did not, 
however, associate the public right to fish with prerogatives of the Crown to the degree 
that Justice Selway did in Gumana v Northern Territory 1044 Justice Selway was of the 
view that the public right to fish was not really a right, but a limitation on the exercise of 
the prerogative of the Crown to make grants in the tidal zone and seas, stating that:  
those public rights are best understood as restrictions on the Crown’s prerogative 
powers, rather than restrictions on statutory grants. The relevant prerogative powers have 
had no application in Australia since 1842 ... What is effectively left of these public law 
rights (if anything) are not enforceable common law ‘rights’, but rather the common law 
principle that a person can do that which is not prohibited.1045 
Not only did Justice Selway not recognise the multiple legal bases for the public right 
to fish as outlined in Chapters 1–3, he also did not cite any English authority for this 
proposition. Justice Selway acknowledged1046 that his views on the public right to fish 
were different to those of Justice Brennan in Harper.1047 It should be noted that Justice 
Selway’s association of the public right to fish with the prerogative is subtly different to 
the association made by Moore and Moore.1048 As outlined in Chapter 2,1049 Moore and 
Moore associated the public right to fish with the prerogative because they presumed the 
right’s origin was in a past exercise of the powers of the Crown over its estate in the seas. 
In other words, the public right was carved out of the interests of the Crown. Justice 
Selway’s view was that the right — at least in Australia — was not an interest carved out 
of the estate of the Crown, but a mere limitation of the prerogative powers of the Crown. 
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The Full Federal Court’s view in Gumana v Northern Territory1050 on the relationship 
between the public right to fish and prerogatives of the Crown is less clear. As noted 
above, the Federal Court’s principal focus was on the ‘text, structure and context of the 
Land Rights Act’.1051 The Court did discuss both the public right to fish and prerogatives 
of the Crown, but decided that it was not necessary to come to a conclusion, stating 
that:1052  
Equally, because of the view we take of the text, structure and context of the Land 
Rights Act, it is unnecessary for us to enter upon the debate fanned by Selway J as to 
whether the public rights to fish and to navigate are, strictly, common law rights or ‘are 
best understood as restrictions on the Crown’s prerogative’: Gumana 141 FCR 457 at [69]. 
It is unsurprising that in different ages the rights have been ascribed differing provenances: 
see Bonyhady T, The Law of the Countryside (1987) Ch 8. What needs to be said about the 
public rights is what has been emphasised on a number of occasions. As was said by Barrett 
J in Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534 (at [84]):  
… it is not possible to make, with any degree of confidence, a complete and exhaustive 
statement of the common law rights of the public in relation to tidal waters and the foreshore. 
The matter is a ‘difficult question’ no less today than when so described by Lord Wright in 
1935 [in Williams-Ellis v Cobb [1935] 1 KB 310 at 320].  
See also Bonyhady (1987) p240 on the right to fish (“the legal basis of this right is 
unclear and there are also significant limitations on the manner in which the right may be 
exercised”). 
The Federal Court stated that legislation was subject to public rights, unless those 
rights failed to have ‘contemporary accuracy and utility’.1053 Furthermore, it stated that 
the application of older common law rules of interpretation of this kind also depends on 
the context in which they were being applied.1054 This approach to the public right to fish 
would appear to be inconsistent with Justice Brennan’s statement in Harper where he 
referred to the ‘paramount’ nature of the public right to fish.1055 The Federal Court 
interpreted that statement as applying only to the interaction between the right and 
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prerogative grants.1056 It is not clear in this context, however, what prerogative grants the 
Federal Court believed Justice Brennan had in mind. As Justice Selway noted above,1057 
prerogative rights to grant estates in the seas lapsed with self-government sometime in 
the mid-to-late 1800s. Furthermore, earlier in its judgment, the Federal Court discounted 
the need to resolve the relationship between the prerogative and the public right to fish.1058 
This leaves the position of the Federal Court on the prerogative somewhat uncertain.1059 
Stripped of the attempt to reconcile its position with Harper by reference to the 
prerogative, the Full Federal Court’s approach — emphasising the context for the exercise 
of the public rights — has the advantage of resolving some of the conceptual difficulties 
arising from the application of English legal precedents to Australia. In Australia, all 
private interests in the tidal zone have been created1060 or are sustained1061 by statute. 
Unlike England, there is no question of a transfer, or carve out, of rights derived from a 
pre-existing Crown Estate with both public and private characteristics. Following the Full 
Federal Court’s logic, the public right to fish need not be classified as either intrinsically 
weak or intrinsically strong. The strength of any presumptions in favour of the right would 
instead depend on the specific statutory context in which the right was being considered. 
It would be fully consistent with such a view that presumptions in favour of the public 
right to fish might be weak against rights created by fee simple private grants,1062 but 
there might be a stronger presumption in the right’s favour when regulatory schemes of 
the Crown for natural-resource management are involved. More speculatively, in 
Chapters 7 and 8, it is argued that where land or waters have been vested in a body for a 
public purpose that is not directly related to fishing, then the context and purpose of that 
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legislation should be reviewed carefully to assess whether it wholly or partially abrogates 
the right. 
The Federal Court’s emphasis on context largely resolved a glaring incongruity in 
Australian law: the extensive impact of a weak public right on the recognition of 
Indigenous rights.1063 Justice Selway in the first instance stated that ‘these public law 
rights (if anything) are not enforceable common law “rights”, but rather the common law 
principle that a person can do that which is not prohibited’.1064 This formulation suggested 
that the public right to fish is a very weak right, if a right at all. The public right to fish, 
however, has had a significant impact on Indigenous rights, by preventing recognition of 
exclusive Indigenous interests in Australia’s marine domain.1065 Adoption of the Full 
Federal Court’s approach resolves this incongruity, as it context that is decisive rather 
than whether the public right is characterised — in other circumstances — as 
‘skeletal’,1066 ‘fundamental’1067 or even as ‘lacking contemporary significance’.1068 
As noted earlier, the order of questions adopted by the Federal Court led it to focus 
on the interpretation of the LRA. The general views expressed by the Federal Court on 
common law presumptions and the public right to fish were not explicitly rejected in The 
Blue Mud Bay Case, as the plurality decided on different grounds. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the views of the Federal Court on the public right to fish retain considerable 
authoritative weight. Unfortunately, the clarity of the Federal Court’s position is 
undermined by its own reference to prerogative grants of the Crown, as if they were still 
operative in the marine domain. It is, therefore, an open question whether the Federal 
Court did or did not find an association between the public right and the prerogative and 
whether that association was relevant to the weight to be afforded to the right.  
Some general guidance on the strength of association between the public right and 
the prerogative can be gained from guidance from two significant decisions handed down 
after Chief Justice French joined the High Court bench. Judgments in ICM Agriculture 
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Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth1069 and Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales1070 
touched broadly on prerogatives of the Crown, state power, legal history and resource 
management. These two cases involved a wide-ranging review of the history of the 
relevant legislation.1071 This approach contrasts with the very limited review taken by the 
plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case. In Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales1072 
the Court undertook an extensive review of prerogatives of the Crown relating to mining 
and minerals, without reference to De Keyser’s Case,1073 as would have been expected if 
the Blue Mud Bay Case established a broadly applicable rule to statutory interpretation 
based on De Keyser’s Case. In ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth ,1074 the 
nature of common law rights to water and the effect of regulation were discussed by the 
court, with a significant emphasis on water resources as limited natural resources.1075 De 
Keyser’s Case1076 was referred to by Justice Heydon, but only as a case on compensation 
for takings by the Crown,1077 not as a general rule of interpretation. 
The treatment of De Keyser’s Case by the High Court in these two cases 
demonstrates scant support for it as a general or overarching rule of interpretation. In this 
regard, the treatment by it in the Blue Mud Bay Case is the outlier, and only a modest 
weight should be afforded to the indirect association between the prerogative and the 
public right. This issue is of more than antiquarian import. Different views on the source 
of the right are associated with different conclusions as to the weight to be afforded it. In 
addition, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, different views on the source of the right 
would lead to differences in outcome should abrogatory legislation be lifted, leaving open 
the question of whether the public right to fish can revive. 
                                                 
 
1069 ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (2010) 242 CLR 195 . 
1070 Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195. 
1071 The Court under Chief Justice French has been criticised for ‘its heavy focus on history ... chewing up 
litigants’ time and money’, in Alex Boxsell, Samantha Bowers and Hanna Low, ‘High Court Ramps Up 
Pressure’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 15 August 2011) 52-3. 
1072 Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195. 
1073 [1920] AC 508. 
1074 ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (2010) 242 CLR 195. 
1075 See discussion of this case in, DE Fisher, ‘Water Law, the High Court and Techniques of Judicial 
Reasoning’ (2010) 27 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 85. 
1076 [1920] AC 508. 





In concluding, it is useful to consider Coper’s distinction between criticism of a 
decision and criticism of the reasons given in that decision.1078 In the Blue Mud Bay Case, 
the decision of the Court substantially restored what Justice Woodward considered the 
status quo prior to the LRA, that being a closure of access to commercial fishers.1079 In 
relation to recreational fishers, the effect was to create a right to privacy over the tidal 
zone, as had originally been recommended by Justice Woodward.1080 The High Court’s 
confirmation of the Northern Territory’s role in, and powers over, natural-resource 
management was called for by all parties. The Blue Mud Bay Case is not problematic due 
to the orders made by the court, but due to the approach taken by the plurality in their 
judgment.  
The effect of the Blue Mud Bay Case in other jurisdictions depends on the 
characterisation of that decision by the courts in question. If the case is characterised as a 
special case relating to Indigenous rights with a unique legislative provenance, then its 
impact on the interpretation of fisheries legislation is limited.1081 If the case is 
characterised as one relating to the interpretation of natural-resource management 
legislation generally, it undermines the general authority of Yanner v Eaton, effectively 
limiting the relevance of that case to consideration of the interaction between legislation 
and Indigenous interests.1082 Based on the analysis of cases before the High Court 
between 2008 and 2017, it seems likely the Blue Mud Bay Case has been relegated to 
judicial obscurity through non-citation, but it has not been overruled. The consequences 
for the interpretation of fisheries legislation is covered in Chapter 6. 
                                                 
 
1078 As suggested by Michael Coper, there is a distinction between a critique of the reasons in a decision 
and criticism of the result. See Michael Coper, ‘Interpreting the Constitution: A Handbook for Judges and 
Commentators’ in AR Blackshield (ed), Legal Change: Essays in Honour of Julius Stone (1983) 52, 53 ‘the 
failure in criticism to distinguish reasoning from results is a common source of antithetical observations’. 
1079 Woodward, above n 869, 80-1. 
1080 Ibid.  
1081 See, for example, the approach to the Blue Mud Bay Case adopted by Sean Brennan, ‘Statutory 
Intepretation and Indigenous Property Rights’ (2010) 21(4) Public Law Review 239 . Possibly also the 
characterisation that was favoured by French CJ, see Wurridjul v Commonwealth (2009) 252 ALR 232, 262 
(French CJ). 




CHAPTER 6: THE RIGHT AND FISHERIES 
LEGISLATION 
A. Chapter 6: Introduction 
The previous two chapters reviewed the judicial treatment of the public right to fish 
in Australia following the recognition of Indigenous rights to fish and the implementation 
of rights-based management. Following the analysis presented in those two chapters, this 
chapter undertakes a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction assessment of the likelihood of the right 
being wholly abrogated by fisheries legislative schemes introduced since 1988.  
The relevance of an enquiry into whether the right has been wholly abrogated in a 
jurisdiction was demonstrated in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1083 Public access to the marine 
domain rests in part on the underlying public right to fish, the abrogation of which 
changes the relationship of the rights of the public to the marine domain. In addition to 
waters held under fee simple title, the marine domain is also the subject of a range of 
leases, statutory vesting in government authorities and management regimes for non-
fishing purposes (such as ports). More recently, the marine domain has seen extensive 
marine parks and reserves declared, with further reserves planned.1084 The abrogation of 
the public right to fish changes the legal context underpinning the interpretation of 
potentially conflicting legal regimes. 
This chapter is focused on whether or not fisheries legislation wholly abrogates the 
public right to fish. Chapter 7 focuses on the legal consequences of partial abrogation in 
those areas of Australia’s marine domain where the public right to fish has only been 
abrogated in part. A partial abrogation, for example, could be limited by time, place, 
purpose or species.1085  
 
                                                 
 
1083 (2008) 236 CLR 24. See n 53 above on the use of the term ‘wholly abrogated’. Although the plurality 
in that case did not use the term ‘wholly abrogated’, it did emphasise the complete extent of abrogation. 
See Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24, 58 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
1084 For example, there is an intention to cover 3.3 million square kilometres of the marine domain with 
Commonwealth marine parks. See Parks Australia, ‘Have Your Say Today on Marine Park Draft Plans’ 
(Media Release, 21 July 2017) <http://www.environment.gov.au/mediarelease/have-your-say-today-
marine-park-draft-plans> . 




B. Key Issues 
1. Rights-based Management 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 4, from the 1950s to the early 1980s, the principal concern 
of Australian governments1086 was the expansion of commercial fisheries; the prevention 
of overfishing was a secondary concern.1087 By the 1980s, failures in fisheries 
management had led to overfishing and poor economic outcomes. Between 1988 and 
2007, all Australian governments managing marine fisheries introduced new and 
substantially reformed legislative schemes for fisheries management.1088 A key objective 
of these schemes was to improve economic outcomes, particularly from commercial 
fisheries.1089 Typically, this objective was achieved through the creation of defined rights 
of access under statutory plans of management.1090 Statutory fishing rights in this form 
necessarily partially abrogate the common law public right to fish, and in the case of the 
Northern Territory, wholly abrogated the right in the intertidal zone.  
As noted earlier, in Harper in 1989 the High Court considered the legal effects of a 
statutory scheme introduced to implement rights-based management.1091 As noted in 
Chapter 4, this case was fundamental to the recognition of the public right to fish in 
Australia. The dispute in Harper1092 was over the introduction in Tasmania of a quota 
management scheme for wild abalone. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, the more 
comprehensive a statutory scheme is, the harder it becomes to classify as merely 
                                                 
 
1086 The Australian States were early adopters of fisheries regulation as to size limits, limitations on nets 
and the licensing of commercial vessels (but not limitations on the number of vessels). 
1087 Industry Commission, ‘Cost Recovery for Managing Fisheries: Draft Report’ (Industry Commission, 
1991), 2. Fred Woodhouse, ‘National Competition Policy Review of Commonwealth Fisheries’ (Australian 
Government, 2002) 11-2 <http://www.daff.gov.au/fisheries/domestic/review-comm-fishleg>. As late as 
the 1970s the Commonwealth Government’s concern was to maintain open access to marine fisheries; 
see Justice Woodward on the Commonwealth’s submissions in relation to open access for Australian 
fishers over Aboriginal reserves in Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, Second Report, Woodward, above 
n 869 80.  
1088 The States of Australia, the Commonwealth of Australia (the Federal Government) and the Northern 
Territory. The Australian Capital Territory, although self-governing, is landlocked and does not have a 
relevant marine jurisdiction.  
1089 For example, in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) the objective of the ‘efficient and cost-
effective’ management of fisheries, s 3 (1)(a). 
1090 Referred to as ‘rights-based management’ in this thesis. See Chapter 4 B. For a general discussion of 
fisheries management plans see Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 205-248.  





regulatory in nature.1093 In Harper,1094 the Court recognised that the public right to fish 
abalone in Tasmania had not merely been regulated but had been abrogated and replaced 
with new statutory rights for both recreational and commercial fishers. As noted in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the general authority of Harper on the effect of fisheries legislation on 
the public right to fish has been confirmed, even though an extension of the reasoning in 
the case to the extinguishment of Indigenous rights has been rejected by the High 
Court.1095 
2. Property in Wild Fish  
In addition to the introduction of comprehensive schemes of management, some 
States of Australia have also sought to emphasise their rights over fisheries by asserting 
their ownership of wild fish in the water, a novel legal concept.1096 Harper1097 sheds light 
on the likely motive for such assertions.1098 Legislative assertions of ownership are likely 
related to questions of the constitutional ability of States to levy fees.1099 If fish are owned 
by the state, fees levied on fishing activities can be classified as royalties instead of fees 
of excise (which Section 90 of the Australian Constitution prohibits the States from 
imposing), making them free of doubt. 
In Harper, Justice Brennan cast doubt on claims of property in the abalone fishery 
by the state of Tasmania, 1100  but he did not express a final opinion on this point.1101 
                                                 
 
1093 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, 372 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ) ‘regulation may 
shade into prohibition and the line between the two may be difficult to discern.’ 
1094 (1989) 168 CLR 314, 334 (Brennan J). 
1095 Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507.  
1096 Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic), Section 10(1); Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas), Section 
9(1); Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA), Section 6(1). Ownership of wild fish is a legal concept 
fundamentally at odds with the common law tradition. That issue is outside the scope of this thesis, except 
to the extent that assertions of ownership impact on the abrogation of the public right to fish. More 
generally on the question of ownership of fish see: Walrut, ‘Domestication and Absolute Ownership of 
Fish in the English Common Law’, above n 182; Walrut, ‘Sharing the Fish — Whose Fish?’, above n 182. 
Also, Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 60-1. 
1097 (1989) 168 CLR 314. 
1098 See Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic), Section 10(1); Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas), 
Section 9(1); Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA), Section 6(1).  
1099 There was no question, following Harper, of the lack of authority of a State or Territory to regulate 
fishing and abrogate the right. See, Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314, 334 (Brennan 
J). 
1100 Ibid, 335 (Brennan J). 




Justices Dawson, McHugh and Toohey, although generally agreeing with Justice 
Brennan, did hold that access fees of this nature could constitute a duty of excise in some 
circumstances, and therefore were at risk of being constitutionally invalid.1102 In an 
apparent attempt to resolve any uncertainty in its favour, Tasmania asserted ownership of 
living marine resources under Section 9(1) of the Living Marine Resources Management 
Act 1995 (Tas). In parliamentary debate, the Tasmanian Minister for Fisheries was 
questioned as to whether or not certainty over the validity of fees was the purpose of the 
relevant provision. The response from the Minister, although somewhat equivocal, 
suggests that the question of ownership was indeed a relevant factor.1103 
3. Regulate/Abrogate/Extinguish: A Recap of Yanner v Eaton  
Two aspects of Harper1104 have the potential to limit the general application of the 
High Court’s approach to the public right to fish to legislation. The most important of 
these is the limited extent of the scheme involved. The statutory scheme in the case of 
Harper was comprehensive in nature but limited to wild abalone. Public rights of access 
to fish for other species had not been abrogated. The second aspect is that the case did not 
directly consider the interaction of Indigenous rights and the public right to fish, and that 
the relevant fisheries legislation was interpreted in the absence of direct consideration of 
Indigenous interests. The recognition of native title rights in 1992 prompted a 
reconsideration by the High Court in Yanner v Eaton on the appropriate stance to take 
when interpreting legislative schemes of natural resource management.1105 The relevance 
of Yanner v Eaton to the interpretation of fisheries legislation lies in the sceptical eye cast 
by the majority on the effects of legislative provisions that asserted complete control over 
wildlife in the form of a general prohibition coupled with an exemption and licensing 
regime.1106 The general applicability of that case to the interpretation of fisheries 
legislation might appear to have been undermined by the Blue Mud Bay Case.1107 As 
                                                 
 
1102 Even if those fees served ‘the purpose of conserving a natural resource’. Ibid, 336 (Dawson, McHugh 
and Toohey JJ). 
1103 The proposition that ownership was included in Section 9(1) for revenue reasons was put forward in 
parliamentary debate. The Fisheries Minister, Mr Robin Gray, stated in response that ‘the fish belong to 
the State, to the people of Tasmania’. Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly 28 June 1995, 
34-79 (Mr Robin Gray, Minister for Primary Industry and Fisheries). 
1104 (1989)168 CLR 314.  
1105 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. As seen in a shift in approach by the High Court when considering 
the same legislation in Walden v Hensler (1987) 166 CLR 561.  
1106 (1999) 201 CLR 351, 369-71 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron Kirby and Hayne JJ). The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) 
clearly contemplated the extension of native title rights to fish, for example Section 211.  




outlined in Chapter 6, however, the approach taken in Yanner v Eaton1108 found support 
in Akiba v Commonwealth1109 and Karpany v Dietman.1110 
In Yanner v Eaton,1111 the High Court considered the meaning of assertions of Crown 
‘property’ in Section 7(1) of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld). Chief Justice 
Gleeson and Justices Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne found that the word ‘property’ allowed 
for the continuation of common law native title rights to hunt and fish. They characterised 
property as a term that could signify a ‘wide variety of different forms of interest’.1112 
They then held that the reference to property in the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld) 
should be interpreted as a way of describing the aggregate of State rights over wildlife, 
and that, accordingly, the vesting of ‘property’ under Section 7(1) did not have an 
extinguishing effect on Indigenous rights.1113 As noted in Chapter 4, the plurality 
judgment cited Chief Justice Vinson from the American case of Toomer v Witsell: ‘The 
whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in 
legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and 
regulate the exploitation of an important resource.’1114 Legislative words merely claiming 
the ownership of fish in general terms could be classified as just such ‘legal shorthand’, 
with fishing fees at risk of being classified as a constitutionally prohibited excise. The 
Victorian Fisheries Act 1996 (Vic) appears to have been drafted specifically to exclude 
such an interpretation to the greatest extent possible.1115 
C. Australian Fisheries Legislation after 1988 
1. A Continuum of Legislative Approaches 
Reconciling different approaches by the High Court to natural-resource management 
legislation of the ‘prohibit, regulate and exempt’ variety is problematic. The authority of 
the Blue Mud Bay Case,1116 on the extent of abrogation in the legislative schemes of the 
                                                 
 
1108 (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
1109 Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209. 
1110 Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507. 
1111 (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
1112 Ibid, 367 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron Kirby and Hayne JJ). Gummow J, in similar terms at 388-9. 
1113 Ibid, Callinan J at 408 did not dispute that regulatory schemes that included a statutory declaration of 
ownership or licence requirements might preserve Indigenous rights. He was of the view, however, that 
the legislative schemes failed to do so in this case. He took as particularly relevant to his conclusions the 
removal of a previous Indigenous exemption to the Act. Similarly, McHugh J at 375.  
1114 Ibid, 369 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron Kirby and Hayne). 
1115 See 6 C b) below and associated text. 




Northern Territory has not been not overruled. Accordingly, expansively words in 
legislative schemes cannot be safely be assumed as merely being legislative shorthand for 
full powers of management.1117 Nonetheless, later cases do not appear to follow the same 
approach.1118 The result is that there are three possible outcomes arising out of legislative 
schemes governing fishing that have been implemented since 1988. The public right to 
fish may have been wholly abrogated by fisheries legislation; the public right to fish 
commercially might have been wholly abrogated, but recreational rights regulated; or 
lastly, both commercial and recreational rights might have been preserved in a highly 
regulated form.  
To assess the extent of abrogation it is necessary to identify what factors are relevant 
in assessing whether fisheries legislation — in the broad form of a prohibition, coupled 
with exemptions — wholly abrogates the public right to fish. Even though the law is not 
clear on this point, at the very least, the identification of such factors can assist drafters 
who wish to clarify whether or not their proposed regulatory scheme rests on the 
regulation of the public right to fish, or rests on the abrogation and replacement of the 
public right.1119 Three factors can be identified based on the text of Australian fisheries  
legislation. Firstly, whether legislation expresses a clear general prohibition on fishing 
coupled with regulations that grant fishers rights of a statutory nature. Secondly, whether 
there are assertions of state ownership that support the conclusion that the right has been 
wholly replaced with statutory rights. Finally, whether there are supplemental 
characteristics of the legislation that might clarify the intended effects of the legislative 
scheme.  
Based on these three factors, the legislative schemes of the Australian States and the 
Commonwealth 1120 can be arranged on a continuum of the degree to which they are likely 
to either wholly abrogate public rights or regulate, but preserve, public rights. Victorian 
legislation is at the notional left end of the continuum, as it couples a general prohibition 
on fishing with assertions of state ownership and implements a comprehensive licensing 
regime for both recreational and commercial fishing. New South Wales legislation is at 
the right end of the continuum and is more explicitly regulatory in nature, preserving the 
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1118 In particular, Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209; Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507. 
1119 For example, new fishing legislation for Western Australia is currently being prepared. Department of 
Fisheries (WA), ‘Regulatory Impact Statement’, Regulatory Impact Decision Statement: Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources Management Bill (2012), 2. 
1120 The Northern Territory is not included, being a Territory and not a State, and the abrogatory effect of 




public right to fish — at least for recreational fishers. Commonwealth and other State 
legislative schemes can be placed between those two ends of the spectrum. Reading from 
left to right and from most abrogatory to least abrogatory, the schemes are; Victorian, 
Tasmanian, South Australian, Western Australian, Commonwealth, Queensland1121 and 
then New South Wales.  
The point of arranging them on such a continuum is that even if the general approach 
of the courts to interpretation shifts, the relative positions of the States are likely to remain 
the same. In other words, based on the discussion below, if as per Karpany v Dietman,1122 
South Australian legislation does not wholly abrogate the public right to fish then, all 
other things being equal, Western Australian legislation is unlikely to do so. However, 
Tasmanian legislation might abrogate the right as it is more similar to Victorian 
legislation and worded similarly to Northern Territory legislation.  
The discussion below of the legislative schemes of the Australian States is prefaced 
by comment on Commonwealth fisheries legislation, whose structure has been influenced 
by the Commonwealth’s focus on commercial fisheries management. As noted above, 
this analysis focuses on legislative text rather than contextual elements, which are 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
a) Commonwealth Fisheries Legislation 
The objectives of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) demonstrate the 
Commonwealth’s concern for ‘efficient and cost-effective’1123 management while 
‘maximising the net economic returns to the Australian community from the management 
of Australian fisheries’1124 and having regard for ‘principles of ecologically sustainable 
development’.1125 The Act does not contain an assertion of the ownership of wild fish by 
the Commonwealth,1126 nor a general prohibition on fishing without a licence. 
Commercial fishing without a licence is, however, an offence under Section 95 of the 
Act. Given Section 95, the public’s right to fish commercially is, on balance, likely to 
have been wholly abrogated by the provisions of the Act. Supporting this conclusion, 
                                                 
 
1121 For reasons given below, Queensland fisheries legislation is less comprehensive than other States and 
it is harder to place with confidence on this continuum.  
1122 (2013) 252 CLR 507. 
1123 Section 3(1)(a). 
1124 Section 3(1)(c).  
1125 Section 3(1)(b). Those principles being defined in Section 3A. 
1126 The principal objective of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) in Section 3(1)(a) is ‘Fisheries 




under Section 17, the Australian Fisheries Management Agency has a positive obligation 
to implement plans of management for commercial fisheries unless it makes a specific 
determination that one is not needed. Based on its overall structure, the Act so 
substantially regulates commercial fishing that it is likely that public rights to fish 
commercially have been abrogated and replaced with a statutory scheme, rather than the 
public right having been merely regulated. Such a conclusion is consistent with the 
objectives of the Act.  
The Act is principally concerned with the management of commercial fisheries.1127 
The limited coverage in the Act of recreational fishing reflects the Commonwealth’s 
focus on commercial fisheries. Most recreational fishing in Australia takes place close to 
shore,1128 and recreational fishing activities are generally managed by the States and the 
Northern Territory. Recreational fisheries beyond State waters are typically managed by 
the States by means of statutory arrangements agreed with the Commonwealth.1129 There 
is limited coverage of recreational fisheries in the provisions of the Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth). The Act lacks a prohibition on recreational fishing (without 
a licence) equivalent to that for commercial fishing in Section 95. Section 10(3)(a) of the 
Act stipulates that management plans apply to recreational fishing only if recreational 
activities are expressly included. Further reinforcing the separate treatment of recreational 
fishing, 2004 amendments to the Act1130 clarified that recreational charter-boat fishing1131 
was to be classified as a form of recreational fishing, not commercial fishing. Given the 
above, the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) is very unlikely to have wholly 
abrogated all recreational public rights to fish. Even if there is a statutory management 
plan in place that licences recreational fishers for a specific fishery their rights to access 
other fisheries would not have been abrogated. That the Act was not intended to create a 
fully comprehensive statutory regime for all fishing activities is supported by the lack of 
reference in the Act to the management of Indigenous fishing.1132 Accordingly, the public 
                                                 
 
1127 Borthwick, above n 133, vi. 
1128 Ibid, 9.  
1129 Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 251-2. Borthwick, above n 133, 9. 
1130 Fisheries Legislation Amendment (High Seas Fishing and Other Matters) Act 2004 (Cth). 
1131 Where the owner of a charter boat takes persons recreational fishing for a fee, this is a commercial 
activity for the charter-boat owner, but a recreational activity for the passengers. See Section 4, Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth). 
1132 A significant exception is in the Torres Strait, where the Commonwealth is involved in the 
management of a number of commercial and Indigenous fisheries under a different and complex 
legislative framework that takes into account Australia’s treaty obligations to Papua New Guinea, see 




right to fish recreationally in Commonwealth waters continues, including public rights of 
access. The effect of partial abrogation of the right is considered further in Chapter 7. 
b) Victorian Fisheries Legislation 
The Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) combines a declaration of the ownership of wild fish 
with broadly worded prohibitions on fishing without a licence (or exemption). The 
combined effect is highly likely to have wholly abrogated public rights to fish, replacing 
them with statutory rights under that Act. To find to the contrary, the Blue Mud Bay 
Case1133 must be distinguished, overruled or ignored.  
The Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) has the most emphatic statement of Crown ownership 
in Australian legislation. Section 10(1) states that ‘[t]he Crown in right of Victoria owns 
all wild fish and other fauna and flora found in Victorian waters’.1134 The term ‘found’ is 
an undefined term in the Act, and exactly when a fish might be found and become 
property of the Victorian State is unclear. Gullett has suggested that the reference to fish 
‘found’ in Victorian waters in Section 10(1) of the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) implies that 
the designation of property would only apply to fish ‘located by humans in Victorian 
waters’.1135 This would avoid the apparent absurdity of ownership changing as fish move 
in and out of Victorian waters in an ‘unfound’ state. Although it is not possible to say 
exactly when a fish might be ‘found’ or ‘located’ there can be little doubt of the legislative 
intent to assert ownership of wild fish before they are captured, especially given the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the original bill also emphasised prior Crown 
ownership.1136 
Section 10(2) further states that property in fish only ‘passes’ (presumably from the 
Crown) to fishers when they are taken lawfully under the Act. Section 150 provides for 
royalties to be levied on fishers. For a fee to be classified as a ‘royalty’, there must first 
be State ownership. Indeed, if the Act’s provisions on ownership were intended to 
definitively avoid fees being classified as excise duties, they would likely be ineffective 
in achieving this purpose unless they abrogated the public right to fish.  
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1134 Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) s 10(1).  
1135 Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia, above n 4, 64. Although if fish were located, and therefore ‘found’, 
but not then caught and landed, such problems might still arise. 
1136 ‘Clause 10 specifies the circumstances in which ownership of wild fish and other flora and fauna passes 
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That the intention exists to wholly abrogate the public right to fish is further 
supported by the comprehensively worded licensing provisions in the Act. Section 36 (1) 
implements a comprehensive licensing regime for commercial fishing. A recreational 
licence is required for all marine fisheries under Section 44(1).1137 Both Sections 44 and 
36 are in the form of a prohibition on recreational fishing, with subsequent authorisation 
by licence or permit. That the Act was intended to create a truly comprehensive legislative 
regime is further suggested by the lack of general exemption in the Act for Indigenous 
fishers, coupled with a very limited statutory provision for permits to be issued under 
Section 49(2)(h) for a ‘specified Indigenous cultural ceremony’.1138 Indeed, given the 
assertion of State ownership of marine resources, it is possible that but for a combination 
of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Native Title Act (1993) (Cth), 
Indigenous rights to Victorian fisheries might have been thought extinguished by the 
Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic).1139 The overall effect of the provisions of the Act is to create a 
comprehensive statutory regime, and a likely abrogation of public right to fish across 
Victorian waters.1140  
If the public right to fish has been wholly abrogated across Victoria, then on the 
authority of The Blue Mud Bay Case,1141 any vesting of waters in private individuals 
would consequently be interpreted free of common law assumptions in relation to the 
public right to fish and access for this purpose.1142 Where land or waters are vested in a 
public authority, access to those waters for fishing might depend on the goodwill of that 
authority or, alternatively, specific permission for access might be required. In some 
circumstances, a fishing licence might be sufficient authorisation of access. Such an 
implication is more likely to be found in detailed management arrangements for fisheries 
in a specific area, analogous to the undefined something ‘more’ referred to by the majority 
in the order granted in The Blue Mud Bay Case.1143 A fishing licence might be capable of 
providing such authority under the terms of a management plan, however, Section 50A 
                                                 
 
1137 This was not an original feature of the Act. It was added by the Fisheries Amendment Act 1997 (Vic). 
1138 Compared to the South Australian legislation referred to in Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507.  
1139 At least prior to Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 20 and Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 
507. 
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outside the limits of the State (generally the low watermark) may not be valid. 
1141 (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
1142 Although public rights of navigation would be unaffected.  




of the Act emphasises that a licence does not of itself authorise access to ‘water authority 
property’. 
c) Tasmanian Fisheries Legislation  
Tasmanian legislation includes a declaration of ownership of living marine resources, 
but there are less comprehensive licensing provisions than there are in Victoria’s 
legislation. Section 9(1) of the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas) 
states that ‘[a]ll living marine resources ... are owned by the State’. The Act, however, is 
less emphatic in its assertion of ownership than the Victorian Act. For example, the 
Tasmanian Act does not have an equivalent provision to the statement that wild fish are 
owned by the ‘Crown in right of Victoria’,1144 and there is no equivalent provision to 
Section 10(2) of the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) which sets out the circumstances in which 
property in fish will pass to fishers. 
The provisions of the Tasmanian Act on the prohibition of fishing activity are almost 
identical to those found in Section 10 of Fisheries Act 1988 (NT) and interpreted in the 
Blue Mud Bay Case1145 as wholly abrogating the public right to fish. There is a general 
prohibition on take without a fishing licence in Section 60(1) of the Living Marine 
Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas). This prohibition is relieved by a wide exemption 
for recreational fishers in Section 60(2)(a)1146 and for Aboriginal fishers at Section 
60(2)(c). Given the similarity of Section 60 of the Act to Section 10 of the Fisheries Act 
1988 (NT), if the approach of the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case was strictly applied, 
the Tasmanian Act would wholly abrogate the public right to fish (for both commercial 
and recreational fishers). Based solely on the authority of the plurality judgment in the 
Blue Mud Bay Case, Tasmanian legislation would wholly abrogate the right. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, however, the general applicability of that case is doubtful. Furthermore, 
accepted principles of statutory interpretation do not require that a court follow the 
interpretation of words in a different statute in a different jurisdiction. The High Court 
has held that identical words may be interpreted differently in different States, given that 
context and legislative history varies.1147 
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If the public right has been abrogated, recreational fishers’ rights will depend either 
on the general exemption in Section 60(a) of the Living Marine Resources Management 
Act 1995 (Tas) or on the provisions of a statutory management plan issued for a specific 
fishery. The general arrangements under the Act for recreational fishing do not appear to 
be as comprehensive in nature as in Victoria. Given the treatment of South Australian 
fisheries legislation by the High Court in Karpany v Dietman,1148 it seems that, on 
balance, the arrangements would not be interpreted as wholly abrogating recreational 
rights. Although given the similarities between Section 60 of the Living Marine 
Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas) and the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), this cannot be 
free from doubt.  
For commercial fisheries, Section 32 of the Living Marine Resources Management 
Act 1995 (Tas) provides a somewhat limited (and circular) definition of management 
plans under the Act, stating that ‘[a] management plan consists of rules relating to a 
specified fishery’. The authority of a fishing licence is described using restrictive 
language in Section 63: ‘[a] fishing licence authorises the holder of the licence to carry 
out fishing in accordance with the licence.’ On the other hand, Part 3 and Part 4 of the 
Act contain extensive provisions on management plans and quota rights. In addition, as 
noted above, there is a general assertion of State ownership. Given these considerations, 
even without a high degree of authority being accorded to the Blue Mud Bay Case,1149 the 
provisions of the Act relating to commercial fishing under a management plan would 
likely abrogate public rights to fish commercially and replace them with a statutory 
scheme. Whether there is some residual public right for commercial fishers who are not 
covered by a plan is unclear.  
In summary, compared to Victoria, the provisions of the Act are less emphatic on 
ownership and a recreational licence is only required for some fisheries. It is likely that, 
but for the Blue Mud Bay Case,1150 Tasmanian legislation would have been interpreted as 
merely regulatory in nature with respect to recreational fishing activities. Yanner v 
Eaton1151 would be authority for reading down the assertion of ownership to mean a 
general statement of the interests of the State in fisheries management. Nonetheless, with 
both a claim on ownership and given the similarity of Section 60 of the Act to Section 10 
of the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT), it is arguable that public rights to fish in Tasmania have 
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been wholly abrogated. Given differences in wording from the Victorian legislation, 
whether wild fish are ‘owned’ by the State of Tasmania in a fashion analogous to private 
ownership depends on the degree to which the authority of Yanner v Eaton1152 is 
persuasive on this point.  
d) South Australian Fisheries Legislation  
In South Australia, the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) includes an assertion 
of the ownership of wild fish in broadly similar terms to that of Victoria.1153 The Act 
contains a general prohibition on commercial fishing except by license,1154 but does not 
include an equivalent general prohibition on recreational fishing. Due to the lack of 
comprehensive recreational licensing provisions in the Act, the complete abrogation of 
public rights is less likely than in Victoria. In Karpany v Dietman, the State of South 
Australia conceded that the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) did not extinguish 
native title rights.1155 In this regard at least, the assertion of ownership of wild fish does 
not appear to have been interpreted literally. Given the general interpretative stance to 
South Australian fisheries legislation adopted by the High Court in Karpany v 
Dietman,1156 the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA) is unlikely to have wholly 
abrogated all public rights to fish in that jurisdiction.  
e) Western Australian Fisheries Legislation  
In Western Australia a general prohibition on commercial fishing is created by 
regulations issued under the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA) 1157 and not 
directly by the Act itself. Recreational fishing is highly regulated, but licenses are not 
required for recreational fishing activities. It is likely that the public right continues in 
Western Australia, unless excluded by specific management plans enacted under the Act.  
The objects of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA) in Section 3(1) are 
‘to share and conserve ... the State’s fish and other aquatic resources ... for the benefit of 
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present and future generations’. The Act, however, does not include a specific assertion 
of property by the State in wild fish. For commercial fisheries, Part 6 of the Act sets up a 
system of management plans and authorisations. The Act itself does not explicitly require 
that all commercial fishers hold a commercial licence; Regulation 121 of the Fish 
Resource Management Regulations 1995 (WA) does. Regulation 121(1) provides that all 
persons who engage in commercial fishing must hold a licence under the Act.1158 
Furthermore, it is an offence under Regulation 121(2) for any fisher to sell fish without 
such a licence. By way of contrast, for recreational fishers, Regulation 123(1) provides 
only that a licence must be held for those activities listed in Regulation 124. The activities 
listed in Regulation 124 are quite extensive. From 2010, all boat-based recreational 
fishing activities came under a new licensing regime created under Regulation 124(B-D). 
Recreational fishing from a beach with a line, however, is not listed under Regulation 124 
and, consequently, a licence is not required. Although there is no general exemption in 
the Act for Aboriginal fishers, Section 6 of the Act provides that Aboriginal fishers do 
not need to hold a recreational licence when fishing for non-commercial purposes. 
Read together, the Western Australian Act and Regulations would appear to create a 
regime for commercial fishers partially abrogating the public right to fish and selectively 
replacing those rights with statutory schemes. The public right to fish commercially has 
likely been closely regulated rather than abrogated given the lack of a general prohibition 
on commercial fishing in the Act itself, and its relegation to regulations to the Act. 
Furthermore, in Western Australia there has been extensive use of broadly worded 
exemption provisions under the Act to create commercial fisheries outside the general 
legislative framework of the Act.1159 The use of an exemption from a prohibition as a 
management tool implies that some underlying right remains, which relief from a 
prohibition allows a fisher to take advantage of. The South Australian Supreme Court has 
commented on the Western Australian practice of extensive use of exemption provisions, 
and a distinction between Western Australian and South Australian practice in this regard 
was made.1160  
Section 66 of the Act (on commercial management plans) is expressed in positive 
terms, authorising a person to undertake a specific activity, not merely relieving them of 
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a prohibition on an activity. A new Section 73(A) was added in 19971161 to clarify that 
managed-fisheries authorisations were subject to marine reservation provisions for 
conservation under the Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 (WA). That this 
amendment was deemed necessary suggests that its drafters were of the view that 
authorisations under Part 6 of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA) might be 
capable of being interpreted as a positive statutory right, including a right of access to 
waters. Section 66(2) states that an ‘authorisation may authorise a person ... to engage in 
fishing or any fishing activity of a specified class in a managed fishery or an interim 
managed fishery’. Unless a plan is drafted very broadly to cover ‘any fishing activity’, it 
is likely that it would have only a partial abrogatory effect relating to that particular 
activity, similarly to abalone regulation in Harper.1162  
In relation to recreational fishing in Western Australia, the Act and Regulations 
create an extensive, but not fully comprehensive, recreational fishing regime. As noted 
above, the right of Western Australian recreational fishers to fish commercially is 
abrogated by a restriction on sale in Regulation 121. This regulation, however, does not 
affect their right to fish recreationally, nor does it require them to hold a licence. It is a 
matter of interpretation and judgement when the regulation of the public right to fish 
becomes an abrogation of the right and replacement of the right by a new scheme.1163 If 
all recreational fishing activities were required to be licensed under the Regulations to the 
Western Australian Act, they might have been wholly abrogated and replaced by statutory 
rights. It would appear, however, that the recreational activities for which a licence is 
unnecessary are still sufficiently extensive that the public right to fish has not yet been 
wholly abrogated. This conclusion is all the more likely given that the Act lacks 
provisions on ownership comparable to those in either Tasmania or Victoria. 
In summary, for commercial fishers, the lack of a direct prohibition on commercial 
fishing without a license in the Act, the absence of an assertion of State ownership, and 
the wide use of exemptions make it likely that the public right to fish of commercial 
fishers has not been wholly abrogated by the Act alone. A detailed management plan 
under the Act could do so. For recreational fishers there is no mandatory requirement to 
be licenced. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the effect of the Act is to wholly 
abrogate their public right to fish.  
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f) New South Wales Fisheries Legislation  
The objectives of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) do not include an 
express declaration of ownership or property in wild fish. Section 3(1) merely includes 
an objective to ‘share the fishery resources of the state’. In addition, there is no general 
prohibition of access in the provisions of the Act. There is, instead, a broad power under 
the Act to define a fishery under Section 6 of the Act and then to declare ‘fishery 
management strategies’ for it under Part 1A of the Act (Section 7(A)-(D)). Notes in the 
Act make it clear that the authors intended to preserve the public right. At Section 3 the 
notes state that:  
At common law, the public has a right to fish in the sea, the arms of the sea and in the 
tidal reaches of all rivers and estuaries. The public has no common law right to fish in non-
tidal waters — the right to fish in those waters belongs to the owner of the soil under those 
waters. However, the public may fish in non-tidal waters if the soil under those waters is 
Crown land. In the case of non-tidal waters in rivers and creeks, section 38 declares that 
the public has a right to fish despite the private ownership of the bed of the river or creek. 
However, the right to fish in tidal or non-tidal waters is subject to any restriction imposed 
by this Act. 
Under Section 102(1) of that Act, all commercial fishing activities must be licenced. 
There are some differences in the wording of that section from the statutory provisions 
considered in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1164 If only the authority of that case was relevant, 
however, Section 102(1) could be interpreted so as to wholly abrogate commercial 
fishers’ public right to fish. Applying that case to New South Wales legislation would, 
however, lead to an anomaly in that Act between the status of commercial rights in the 
marine domain and of commercial rights to fish in inland waters. Section 38(1) creates an 
independent statutory right to fish inland waters (non-tidal rivers and creeks) for both 
commercial and recreational fishers. This statutory right applies even if the bed of the 
river is in private hands. Creating a positive right to fish for commercial fishers in this 
manner that does not appear to be consistent with an intent to wholly abrogate the public 
rights of commercial fishers in the marine domain. That this anomaly would be created 
strongly suggests that it was not the original intent of the Act to fully abrogate the rights 
of commercial fishers. Given the weak authority of the Blue Mud Bay Case,1165 Section 
38(1) can likely be interpreted as supporting the general provisions of the Act, rather than 
abrogating the public right to fish of commercial fishers. A fishery management strategy 
provided for in Part 1A of the Act might still substantially abrogate the right of 
                                                 
 





commercial fishers, short of wholly abrogating it.1166 Nonetheless, taking into account the 
overall structure of the Act and the notes to the Act, it is likely that regulation, rather than 
complete abrogation, was intended by the general provisions of the Act. 
In relation to recreational fishing, Division 5 of the New South Wales Act creates a 
comprehensive system of recreational fees. There are, however, significant differences 
between the provisions relating to fees on recreational fishers and licence requirements 
on commercial fishers.1167 For commercial fishers, under Section 102, the relevant 
offence is the take of fish without a commercial licence. Under the Act, recreational 
fishing activities in New South Wales are not expressed as being conditional on the 
holding of a licence. For recreational fishers, it is the non-payment of a fee under Section 
34(J) that is the offence. To clarify, this means that it is not the activity engaged in by 
recreational fee evaders that is unlawful, but the non-payment of the fee. This difference 
in legislative approach strongly supports the inference that recreational fishing rights 
depend on the underlying public right to fish, rather than arising out of the statutory 
provisions of the Act. Again, that it was the intent of the drafters of the Act to preserve 
the public right to fish is supported by the note to Section 3 of the Act. That note both 
summarises the common law public right to fish and supports the inference that the 
purpose of Section 38(1) was to extend the rights of all fishers through creating a statutory 
right to fish in inland waters. The Act does not expressly preserve Indigenous rights, but 
limited guidance can be drawn from this omission, as it is unlikely that Indigenous rights 
would be extinguished by the provisions of the Act in any event.1168 
Further supporting the inference that the public right to fish has not been wholly 
abrogated, the Act introduces the concept of ‘public water land’. Under Section 4(1), 
where land is vested in the Crown for a public purpose, the Act classifies it as ‘public 
water’. Limited exemptions for the exclusive possession of public water land are provided 
for in Part 6 of Division 3 of the Act. The limited nature of these exemptions indicates 
that the drafters’ intent was to favour public access. This right of access can be contrasted 
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with the more restrictive approach over access to ‘water authority property’ under Section 
50A of the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic). 
In conclusion, it is almost certain that the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) 
does not trigger the complete abrogation of the public right to fish for recreational fishers. 
Broad provisions in the Act provide the power to implement comprehensive management 
schemes for recreational fisheries, but given the overall structure of the Act, it seems 
likely that these provisions regulate, rather than wholly abrogate, the public right to fish. 
It is likely the Act does not trigger the complete abrogation of the public right to fish for 
commercial fishers. Section 102 abrogates the general public’s right to fish for 
commercial gain, but whether it also abrogates commercial fishers’ public rights, and 
replaces them with a statutory right, likely depends on the wording of particular 
management schemes. A conclusion that the public right to fish commercially has not 
been wholly abrogated would have the advantage of bringing commercial and recreational 
rights in line with the provisions of Section 38(1) on access to non-tidal waters. 
g) Queensland Fisheries Legislation  
In Queensland the Fisheries Act 1994 (Qld) refers to the ‘community’s fish 
resources’ in Section 3(1), but the Act does not include a declaration of ownership in wild 
fish. There is no general prohibition on commercial fishing in the Act itself, however the 
Fisheries Act 1994 (Qld), Fisheries Regulation 2008 (Qld) and individual declared 
management plans1169 work together to limit fishing for commercial purposes to those 
holding licences under the Act. For example, the Fisheries Act 1994 (Qld) includes wide 
provisions for the declaration of ‘regulated fish’ under Section 78 and for setting out 
‘prescribed waters’ under Section 79A. Regulation 627 supplements these provisions by 
limiting the use of boats for commercial fishing activities to licensed commercial fishers. 
A piecemeal approach to regulation as taken in Queensland makes a summary of the 
overall impact of the Act difficult.1170 That it is piecemeal1171 suggests that, although the 
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regulatory scheme in Queensland may have abrogated recreational fishers’ public rights 
to fish commercially, it has not done so comprehensively for commercial fishers who 
might still exercise that right subject to regulation. As in Western Australia, specific 
management plans might replace commercial fishers’ public rights with a statutory right 
in some cases. Although the Act provides for the management of recreational fisheries, 
including the creation of fishery management plans under Section 32, there is no general 
prohibition on recreational fishing, and in practice a recreational licence is only required 
in limited circumstances.1172 Accordingly, the right of the public to fish recreationally is 
unlikely to have been wholly abrogated.  
h) Summary of Legislative Abrogation  
Based on the factors identified above, Victoria and New South Wales fisheries 
legislation represent opposite ends of a continuum of legislative approaches, with the 
most abrogatory being in Victoria and the least abrogatory regime in New South Wales. 
Tasmanian legislation is broadly similar to that in Victoria, if less comprehensive in 
nature. South Australian and Western Australian legislation fall somewhere in the middle 
of the continuum. Queensland’s piecemeal Act and Regulations are less restrictive than 
Western Australia but lack the clarity of intent that exists in New South Wales legislation 
maintaining public rights and public access. Notwithstanding that lack of clarity, taken as 
a whole, Queensland legislative arrangements fall well short of being a sufficiently 
comprehensive scheme that would justify the conclusion that the public right had been 
wholly abrogated across the jurisdiction. 
2. Abrogation and Access  
The public right to fish is a longstanding legal presumption that supports public 
access to the sea, foreshore and tidal rivers for the purpose of fishing. The right has 
contributed to the non-recognition of, and hence the rejection of, exclusive Indigenous 
rights to the marine domain in Australia.1173 In reality, private grants of exclusive (fee 
simple) estates below the high watermark are rare in Australia, so the practical influence 
of private grants on the public right to fish is limited.1174 Fee simple title to the tidal zone 
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under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (the ‘LRA’), is an 
exception to the usual practice.  
Given that private ownership down to the low watermark is rare in Australia, there is 
little interaction between private titles equivalent to a fee simple title and the public right 
to fish.1175 As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, the application of old English rules relating to 
fee simple grants of land over the marine domain in Australia seems to lack both a solid 
legal foundation and a compelling public need. In particular, there is no competing Crown 
interest in lands and waters analogous to the Crown Estate in England. In addition, there 
are no competing private rights to the extent there is in England with private rights 
equivalent to fee simple estates covering 50 per cent of the foreshore.1176 In Australia 
extensive private rights to the low water mark have rarely been granted. Furthermore, 
even in England, the contemporary relevance and utility of the public right to fish has 
been questioned.1177 The need for a strong public presumption against private rights in 
order to generally protect public access to the Australian coast is weak.1178 Access under 
the public right to fish to areas in the marine domain that are vested in a government 
agency is an issue of more widespread application. As noted by Justice Selway in Gumana 
v Northern Territory,1179 there has been extensive vesting of waters for ports and harbours 
in public authorities in Australia.1180 For example, the Rottnest Island Authority Act 1987 
(WA) covers the waters around Rottnest Island as well as the land, with control and 
management vesting in the authority under Section 11(2). 
Old common law assumptions in favour of the preservation of public rights should 
be applied with caution and the weight given to those assumptions will depend on the 
context in which they are being considered.1181 Based on the Full Federal Court’s ‘text, 
structure and context’ approach to statutory interpretation in Gumana v Northern 
Territory1182 it would appear reasonable that the public right to fish is accorded more 
weight where land or waters are vested in a public body for a public purpose which does 
not require exclusive use of the marine domain. By contrast, where there are competing 
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private interests where a degree of exclusivity would otherwise be expected, the 
presumption in favour of the public right to fish should be more readily excluded. 1183 
The Full Federal Court’s approach to interpretation seems logical, but as noted 
earlier, the authority of its view on this point is clouded given the successful appeal to the 
High Court in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1184 The High Court plurality, however, did not 
directly contradict the Federal Court on this point, and a single Federal Court judge at 
first instance might properly consider the Full Federal Court’s argument on this point as 
persuasive.1185 A partial reconciliation would be possible if a distinction was made 
between approaches to fisheries legislation and non-fisheries legislation. As noted in 
Chapter 5, Goldsworthy has proposed two meanings to ‘necessary implication’. The first 
is as an implication that is necessary for a statutory provision to have its intended 
effect.1186 To read fisheries legislation as being subject to a strong common law 
presumption in favour of the public right to fish would undermine the effectiveness of 
even the most carefully worded fisheries legislation. For non-fisheries legislation, it 
makes sense for the primary intent of that legislation to be more closely scrutinised by 
the courts on whether abrogation is truly necessary for such legislation to have its 
intended effect. For non-fisheries legislation, the second of Goldsworthy’s proposed tests 
for a ‘necessary implication’ would still apply, being an implication where there is a 
‘certain communicative intention’ that is ‘in the circumstances obvious’.1187 Although it 
is possible the public right to fish might be directly dealt with in non-fisheries legislation, 
it appears to be rarely, if ever, specifically referred to in non-fisheries legislation.1188 
Regardless of the appropriate test, where the public right to fish has been wholly 
abrogated, a legal presumption in favour of access by fishers will be lost. For example, 
the old English common law rule that applied to private grants of harbours or oyster leases 
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was that those grants were subject to public rights of fishery and navigation, at least to 
the extent that those activities were consistent with the purpose of the grant.1189 If the 
right has been wholly abrogated, then the public right to fish no longer forms part of the 
context in which other legislation covering the marine domain is being considered. 
Indeed, where the public right to fish has been wholly abrogated by fishing legislation, 
then fishing access to such areas vested in public authorities would appear to require 
either specific legislative authority1190 or the consent of the agency in which that area has 
been vested. Where access requires both a fisheries licence and the consent of another 
body, there is the potential for multiple layers of management and conflict over 
management. Although integrated coastal management — whereby overlapping and 
competing interests are managed within a common framework — has been highlighted 
as advantageous for some time, it has not been implemented to any great extent in 
Australia, although small-scale attempts have been made.1191 
The practical problem is that the marine domain is subject to a range of coexisting 
and competing rights. What guidance can be gained from common law interpretative 
principles for legislation? Where there is a potential conflict between different legislative 
schemes, which rights will prevail? In all of this, what weight should be given to the 
public right to fish? In 2011, the leading Australian text on statutory interpretation listed 
the public right to fish as a standard presumption in interpretation.1192 The 2014 edition 
did not.1193 If that change signals that the right is now especially susceptible to statutory 
abrogation by implication, then the balance of interests in the marine domain shifts, with 
the potential for unintended consequences as a result. 
In the marine domain, a consistent set of assumptions on the public right can provide 
a degree of consistency in approach to the interpretation of text and context, assisting in 
achieving a higher degree of clarity and coherence in the law.1194 Shared assumptions 
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provide a common starting point for resolution of conflicts. The history of the NT Fishing 
Cases1195 show the difficulty that courts have resolving ‘text and context’ where the 
legislature, deliberately or not, does not explicitly address potential conflicts between 
legislative schemes and the common law. Where the right is wholly abrogated, the effect 
of overlapping legislation may lead to shifts in the interests of other rights holders, such 
as the holders of LRA title in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1196 It is true that the High Court in 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr declined to give the public right to fish the status of a ‘skeletal 
principle’.1197 This statement should be judged, however, in the context of the argument 
put forward that a ‘skeletal principle’ would extinguish common law native title.1198 This 
does not prejudge whether the right has a role as a basic organising principle for access 
and use of the marine domain. In this capacity, the plurality recognised the ‘fundamental 
inconsistency’ between the public right and the native title rights asserted in that case.1199 
The case does not, therefore, preclude recognition of the public right as having 
fundamental qualities. To avoid inappropriate analogies to issues of extinguishment in 
Indigenous rights cases, the right is better described as an organising principle rather than 
a fundamental or skeletal mechanism.  
As noted above, a primary objective of rights-based fishery legislation is to clarify 
rights to take fish, particularly statutory rights held by commercial fishers. If regulating 
the right to take fish has the incidental effect of removing common law rights of access 
to the marine domain, this works against the achievement of the clarity that is being 
sought, because rights are replaced with an uncertain access regime. Fisheries managers 
in some jurisdictions may already have the power to address access in statutory 
management plans for fisheries. As noted above, it is likely in Western Australia that the 
current Act in force may already include such a power. Given the potential effect of 
abrogation on access to areas vested for public purposes, there might be an advantage in 
fishing legislation clarifying access arrangements like in New South Wales. Alternatively, 
management plans should be worded carefully to avoid the conclusion that they were 
intended to wholly abrogate the right. Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approaches may 
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resolve conflict over access to fisheries through detailed and highly specific management 
plans, but such approaches are unlikely to generally clarify the underlying basis of access 
to the marine domain. In any event, recreational fishing management arrangements are 
typically less detailed than those governing commercial fishing activities. Accordingly, 
in many cases recreational fishers whose rights have been abrogated might be left with a 
weak statutory exemption supporting their access.1200 In relation to access by recreational 
fishers, the approach adopted in New South Wales of declaring areas of the marine 
domain ‘public water land’ has merit.1201  
D. Conclusions 
A key objective for the introduction of the new fisheries legislative schemes adopted 
since 1988 was to improve management outcomes through ‘the explicit allocation of 
access to fish resources between stakeholders’.1202  
When expansive legislative language on ownership is mixed with legislation for 
rights-based management, there is a risk of unanticipated consequences from both the loss 
of rights of access and from the reversal of common law assumptions on the ownership 
of wild fish; in particular, the loss of a consistent, albeit possibly weak, principle 
underlying consistent approaches to the interpretation of legislation over the marine 
domain. The result renders more difficult the task of assessing priorities to access and use 
under overlapping statutory regimes in the marine domain. If legislation is intended to 
wholly abrogate public rights and replace them with a statutory scheme, then it is 
desirable that access issues are directly addressed, including access to waters and lands 
vested in bodies for public purposes. The value of legislative assertions of ownership to 
wild fish is questionable. Their value as a defence by the states of Australia against claims 
that some fishing licence fees might otherwise be constitutionally invalid has yet to be 
tested. There has been no evidence of any other purpose for such assertions. 
As noted in Chapter 1, Australia’s fishers, researchers and managers have identified 
the establishment of clear allocated rights to fisheries as Australia’s second-highest 
priority for reform. Uncertainty works against the advancement of that objective.1203 A 
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more consistent and coherent approach that can be applied to the public right is outlined 




CHAPTER 7: A USEFUL RIGHT 
A. Introduction  
1. Connection to Previous Chapters and the Concluding Chapter 
This chapter completes the substantive discussion on abrogation introduced in 
Chapter 5 and continued in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 focused on whether Australian fisheries 
legislation had wholly abrogated the public right to fish. This thesis concludes that the 
right was wholly abrogated by fisheries legislation in the Northern Territory,1204 and has 
likely been wholly abrogated by legislation in Victoria and possibly Tasmania. The right 
has not been wholly abrogated by Commonwealth fisheries legislation or in Queensland, 
New South Wales, Western Australian or South Australia. Whereas Chapter 6 focused on 
the effect on the right of fisheries legislation, this chapter discusses the potential effects 
of abrogation on statutory schemes and develops a general guide to abrogation which is 
intended to reduce uncertainty surrounding the right.  
The conclusion to this chapter considers the contemporary utility of the right, a 
discussion that is furthered in the final chapter of this thesis.  
B. Incidental Impacts of Abrogation 
1. Public Vesting of the Marine Domain  
The public right to fish underpins public access to the marine domain.1205 Given that 
substantial parts of the marine domain have been vested in public bodies,1206 a question 
then arises about the interaction of the public right and legislation vesting the marine 
domain to a public body. The public purpose of such a vesting might be clear, such as the 
vesting of a port or special-purpose reserve,1207 and not necessarily related to the 
management of fishing activities. In such cases, common law presumptions in favour of 
the public right should continue to apply, unless they are expressly excluded by 
legislation. Given that Australian law has preserved the common law rule that the public 
right to fish is ‘paramount’ over fee simple estates in the marine domain,1208 there seems 
to be no reason why a lesser estate vested in a government body would not be subject to 
the right — unless the right has been expressly excluded or the right has been excluded 
by necessary implication. The public right to fish is abrogated only to the extent that 
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abrogation is consistent with a purposive test applied to the interpretation of vesting 
legislation. 
Where there are extensive legislative vesting and control schemes in non-fisheries 
legislation, fishing activities can become subject to another level of regulation while at 
the same time remaining subject to fisheries legislation. Coexistence between overlapping 
legislation appears to be the norm in Australian jurisdictions. For example, Queensland 
fishing activities within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park also remain subject to 
Queensland fisheries legislation.1209 By way of a further example, the waters around 
Rottnest Island in Western Australia have been vested as an ‘A’ Class Reserve in the 
Rottnest Island Authority.1210 That Authority nonetheless states that it defers to 
‘Department of Fisheries rules and regulations’.1211 As noted in Chapter 6, both Western 
Australian and Queensland fisheries legislation operates to regulate, but does not wholly 
abrogate, the public right to fish.  
If a court finds that a generally worded vesting provision wholly or substantially 
abrogate the right, this could change the legal context for the application of fisheries 
legislation. Potentially abrogatory legislation might put in place a comprehensive scheme 
of regulation over the use of the marine domain but still not provide a positive right of 
access.1212 Where there is no right of other access and the public right has been wholly 
abrogated, it would be the responsibility of the body in which the marine domain has been 
vested to resolve access issues. The result could be potentially burdensome to the body in 
which the marine domain is vested. The body may be reluctant, unqualified or lack the 
resources to take on the obligations of managing access. As noted in Chapter 5, on the 
handing down of the decision in the Blue Mud Bay Case,1213 the Indigenous title-holders 
did not seek to manage fishing activities through their control over access. Instead, they 
sought to have the Territory government assume obligations for the management of 
access to the intertidal zone.1214 
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2. Proprietary Rights  
The potential impact of the abrogation of the right on proprietary estates in the marine 
domain is a complex question. Even if, as in the Northern Territory, the public right to 
fish has been lost, the separate common law principle that no property can be held in wild 
fish appears unaffected1215 and general fisheries legislation still applies.1216 Although 
fisheries law applies over private estates, the effect of those laws might be different 
depending on whether they apply to proprietary interests or to the public right. 
That fisheries laws may have a different effect on private estates in the marine domain 
is consistent with old English precedent. Moore and Moore1217 demonstrate that the 
holders of ancient fisheries in the marine domain were initially considered exempt from 
general fisheries regulations.1218 Such an exemption would be consistent with the 
proposition that proprietary rights are unaffected by general words in legislation. The 
conclusion that fisheries legislation in Australia may have a different effect on public 
rights than it has on proprietary rights finds support in Akiba v Commonwealth, where 
Chief Justice French and Justice Crennan held that the ‘necessary implication’ test was 
of greater strength when proprietary, or usufructuary, rights were involved.1219  
The issues that arise are illustrated below by an example based on the extensive fee 
simple title to the marine domain in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (LRA). This example demonstrates how 
fisheries regulation can have a different effect on an area where the public right has been 
wholly abrogated as compared to an area where it has only been regulated. In particular, 
there may be a legal obligation to pay compensation to a LRA title holder compensation 
arising out of changes in fishing regulations. There might be also be case that any failure 
to pay compensation would breach the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).1220 It is 
acknowledged that legal liability for compensation arising from changes to regulatory 
schemes is a complex and contested legal issue and not free of uncertainty.1221 
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Nonetheless, three elements would appear to be relevant; that a proprietorial interest is 
involved, that this interest is substantially or wholly affected by regulation, and the state 
has acquired an interest directly or for the benefit of another party.1222 On the first point, 
a LRA title-holder — free of the public right to fish — could grant out an exclusive 
‘fishery’ to a commercial fisher. If this were an old English case, there would be no doubt 
that a right of fishery of this kind is a form of incorporeal property.1223 In the absence of 
the public right, this characterisation of the rights of the title-holder as proprietorial in 
nature gives rise to the possibility compensation might be required upon a change of 
regulatory arrangements over the marine domain.  
Before considering the degree to which the other two elements required for 
compensation have been met, it is first appropriate to distinguish between the economic 
advantages arising out of a regulatory fishing scheme and those arising from locational 
advantages associated with the ownership of a property. The first set of advantages is 
unlikely to be proprietary in nature,1224 and the second is more likely to be proprietary. 
As earlier chapters have outlined, in a common-pool fishery free from regulation, 
economic rents are likely to be dissipated. It can be argued that the economic rents1225 
that accrue from the regulatory intervention by the Northern Territory under the Fisheries 
Act 1988 (NT) depend on, and are inherently subject to, changes in that statutory 
regime.1226 An economic advantage of a different type, however, accrues to exclusive 
title-holders, whether economic rents in a fishery are achieved overall or not. This is 
because some fishing sites are better than others and give rise to localised rents — in other 
words, it is convenient for fishers to fish in that location, and they would be prepared to 
pay for that access even if no true economic rents were generated from the fishery overall. 
These local advantages constitute part of the regular value of proprietorial right of control 
of land and waters, albeit they may have a low economic value in an open-access 
fishery.1227 A title owner free of the public right to fish can grant out a ‘fishery’ to a 
commercial fisher. That fisher would still need a license issued by the Northern Territory 
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government to carry out fishing activities.1228 As noted above, if this were an old English 
case, there would appear to be little doubt that a right of fishery of this kind is a form of 
property, albeit still subject to fisheries laws.1229 
Once the test for a proprietorial interest has been satisfied two questions remain; 
whether the interest has been affected and whether the state has acquired an interest that 
is directly or indirectly for the benefit of another party.   For the purposes of this example, 
let us then say that after a LRA title-holder granted a fishery to a commercial fisher, the 
Northern Territory government restricted commercial fishing for barramundi within LRA 
title areas,1230 removing the prospect of gaining economic value from commercial 
fisheries. Further, let us assume that the Northern Territory government did so primarily 
to benefit another sector, recreational fishers. The LRA title-holder’s proprietorial rights 
would appear substantially diminished, with that value transferred by the Northern 
Territory government to other beneficiaries. Barramundi could still be caught 
commercially, but no longer over LRA title. There would appear to be a plausible case for 
compensation for the loss of such local advantages, which are proprietorial in nature, and 
possibly, but much less likely, for compensation for the loss of an opportunity to gain a 
portion of the economic rent generated by the regulatory regime itself.1231 In Harper, 
Justice Brennan stated that a right to fish may be invalid if ‘created in diminution of 
proprietary rights of the owner of the seabed and without the owner’s consent’.1232 If this 
is the case, by analogy, a diminution of a proprietary interest, being the right to fish 
commercially over LRA title, would plausibly attract compensation.  
This is not to suggest that every form of regulation, for example, general 
environmental regulation, would give rise to a compensable interest or claim. As 
acknowledged above, compensation is a complex and contested area of the law. By 
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contrast, where the public right exists, a title-holder might be able to exercise joint control 
over access, but cannot be said to have the same interest in the fisheries themselves.1233 
Those fishing would be able to do so in pursuance of their regulated public right.1234 To 
further demonstrate this point, let us consider a slightly different set of facts, where 
fishing activities were not actually taking place on a title-holder’s land, but access across 
that land was necessary to access a fishery, for which the title-holder was charging fees. 
The title-holder could not be said to have a legal interest in the fishery, even though the 
title-holder was generating fees out of the fishery. Here, it is less likely that a court would 
find that the title-holder had a proprietorial right in a fishery, as the fisher would still be 
fishing pursuant to a pre-existing public right, even though the fisher was paying access 
fees to the title-holder.  
This example highlights the potential for shifts in legal relationships when the public 
right is wholly absent. Where the public right has been wholly abrogated, proprietorial 
interests may emerge that would require fisheries-management actions to consider the 
proprietorial interests of title-holders. In some cases, plausible claims to legal 
compensation might arise. The discussion above provides insight into novel legal issues 
that can emerge when the right is wholly abrogated. 
3. Indigenous Interests 
Assessment of the extent of abrogation of the public right to fish is relevant to 
Indigenous interests in the marine domain1235 in two ways. Firstly, in the absence of the 
public right, general statutory rules of interpretation apply to any conflict between the 
NTA and fisheries legislation. The NTA has been interpreted as intended to be protective 
of Indigenous rights,1236 but it also contains extensive statutory provisions purporting to 
protect the integrity of statutory fishery-management regimes.1237 The resolution of these 
elements is problematic. As discussed by Bartlett,1238 so far, no significant issues seem to 
have arisen out of the difference between a regulated public right and a statutory right to 
fish. This may be in part because, although the High Court in Commonwealth v 
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Yarmirr1239 recognised Indigenous rights to fish, it also established that they were non-
exclusive.1240  
Where the public right to fish has been wholly abrogated, however, one of the 
principal rationales for non-exclusivity becomes significantly weaker. Although the 
public right to navigate remains, this is a narrower right. It does not protect the public use 
of fisheries and protects access only under limited circumstances, such as when traversing 
an area. Justice Merkel argued in favour of the potential recognition of exclusive rights 
in his dissenting opinion in the Full Federal Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr.1241 His 
argument — which is well-founded in historical terms – highlighted precedents for the 
recognition of exclusive fisheries that existed in Ireland before the English settlement of 
Ireland was legally recognised. He highlighted 19th and early 20th century Irish cases 
involving private fishing rights. In Akiba v Commonwealth, Chief Justice French and 
Justice Crennan found that Indigenous rights to fisheries were of a proprietorial or 
usufructuary character,1242 making Justice Merkel’s analogy to old Irish rights even more 
apt.1243 That these rights perhaps only became capable of recognition as exclusive once 
they had been abrogated by later legislation is a significant hurdle, but overcoming it is 
not impossible. The High Court in Commonwealth v Yarmirr held that Indigenous rights 
could be recognised beyond territorial limits at settlement.1244 As the discussion in this 
thesis on Yanner v Eaton1245 in Chapter 4 demonstrates, the approach of the High Court 
to the interpretation of Queensland wildlife legislation shifted after the passage of the 
NTA. 1246 Accordingly, it is at least possible that exclusive Indigenous fishery rights could 
be recognised where there is no competing public right to fish. 
Although in theory an exclusive Indigenous right might exist, currently in no 
Australian marine jurisdiction has there been both a broad finding of Indigenous rights to 
fish equivalent to those found in Akiba v Commonwealth1247 and a finding that there is no 
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competing public right, as in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1248 Furthermore, since Karpany v 
Dietman1249 it is now much less likely that the right has been wholly abrogated outside 
the Northern Territory, with the possible exception of Victoria. In an event, if the 
composite nature of the public right is acknowledged, then exclusive Indigenous rights 
are less likely to arise. This is not because recognition of the different elements of the 
public right changes priorities between those rights and Indigenous rights, but because a 
regulatory regime would need to abrogate all elements of the right in order to make way 
for exclusive Indigenous rights.  
C. Termination of an Abrogatory Event 
This section addresses the question of what happens when an abrogating event passes 
or is terminated. To answer this question requires a return to the question raised in the 
first part of this thesis. What is the fundamental character of the public right to fish? 
Depending on the answer to this question, the character of the right will lead to its 
automatic revival on the removal of an abrogatory event or, alternatively, having been 
extinguished by abrogation, the right would not revive.1250  
Recent Australian cases suggest three possibilities. Firstly, the public right may be 
‘public’ only in the limited sense attributed to it by Justice Selway, being that that which 
is not prohibited is permitted.1251 Secondly, the public right may be so closely related to 
the prerogatives of the Crown that, just as prerogatives can be extinguished by regulatory 
regimes,1252 so the public right to fish can be extinguished. Finally, the public right revives 
once an abrogating event has passed. This interpretation rests on the broad enquiry on the 
history of the right with its multiple sources and elements described in Chapters 2-4.  
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Case, based on Attorney General v De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508. Although not free from 





The first possibility noted above — that only a very limited form of public right exists 
in Australia — was raised by Justice Selway in Gumana v Northern Territory.1253 Justice 
Selway argued that the right in England is more appropriately characterised as a 
restriction on the prerogatives of the Crown. He further concluded that the Crown, having 
never asserted those rights on settlement, permanently lost the ability to do so other than 
by legislation once responsible government came into place in the Australian colonies. 
According to Justice Selway, all that remained was a common law rule of statutory 
interpretation that one can generally do what is not prohibited.1254 Justice Selway’s 
approach has a significant advantage in the simplicity of its expression. On application, 
it is less clear what the impact of Justice Selway’s approach would be. If it is a strong rule 
of construction, then in requiring clear and plain words to prohibit it we necessarily return 
to the issue of what constitutes a ‘necessary implication’ where statutory provisions are 
not explicit.  
Justice Selway focused on the relationship of the right to the loss of certain 
prerogatives on the advent of responsible government. Effectively, his account attributed 
the whole of the right’s legal character to the prerogative account of the source of the 
right. This discounts the Bracton/Natural Law sources and Birthright/Magna Carta 
sources of the right. The latter has significant judicial support in key cases underpinning 
the legal development of the public right to fish, such as Malcolmson v O’Dea.1255 Justice 
Selway constructs a coherent account, but it lacks consistency with past treatment of the 
right.  
The second possibility is that the right is permanently extinguished by abrogation. 
This possibility finds support in the emphasis placed by the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay 
Case1256 on De Keysers Case,1257 associating the public right to fish with the prerogatives 
of the Crown.1258 A legal consequence of associating that the right with prerogatives is 
that, like prerogatives, the right would not revive once the statutory scheme that has 
abrogated it passes.1259 The lack of any reference to De Keysers Case by the High Court 
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in Karpany v Dietman1260 and Akiba v Commonwealth1261 suggests that while the Blue 
Mud Bay Case1262 was not formally overruled, it is a judicial dead end in the context of 
public rights to fish.1263 Nonetheless, an association of the right with prerogatives of the 
Crown is supported by Moore and Moore1264 and by Hale’s analogy between the rights 
of the king in the sea and the rights of a lord to the wastes of his manor.1265 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, however, the public right to fish has multiple sources, 
with only one of them dependant on an assumed past exercise by the Crown of its 
prerogative. The prerogative account has its source in a period in English law where there 
were vigorous attempts by the Tudor and Stuart monarchs to expand its powers.1266 The 
assumption that the right was solely a creature of the prerogative is inconsistent with the 
full breadth of its legal history. The public right was not permanently extinguished over 
ancient estates; rather, vigilance was required by the holders of English estates in the 
marine domain to ensure that their exclusive nature was preserved, and that their estate 
was not reattached to those estates of both public rights and the Crown.1267  
On a practical level, extinguishment would lead to highly unusual consequences. 
There would be areas of the marine domain to which the public right extends and some 
to which it does not, provided an abrogatory event has occurred in the past. Effectively, 
a quilt of legal patchwork would exist over the marine domain, with the public right in 
some places and not others. For example, a lease of an area of the intertidal zone, even 
when expired, might lead to a gap in the public’s right to cross the area. This would make 
effective management of the marine domain even more complex given the potential for 
conflicts between multiple uses, multiple users and multiple jurisdictions.  
That abrogation does not necessarily extinguish under Australian law is suggested by 
the consistent use by Australian courts of the term abrogation rather than extinguishment 
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in relation to the right. 1268 Australian courts have not explained this preferred word 
choice, which suggests two main possibilities: judicial reticence to avoid implying 
extinguishment, or courts overlooking explanation by coincidence and without 
consideration of the alternative possibility of extinguishment. The first possibility appears 
to be a more reasonable assumption. It is conceded, however, that this does not mean that 
the courts have adopted the revival approach preferred below — merely that the 
implication of extinguishment associated with the prerogative account has not been 
resolved.  
The preferred construction of the right in this thesis, as developed in Chapters 2–4, 
is that there are three sources of the right; the Natural law/Bracton foundation for the 
right, the Birthright/Magna Carta foundation, and the assumption of a past exercise of 
power by the Crown (by grant or otherwise) in favour of the public. The characterisation 
of the right that is most consistent across the ancient sources, as well as key formative 
legal cases in the 1800s1269 and 1900s,1270 is that the right is a unique public right of great 
antiquity, the justification for which has changed from time to time, but which is not 
solely a creature of the prerogative. Because the right is not solely a creature of the 
prerogative, it need not be subject to the same legal disadvantage as prerogatives relating 
to extinguishment. 
It is true that the public right to fish has been described as being amenable to statutory 
abrogation and regulation.1271 This does not necessarily imply an inherent fragility in all 
legal aspects of the right, including extinguishment. In Mayor of Carlisle v Graham, it 
was held that where a navigable river changed its course to cover formerly dry private 
land, the river remained subject to public rights of fishery and navigation.1272 The Crown, 
however, gained no permanent proprietary interest in the soil as a result of the shift in the 
river’s course. The Court found that if the river resumed its original course, the private 
landowner would own the (now dry again) soil. This case demonstrates the flexibility of 
common law public rights to fish. Rights that are not proprietary in nature are also not 
subject to the legal limitations of proprietary interests. It is true that Mayor of Carlisle v 
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Graham1273 was cited by Justice Brennan in Harper,1274 as qualified support for the 
proposition that the public right to fish might be ‘sustained’ by a right to the subsoil. In 
fact, Mayor of Carlisle v Graham1275 is merely authority for the proposition that both the 
public right and the rights of the Crown applied to the changed course of the river, not 
that right depended on the Crown’s interest. Chief Baron Kelly stated that ‘the rights of 
the Crown and of the public may come into existence and be exercised in what has thus 
become a portion of a tidal river or of an arm of the sea.’1276 
It is true that there is a paucity of direct English authority on revival of the right after 
abrogation. This may be for several reasons such as; that public rights were formerly 
given greater deference by the courts, the special legal status of the Crown Estate, the 
lack of comprehensive regimes of fisheries management (compared to those of today) 
and, finally, a lack of anyone having a clear interest in challenging public rights after an 
abrogatory event has passed. Justice Selway commented in Gumana v Northern Territory 
that the public right to fish in Australia had been largely ignored and was ‘resuscitated’1277 
by Harper1278 and in Commonwealth v Yarmirr.1279 As argued earlier, this is likely 
because those two cases addressed novel issues in Australian law, respectively rights-
based fisheries and Indigenous rights to fish. Two conclusions can be drawn on revival 
after statutory abrogation has passed. Firstly, it is a novel question and there is little 
guidance from authority. Secondly, a broad reading of the right’s legal history supports 
revival, and only a narrow reading of legal history supports extinguishment.   
The question then arises of what the impact of revival would be. As noted above, one 
of the advantages of revival is the avoidance of a potential patchwork application of the 
right in the marine domain with the associated complications in determining the effect on 
competing interests and interpreting overlapping legislation. Of course, if proprietary 
interests incompatible with the right had been created, then it is likely that, short of 
specific legislative words, the rights acquired would continue to apply. For example, a 
change to fisheries legislation in the Northern Territory is unlikely to change any 
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proprietorial rights gained by LRA titleholders.1280 By way of a further example, the 
discussion in Chapter 6 raised the possibility that in New South Wales, the public rights 
to fish commercially had been abrogated and replaced by a statutory scheme. If so, a 
consequence of the loss of the public right would be the loss to commercial fishers of the 
benefit of provisions extending the public right to fish to private inland waters. If the 
public right to fish were restored to commercial fishers, this restoration would potentially 
represent a reduction in rights held by those holding title to those waters. Absent clear 
words to the contrary, the effect of restoration of the public right might not restore 
commercial fishers’ right to access private inland waters in New South Wales.  
D. Purposive Test and Partial Abrogation  
1. Issues 
Following on from the discussion in Chapter 5, the plurality’s approach in the Blue 
Mud Bay Case does not provide a generally applicable guide to the interaction between 
the right and legislation. The authority of that case has diminished since the decisions of 
the High Court in Akiba v Commonwealth1281 and Karpany v Dietman.1282 These more 
recent judgments share much in common with the approach to interpretation applied by 
the Full Federal Court in Gumana v Northern Territory and that court’s purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation and ‘text and context’.1283 A purposive approach to 
interpretation is relevant to both the specific question of whether there is a ‘necessary 
implication’ of abrogation of a public right as well as the general interpretative stance that 
is applied to legislation.  
In recent cases, factors found relevant to either abrogation or extinguishment by 
necessary implication have included; the comprehensiveness of a legislative scheme,1284 
whether the public right has been replaced by statutory rights1285 and whether the rights 
have a proprietary character.1286 Given that recent cases have been focused on Indigenous 
rights, it is possible that a relevant factor to the degree of abrogation is whether competing 
and potentially inconsistent rights have been created under a statutory scheme of special 
significance for Indigenous people. When interpreting legislation, a strength of a 
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necessary implication’ test depends on contextual factors such as the strengths of the 
competing rights involved.1287 It would appear from Akiba v Commonwealth that the 
necessary implication test is weaker when applied to public rights to fish than rights of an 
usufructuary or proprietorial nature.1288 There appears to be no generally applicable rule 
guiding the assessment of abrogation, other than that the right is ‘freely amenable to 
abrogation or regulation’.1289 In Gumana v Northern Territory the Full Federal Court 
concluded that LRA fee simple title excluded the public right to fish and created a regime 
of exclusive access. The Court, however, declined to provide a more general opinion on 
circumstances that would lead to the public right to fish being abrogated. It was not even 
prepared to express an opinion on whether the highest level of private interest in land — 
a fee simple title — would generally exclude the public right to fish.1290  
Litigation over the marine domain in the Northern Territory, and in particular in the 
NT Fishing Cases,1291 demonstrates that a purposive approach is not in itself enough to 
generate a coherent and consistent test to assess the effects of regulatory abrogation. This 
is unsurprising. Two problems arise in the application of the purposive approach to the 
marine domain. Firstly, which purposes are relevant. Secondly, which purposes are to be 
given priority. The marine domain is a zone of interacting interests, some of them 
conflicting and some of them compatible. Those interests are governed by overlapping 
legislative schemes. Each scheme has its own legislative history and set of purposes. 
There is not only jurisdictional competition between different agencies,1292 but also 
arrangements for shared jurisdiction and management.1293 A test that is useful for 
considering the interpretation of words contained within a single legislation scheme is 
less useful for resolving conflicts between multiple schemes of legislation and the public 
right.  
The NT Fishing Cases,1294 discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, provide examples of 
specific factors that have influenced the courts in their assessment of the degree of 
abrogation of the right. Those cases do not display a systematic approach to the question 
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of abrogation. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, different outcomes can flow from a simple 
constructional choice over which legislative scheme is considered first by a court, and yet 
the reason for such choices is not necessarily clear. For example, the plurality in the Blue 
Mud Bay Case did not explain why it was necessary to first address the issue of the 
interaction between the public right and fisheries legislation, and only then to address 
interaction with Indigenous rights under the LRA.1295  
A guide to abrogation can contribute to consistency in two ways. Firstly, by the 
recognition that there are not one but two potential approaches to the question of 
abrogation by ‘necessary implication’. This recognition allows for explicit consideration 
of which approach is appropriate, as discussed below. Secondly, through setting out a 
preferred order in which potential conflicts should be resolved between the right and 
multiple legislative schemes. In theory, the need for a guide would be limited if there 
were explicit, clear and comprehensive legislative rules on priority. Given the diversity 
of potential interactions in the marine domain, however, an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive legislative approach to priorities, and to keep such provisions up to date, 
is likely to fail. The NT Fishing Cases1296 demonstrate how difficult it was to apply 
legislated rules of priority over areas of the marine domain covered by LRA titles. The 
plurality in The Blue Mud Bay Case avoided the whole question of legislative priorities 
that was established by the LRA by finding, as a preliminary point, that public rights to 
fish had been wholly abrogated under the Fisheries Act 1988 (NT).1297 Where there are 
no clear rules of legislative priority, conflicts will ultimately come to the courts for 
determination. The approach proposed below supplements a purposive approach to 
interpretation with a more specific guide, allowing for a greater degree of consistency to 
the statutory interpretation of legislation governing the marine domain.  
2. Proposed guide 
The guide to abrogation proposed in this chapter draws on Goldsworthy’s 
observation that there are two potential meanings to ‘necessary implication’.1298 The first 
is an implication that is ‘necessary for a statutory provision to have its intended effect’.1299 
The second is an implication where there is a ‘certain communicative intention’ that is 
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‘in the circumstances obvious’.1300 It is proposed that legislative schemes that must 
necessarily abrogate the right in order to be effective should be considered before the 
effects of other legislative schemes are considered. The next step would be to assess the 
impact on the right of statutory schemes where abrogation might not be necessary to 
achieve the intended effect of the scheme, but it is in the circumstances obvious.  It is 
acknowledged that a binary categorisation in this manner will not suit all legislation, and 
that there is an intermediate category of legislation whose purpose is partly directed 
towards the regulation of fishing, such as environmental legislation. The tests, how they 
can be applied, and the impact of this guide are considered in more detail below.  
An intended purpose of fishery legislation is to remedy the defects of the public right 
in relation to fisheries management and preservation, defects long acknowledged.1301 
Accordingly, fisheries legislation falls into the category listed above, a scheme that 
necessarily abrogates the right. That a weak presumption of the ‘intended effect’ kind 
should be applied in favour of the right in relation to Australian fisheries legislation is 
supported by Australian fisheries-management policies supporting rights-based 
management. Since 1988, changes have seen the adoption of comprehensive statutory-
based systems of management, including new forms of statutory fishing rights.1302 To 
interpret such legislation as being subject to a strong presumption in favour of public 
rights to fish would undermine one of its primary objectives. The primary purpose of 
fisheries legislation is to regulate and, accordingly, the public right to fish needs to be 
abrogated to some extent. In relation to the question of whether right has been wholly 
abrogated by implication, then the second meaning of implication applies, that it needs to 
be obvious.  
To convert the principles above into a test for when the right has been wholly 
abrogated, the following decision-making rule should apply. The first test is whether such 
a result is necessary for legislation to have its full effect. If the answer is yes, then the 
right has been wholly abrogated. If the answer to this question is no, then the second of 
Goldsworthy’s meanings for necessary implication is relevant, and the test is whether, in 
the circumstances, such a necessary implication is obvious. In Chapter 6, I argue that the 
Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) has this effect. In Victoria, it was not necessary for the right to 
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be wholly abrogated for fisheries-management purposes, but it was necessary for royalties 
to be applied under that Act.1303   
It is acknowledged that the guidance provided by the scheme outlined above is 
general in nature, but it provides more guidance and certainty than the application of a 
generic purposive approach to interpretation. The Blue Mud Bay Case1304 demonstrates 
how emphatic language intended to settle the authority of the Northern Territory to 
manage fisheries had apparently unintended1305 effects on the public right by also 
abrogating rights of access. A significant advantage of the guide as proposed would be to 
assist the drafters of legislation through clarifying the likely legal effects of differences 
in the wording of legislative arrangements. Drafters of fisheries legislation would become 
more sensitive to the possible impact of their scheme on elements of the right, such as 
access. Drafters of non-fisheries legislation could work from a more certain base when 
considering appropriate provisions to ensure that their non-fisheries objectives are met, 
while not causing unintended consequences following from the abrogation of the public 
right. A consistent interpretative stance in this manner will provide greater certainty on 
the effects of laws governing the marine domain. Experts have named certainty over 
resource rights a high priority if the Australian community is to maximise benefits from 
the marine domain.1306 As noted in Chapter 5, the loss of the public right to fish in the 
Northern Territory does not appear to have provided practical certainty for Indigenous 
interests on the use of or access to the marine domain 10 years after the decision in the 
Blue Mud Bay Case.1307 
As noted above, a purposive approach to the interpretation of a legislative scheme 
will not of itself provide guidance to determining priorities among conflicting legal 
schemes. Little effective guidance can be found in general common law rules of 
interpretation, which have no clear priority of application and which themselves ‘jostle 
for acceptance’.1308 Without explicit guidance on how schemes interact, merely looking 
to the separate ‘purpose’ of each legislative scheme will not provide guidance on their 
interaction. Furthermore, although Australia has one common law applied across its 
States and Territories, precedential guidance from one jurisdiction is of limited utility to 
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another, given that it is a generally accepted rule of Australian statutory interpretation that 
courts are not bound by ‘like words in other legislation by another court’.1309 Even when 
priorities between legislative schemes have been determined by one jurisdiction, the High 
Court might find that the legislative context is substantially different in another, leading 
to a different outcome.1310  
It is argued above that fisheries legislation needs to surmount only a low bar to 
abrogation by necessary implication, but that it does not necessarily follow that it will be 
obvious that the right is wholly abrogated. There are three further grounds that support 
this argument. Firstly, in Yanner v Eaton,1311 expansive general words on ownership and 
regulation in natural-resource management legislation should generally be read as 
expressing the full capacity of the Crown to regulate and control, rather than an intent to 
wholly abrogate. That case, and the more recent case of Karpany v Dietman,1312 are 
focused on the effect of natural-resource management legislation on Indigenous rights. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, however, their characterisation of the effect of natural-
resource management legislation as regulatory is expressed as general in nature and is not 
limited to interaction with Indigenous rights. Secondly, where the replacement legislation 
scheme is not comprehensive, too readily concluding that the right has been wholly 
abrogated creates potential lacunae and inconsistencies in the law, as discussed in Chapter 
6. Effective management does not require complete abrogation. As noted in Chapter 6, 
expansive wording in Victoria’s Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) appears to be unrelated to 
management and designed to protect revenue and avoid a risk that charges for access to 
the marine domain would be classified as constitutionally prohibited. Concluding that 
fisheries legislation does not wholly abrogate the right does not require a high 
presumption against abrogation, merely the application of a standard purposive ‘text and 
context’ approach to the interpretation of the legislative scheme as a whole.  
These first two points about abrogation are partly consistent with the reasoning of 
the High Court plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case.1313 The plurality’s application of a 
low bar to wholly abrogate the public right in general can be supported, while the 
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precedential authority of their conclusion that the Northern Territory statutory scheme 
was so comprehensive as to wholly abrogate the right can be doubted.  
A third consideration in the assessment of abrogation is that not all cases make it 
clear what is being abrogated, implicitly assuming that the public right to fish is a single 
right. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, what is referred to as ‘the public right to fish’ is a 
composite right. It includes, for example, both a specific presumption against the loss of 
access over waters granted out by the Crown and a more general proposition that the 
public’s right cannot be abridged except by a competent legislature. Given there are 
separate elements to the right, the public right to fish may be abrogated in some, but not 
all, elements. In other words, all the elements of the public right to fish do not necessarily 
stand or fall together. Accordingly, any test for abrogation should be applied not just to 
the right in general, but also to each of its elements. That the right can be partially 
abrogated in this manner is demonstrated by Harper, where the relevant regulations only 
abrogated the public right to take abalone.1314 There is no suggestion in that case, 
notwithstanding abrogation, that a person engaged in fishing for abalone had their general 
right to access the marine domain impaired.  
The guide outlined above can be restated as a set of decision-making rules as follows:  
Public rights to fish apply to the marine domain, except where expressly excluded 
or where included by necessary implication.  
As the public right to fish is a composite right with separate elements, abrogation 
or extinguishment of some elements does not of itself imply that all elements of the 
public right have been wholly abrogated.  
If legislation expressly wholly abrogates or extinguishes the right, there are no 
longer interpretative assumptions in favour of the public based on the common law 
right. Interpretation of the interaction between the abrogating legislation and any 
other (potentially) conflicting statutory regimes in the marine domain will be free 
of common law assumptions based on the public right.  
Where legislation does not expressly abrogate or extinguish the right, the question 
is whether or not legislation abrogates the right by implication. The first step in 
addressing this question is to assess whether regulation of, and any consequent 
                                                 
 




abrogation of, the public right is a necessary purpose to which that legislation is 
directed.  
If the answer to this question on necessary purpose is yes, then the impact of that 
legislation on the right should be considered first before the effect of other 
regulatory schemes. As fisheries legislation necessarily regulates the right, its effect 
should generally be considered first. The test is whether abrogation is necessary to 
the purpose of that legislation.  
If the answer to this question on necessary purpose is no, then the common law 
presumption protecting the public right applies and any ‘necessary implication’ 
should be carefully assessed against the purposes of the legislation. Here the stricter 
criterion that the implication must be ‘obvious’ should be applied. Accordingly, 
abrogation should only be assumed to the extent that the other purposes of such 
legislation require abrogation or extinguishment. 
E. Applying this Guide to Abrogation 
1. Application to Fisheries Legislation 
Fisheries legislation must necessarily abrogate public rights to fish if it is to be 
effective in remedying the long-attested defects of the right that are inherent in its open-
access nature. If the strict application of a ‘necessary implication’ presumption was 
applied, drafting fishing legislation would become cumbersome, especially where the 
legislation was intended to clearly express an authority to regulate without also wholly 
abrogating the right.  The general assumption that a central purpose of fisheries legislation 
is the regulation of the public right to fish is consistent with a purposive approach to 
interpretation and the general approach to Australian statutory interpretation. That 
fisheries legislation is exempt from a rigorous application of a ‘necessary implication’ 
test is a reasonable conclusion from both the Blue Mud Bay Case and more recent 
cases.1315  
The guide to abrogation proposed above asserts that the abrogatory effects of 
fisheries legislation on the right should be considered before the potential impact of other 
legislation on the right is considered. That the effects of fisheries legislation should be 
considered first should not be interpreted as a claim for the authority of fisheries 
legislation as privileged over other legislative regimes. It is merely a pragmatic 
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recognition that when considering potential conflicts between the right and legislation, it 
is logical to first consider the extent to which the right may have been necessarily 
abrogated by legislation whose central purpose requires a degree of abrogation. It is 
conceded that it may not always be apparent from the title of legislation that one of its 
primary purposes is the management and regulation of fishing activities. Historically, this 
was a trivial task when the distinction was clear from the title of legislation, for example 
the Fisheries Resource Management Act 1994 (WA) and the Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic).  
There is, however, an increasing trend towards fisheries management being 
perceived as part of a broader domain of ecosystem and environmental management. 
Broad environmental objectives are now common in fisheries legislation, along with more 
traditional ones of the preservation of fish stocks and the optimisation of fisheries. This 
trend is observed from the title of the Tasmanian Living Marine Resources Management 
Act 1995 (Tas) and the title in Western Australia of the Aquatic Resource Management 
Act 2016 (WA). Should this trend continue, scrutiny will continue to be required to 
ascertain the purpose of legislation and distinguish between legislation intended to 
manage fisheries and non-fisheries legislation. For example, if the title and objectives of 
legislation are expressed in general terms, such as in Tasmania’s Living Marine Resources 
Management Act 1995 (Tas), the question exists of whether or not a prime focus of that 
legislation is the regulation of fisheries, or whether it has a broader range of objectives of 
which interaction with fisheries is merely a subset.   
2. Application to Non-Fisheries Legislation  
Where non-fishing legislation affects the public right to fish, the second principle of 
obviousness apples. Abrogation should only be found where it is obvious and to the extent 
that abrogation is required. Arguably, this is not a separate test, but a traditional way of 
expressing a relevant contextual factor for statutory interpretation. One advantage of the 
proposed guide is that drafters of proposed legislation in the marine domain, whose intent 
is directed towards resolving non-fisheries issues, can assume that the words they use will 
not change the balance of rights and interests in the marine domain, except to the extent 
required to achieve the purposes intended. Given the overlapping jurisdictional and 
statutory regimes in the marine domain, for drafters to consider and explicitly address 
every potential impact on both the right and the interaction of the right with other statutory 
regimes would be a difficult, if not practically impossible, task. 
As contextual factors vary depending on the character of the rights involved, so will 
the interpretation of the effects of any legislative scheme. Relevant factors might include; 
an assessment of the balance of objects of the relevant Act: specific sections of the Act, 
subsidiary legislation, administrative acts, and the nature of any interests created under 
that legislation. For example, is the legislation a form of managing the use of the marine 
domain (including fishing methods) or merely a restriction on access to parts of the 




example, a port? Circumstances affecting the purpose (and context) of legislation are 
likely to vary so widely that a specific rule in relation to abrogation by non-fisheries 
legislation is impracticable. In some cases, the purpose of non-fisheries legislation will 
be obvious, for example, a defence control order preventing access to marine areas during 
military exercises involving the live firing of weapons. These orders would wholly 
abrogate both the exercise of the public right to fish and navigate but are of such a 
transient nature that it seems more accurate to speak of a temporary suspension of public 
access rather than an abrogation.  
There is a possible intermediate category of legislation where the management of 
fishing activities is a substantial objective, but it is secondary to another broader goal. 
Where non-fishing legislation implements a scheme of management for fisheries 
activities broadly comparable to fishing legislation, then a similar rule to fisheries 
legislation should be applied, that being that any assumption in favour of the public right 
to fish should be applied with caution. An example of such an intermediate case of ‘mixed 
purpose’ legislation is environmental legislation; this category of legislation is considered 
below.  
3. Intermediate Cases: Environmental Legislation 
The binary approach to the test for abrogation by implication, as proposed above, is 
more difficult to apply to legislation that has some, but not all the characteristics of 
fisheries legislation. Marine environmental legislation is such a potential intermediate 
case, as it operates in the marine domain, but is not centrally concerned with the regulation 
of fishing activities. As noted in Chapter 1 the principal purpose of fisheries management 
is to the regulation of fishing to balance exploitation and protection. Nonetheless, to 
achieve their environmental goals regulatory regimes created by environmental 
legislation might also need to be interpreted free or largely free of a presumption in favour 
of the public right to be effective. To decide which interpretative test for abrogation 
should apply — necessary for effectiveness or in the circumstances obvious — would 
require enquiry into the detail of the scheme and the legislation under which it is 
established. For example, the Commonwealth’s statutory and regulatory process for 
marine reserves provides for the declaration of those reserves and the general purposes 
for which those areas are reserved but leaves management arrangements to be resolved 
later.1316 The purposes for which the reserve has been created can be achieved through 
other statutory mechanisms, including changes to fisheries legislation. This structure 
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suggests that Commonwealth marine reserves are intended to operate with, rather than 
replace, Commonwealth fisheries legislation, and by implication the public rights that 
legislation regulates.  
In assessing the extent to which an environmental scheme necessarily abrogates the 
right, some general guidance can be found in the highly regarded International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)’s classification system for marine reserves.1317 The 
Commonwealth has used this system to guide its development of one of the world’s 
largest system of marine reserves. Under the IUCN’s classification, there are seven levels 
of protection ranging from the most restrictive, Category Ia and Category Ib, to the least 
restrictive, Category 6. Category Ia Reserves are clearly intended to substantially, if not 
wholly, abrogate the public right to fish. The IUCN provides in this category that ‘human 
visitation, use and impacts are strictly controlled and limited to ensure protection of the 
conservation values’.1318 For an Ia reserve, management regimes require significant 
restrictions on fishing activities in the reserve, as well as rights of access.1319 An Ia reserve 
would appear to be so obviously incompatible with the public right to fish that a necessary 
intention to wholly abrogate, rather than regulate, would appear to be met. Other IUCN 
categories allow for other uses, although these uses are clearly intended to be supported 
by the regulation of incompatible activities. For example, commercial fishing is allowed 
for limited purposes in Category VI reserves. Given a range of activities are allowed, 
there seems to be no necessary reason why the public right would need to be wholly 
abrogated. Too ready an assumption of the abrogation of the public right to fish under 
environmental legislation may undermine the effectiveness of the management of 
fisheries under fisheries legislative regimes.1320 A loss of the public right to fish could 
also impact the balance of interests and rights in the marine domain in unanticipated ways. 
By way of a more specific example, as noted in Chapter 6, the regulation of commercial 
fishing in New South Wales may have undermined the intention in that legislation to 
create statutory rights of access to inland waters.1321  
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Given the above, it would seem appropriate to assume that environmental legislation 
of a general nature should be interpreted as being subject to the rules set out in the Guide 
above for non-fisheries legislation. Where restrictions are severe, as in reserves meeting 
the IUCN category Ia description above, then abrogation would be obvious, and for such 
reserves there would arguably be complete abrogation. On the other hand, if a 
comprehensive and extensive management scheme of fishing activities is implemented 
under environmental legislation, there is no reason not to apply the same decision rules 
applied to fisheries legislation under the guide proposed above. Accordingly, the 
abrogation of the public right to fish is necessary to achieve the objectives of such a 
statutory scheme, and only a weak presumption is appropriate in favour of the public right 
to fish. In practice, as noted above, Australian jurisdictions tend to layer schemes on top 
of each other rather than replace schemes with each other, with fisheries continuing to be 
principally managed by fisheries agencies. Given this practice, a pragmatic approach is 
to consider each legislative scheme as one layer of management rather than focusing on 
abrogation. The extent of abrogation principally becomes an issue if a statutory regime 
wholly abrogates the right, making any further consideration of assumptions in favour of 
the right unnecessary. 
F. Conclusion: Organising Conflict? 
Notwithstanding any, or all, of the arguments above, there is no doubt that the public 
right to fish is a common law–based public right, the relevance of which depends on the 
degree to which courts will uphold the right. Its limitation as an organising principle for 
sound resource management has long been recognised.1322 As noted in Chapter 1, its 
contemporary significance has been doubted in both Australia and England. There 
appears little Australian judicial support for the right being characterised as a 
‘fundamental’ public right worthy of a high level of protection.1323  
The public right to fish should not, however, be considered in isolation from the fact 
that the marine domain in Australia is a highly regulated environment and subject to 
overlapping jurisdictions and legislative schemes. Reconciling these without an explicit 
guide or framework is problematic. A purposive approach to the interpretation of 
legislation does not in itself provide a sufficient framework to guide consistent judicial 
interpretation, as was demonstrated in the variety of judicial approaches applied in the NT 
Fishing Cases.1324 As a common starting point for the reconciliation of potentially 
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conflicting legislative regimes, the public right to fish can assist in improving consistency 
and coherence in the interpretation of existing schemes and in the drafting of new ones.  
The public right to fish, therefore, acts as a useful default organising principle for 
access to, and use of, living marine resources. Essential elements of the right remain 
relevant, even if they require some restatement to reflect the right’s contemporary context; 
the public can take fish from the marine domain to the extent they are not restricted by 
legislation; public access is assumed to exist across the marine domain and there is a 
presumption supporting the public right in the marine domain. The strength of that 
presumption, however, will depend in substantial part on the central purposes of 
legislation covering the marine domain.  
This chapter and preceding chapters have adopted the stance of attempting to 
reconcile conflicting views on the right so far as it is possible. This restatement does not 
address whether more radical changes to the right might be justified, for example, whether 
the lack of a legal equivalent of the Crown Estate in Australia warrants a more extensive 
revision of the laws of Australia over the marine domain. Chapter 8 looks forward and 
considers the potential for more extensive changes to the right. It also considers the 




Chapter 8: THE ONCE AND FUTURE RIGHT?  
A. Introduction 
This chapter sets out a summary of the history of the right and proposes a restatement 
of the right in Australian law. The history of the right and its later development in 
Australian law has been a primary focus of this thesis. The lens this thesis applies to that 
development is the influence of the right over access to and the use of the marine domain. 
The rich legal history of the right provides fertile ground for its citation as support for a 
variety of arguments. This chapter also notes the potential relevance of its findings about 
the development of the right to other areas of the law.  It is argued, however, that the legal 
character of the right as a public right in the marine domain means caution needs to be 
exercised in drawing conclusions based on its history in other areas of the law, such as 
private rights and the nature of Crown ownership.  
B. History of the Right: Origins and Legal Reasoning  
The legal history of the public right to fish is long, complex and contested. The right 
is ‘obscure’,1325 with a legal character ‘not easy to define’1326 and has origins ‘lost in the 
darkness of the past’.1327 The contested history of the right leads to the observation that it 
is ‘more controversial than one may have expected’.1328 As Justice Barrett stated in 
Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833:1329 
[i]t is not possible to make, with any degree of confidence, a complete and exhaustive 
statement of the common law rights of the public in relation to tidal waters and the 
foreshore. The matter is a ‘difficult question’ no less today than when so described by Lord 
Wright in 1935 [referring here to Williams-Ellis v Cobb1330]. 
Chapters 2 and 3 surveyed the origins of the English common law public right to fish 
and grouped the principal sources of the right into three main accounts, the 
Bracton/Natural Law, Birthright/Magna Carta and Crown Ownership accounts. It is a 
central proposition of those chapters, and of this thesis, that each of these accounts is 
solidly grounded in legal history. From this proposition, it follows that arguments based 
on a single origin of the right are susceptible to rebuttal by plausible counterarguments 
                                                 
 
1325 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 25 (DF Jackson QC, SJ Gageler) (during argument); A-G 
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1327 Ibid. 
1328 R v East Sussex County Council [2015] UKSC 7, [27] (Neuberger and Hodge LL). 
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based on a different origin of the right. It is argued in Chapter 5 that the legal reasoning 
of the plurality in the Blue Mud Bay Case1331 was over-reliant on the analogy to 
prerogatives of the Crown, and by extension, the Crown Ownership account of the right.  
It is acknowledged that new evidence on the history of the right could emerge that 
challenges the conclusion of this thesis that the right has multiple sources. New evidence 
is, however, much more likely to add to the broad base of existing knowledge than fully 
displace one or more of the three accounts of the origin of the right outlined. By way of 
example, Chapter 3 of this thesis introduced evidence drawn from Australian colonial 
history1332 to fill in gaps in the Australian history of the right. This evidence supports the 
view that the Birthright/Magna Carta account was dominant when the right was received 
into Australian law. This evidence adds weight to arguments based on the 
Birthright/Magna Carta approach, but this evidence does not fully displace arguments 
based on the other accounts of the right.1333 
Two further conclusions about the right can be drawn from this review of the history 
of the right. The first conclusion that can be drawn from Chapters 2 and 3 is that certainty 
about the legal attributes of the right will not be achieved out of its legal history alone. 
Legal history forms part of legal argument and judicial reasoning.1334 As part of judicial 
reasoning, legal history can inform a court on the proper construction of legislation. As 
part of the process of legal reasoning, however, legal history is not subject to evidence 
before the court.1335 There are no prescribed limit on what elements of legal history judges 
can take into account. It is, of course, prudent for advocates to provide, and for a court to 
receive, submissions on legal history, as is accepted Australian practice.1336 
                                                 
 
1331 (2008) 236 CLR 24, 50-67 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
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Chapter 3 D. 
1333 Such as the association of the right with the prerogative in the Blue Mud Bay Case (2008) 236 CLR 24. 
1334 Selway, ‘Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia’, above n 63, 
131. Indeed the High Court has attracted criticism for ‘dumping a huge amount of history in judgements 
[and] by being less explicit about the policy choices being made … with some practitioners concerned that 
its heavy focus on history is chewing up litigant's time and money’ cited in Alex Boxsell, Samantha Bowers 
and Hanna Low, ‘High Court Ramps Up Pressure’, The Australian Financial Review, 15 August 2011, 52-53 
1335 See treatment of historical sources in Alqudsi v The Queen (2016) 258 CLR 320, 213 (French CJ), 244 
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Significant complications will arise for the achievement of consistency in judicial 
reasoning where there are longstanding disagreements as to the history of the law. Even 
if the authorities consulted by a court could be limited to those written by ‘serious 
historians’,1337 such authorities would not provide consistent guidance where serious 
historians themselves disagree on the fundamentals of legal history. Chapter 3 outlines 
significant differences of opinion on the public right in the 1800s and early 1900s. These 
differences include disagreement on the origin of the right and its relationship to the 
interests of the Crown in the marine domain. High-level judicial decisions citing the 
history of the public right have not settled these debates. As noted in Chapter 3, the House 
of Lords decision in Malcomson v O’Dea,1338 — despite being ‘binding authority’1339 — 
did not prevent doubts being raised over Magna Carta accounts of the right.1340 This 
disputed legal history of the public right to fish presents a court with a wide range of 
‘constructional choices’1341 when interpreting the effects of statutes on the public right.  
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the review of the history of the right 
in this thesis is that it retains the potential for further evolution.1342 With both multiple 
origins and unresolved legal disputes over its fundamental legal characteristics, a simple 
account that is capable of one orthodox interpretation has failed to emerge. Chapter 3 
notes the divergence in American and English law from cases in the 1800s and 
onwards.1343 The potential for evolution has so far not lead to significant changes in the 
Australian right, such as it being transformed into an American-style public trust.  
Although there is a lack of full certainty and the potential for evolution, some legal 
characteristics of the right appear to be particularly well grounded and unlikely to change.   
The special public and non-proprietary nature of the right has been consistently 
emphasised in Australian and English law. Its public nature does means that consistency 
in the legal application of the right to fish is unlikely to be found in legal history alone, 
                                                 
 
1337 See Selway, ‘Use of History’ above n 63, 134. Quoting Dixon J in Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 196. This observation sets aside the difficulty of deciding which historians 
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1338 (1863) 11 ER 1155. 
1339 Neill v The Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135, 177-8 (Blackburn L) 
1340 Ibid. 
1341 See discussion on constructional choices in Hepburn, ‘Statutory Construction and Native Title 
Extinguishment: Expanding Constructional Choices’, above n 4. 
1342 See Bonyhady, ‘A Usable Past: The Public Trust in Australia’, above n 137. 
1343 See discussion in Chapter 3 B 2 (b). In particular, the discussion of the rejection of a right to bathe in 




as the degree to which courts are likely to support the right will depend on their perception 
of its utility.1344 This thesis recommends a natural-resource management approach be 
applied to the interpretation of fisheries legislation. This approach does not require a full 
reconciliation of legal historical debates over the right. Instead, it focuses on the central 
concern of fisheries legislation, the appropriate balance between exploiting and 
conserving fish.1345  
Seen from a natural-resource management perspective, a key characteristic of the 
right is that it is a long-accepted background principle of the common law. It underpins 
the public’s use of and access to of the marine domain. In this regard, the principal 
elements of the right have been long accepted.1346 As a background principle of the law, 
the right is a relevant factor for the interpretation of legislation potentially abrogating the 
right. An approach that avoids taking definitive positions on the history of the right is 
broadly consistent with the adjudicative approach taken in Attorney-General for British 
Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada,1347 Harper1348 and in Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr.1349 In each of these cases, the court avoided definitively answering historical 
questions about the origin of the right while confirming the existence of the right. 
The public right is only one of several relevant considerations a court might consider 
in a statutory interpretation of the effects of fishing legislation. Other relevant factors in 
the interpretation of fisheries law might include; advances in fisheries management,1350 
the importance of sustainability,1351 changing approaches to common law rights in 
general1352 and the emergence of Indigenous rights.1353 The challenge — with so many 
potential contextual factors — is achieving consistency in the application of the right and 
certainty for those relying on the right to underpin access to and use of the marine domain. 
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In addition to recommending the adoption of a natural-resource management 
approach to fisheries legislation, this thesis proposes to advance consistency and 
coherence in Australian law through the confirmation of the right as a background 
principle of common law underpinning both public access and use. As a background 
principle, the right is a relevant contextual factor to the interpretation of legislation, unless 
it is expressly excluded.1354 Where no alternative scheme1355 or set of principles is put in 
place, the right should only rarely be found to have been wholly abrogated. To accept an 
implication of complete abrogation without a suitable replacement is to accept an implied 
intent to leave gaps in the law. Although it is acknowledged that, in some circumstances, 
a legislature might intend that gaps be filled in by the courts,1356 such an assumption 
should only be reached with caution due to the risk of intended consequences. This thesis 
has explored the potential for unintended consequences following from the loss of rights 
of access where the public right has been wholly abrogated.   
This thesis concludes with a proposed restatement of the right in Australian law. Prior 
to doing so, however, the potential implications of this thesis on other areas of the law are 
reviewed.  
C. The Public Right and other Rights and Interests 
In Chapter 7, it is argued that where the right has been wholly abrogated it is possible 
that exclusive Indigenous rights in the marine domain might be capable of being 
recognised under Australian law. As noted in Chapter 1 there is an extensive body of legal 
literature on Indigenous rights. This thesis adds to that literature by identifying the 
circumstances in which a recognition of exclusive Indigenous rights is compatible with 
the history of the public right to fish; and its later development in Australian law.  
More broadly, the right has been cited as a support for arguments on topics as varied 
as the origin of property rights1357 and the existence of common law native title.1358 This 
thesis has focused on the right as an organising principle affecting the access to, and use 
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of, living marine resources. This focus precluded a full assessment of the implications 
this thesis may have for other areas of the law. The utility of analogies that can be drawn 
between the right and other rights and legal interests is, in any event, limited. As 
emphasised in Chapter 1,1359 the right is a public right and is not private or proprietary in 
nature. Further, as also noted in Chapter 1, the right is legally distinct from the public 
right to navigation.1360 If analogies between the public right to fish and the public right to 
navigate are limited in utility, then the utility of analogies between the public right to fish 
and private rights to lands and waters is even more questionable. That a failure to fully 
take into account the public nature of the right to fish can lead to false analogies to other 
rights was demonstrated in Akiba v Commonwealth.1361 Comparability between the public 
right and Indigenous rights in the marine domain was specifically rejected in that case.1362 
Although the public right and Indigenous rights have influenced each other’s 
development, this is not the same as asserting that they are similar rights. The public right 
is not an inherently stronger or weaker right than Indigenous rights (or statutory rights). 
It is a right of a different character.  
Furthermore, policy issues related to the marine domain are substantially different to 
those on the land. It is not appropriate to treat interests in land — and the history of those 
interests — as analogous to interests in the marine domain. As this thesis demonstrates 
the marine domain is characterised by a complex set of overlapping public, statutory and 
private rights, many of them coexisting rights. Legal concepts familiar to land law such 
as rights to exclusive possession are less useful in the marine domain. It is acknowledged 
that analogies between the right and interests in land are drawn, for example, Hale’s 
analogy between the interest of the king in the marine domain and that of the lord of a 
manor.1363 Hale, however, also recognised that the king only had a ‘kind of possession in 
the sea’. 1364 That the marine domain is not generally conducive to analysis based on 
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occupation and possession has been acknowledged from the times of Hale1365 to more 
recently.1366  
A similar problem appears to have emerged in other areas of natural resource law 
where there are complex interactions between public and private rights. Writing on rights 
to water, American legal theorist Epstein, generally a strong proponent of property rights, 
observed the problems that arise from treating waters as if they were land. Epstein wrote 
that: 
With water, the courts make the opposite mistake [of dealing with land rights as a 
disaggregated bundle]. They treat it as a single unitary thing for public policy purposes, even 
though as a matter of private law, water rights are highly fragmented to reflect the underlying 
set of multiple inconsistent uses.1367 
 
D. A Restatement of the Australian Right  
1. The Australian Context 
The public right to fish is part of the common law of Australia and was received into 
Australian law in the 1800s as part of the English common law. Those aspects of the right 
that support unlimited fishing are not consistent with the community’s commitment to 
sustainable use, as evidenced by extensive regulation of the right in fisheries legislation. 
Furthermore, the right in Australia exists in a marine domain that is subject to a variety 
of non-fishing legislative regimes with extensive vesting of areas for public purposes. 
Accordingly, the right should no longer be considered fundamental or paramount. It 
remains, however, a background assumption of the common law of Australia that the 
public has a right to use and access the marine domain. It is of particular interest to 
recreational fishers, who do not have a positive statutory right to fish or a statutory right 
to access the marine domain to fish. As a background assumption, it retains utility as a 
starting point for the interpretation of legislative regimes over the marine domain. As 
competition to the marine domain increases, the right can assist in the resolution of 
conflict by providing a common background underpinning the interaction of different 
legislative regimes, each with their own purposes. 
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Although no longer a fundamental common law right, the right should still only be 
abrogated by clear words or necessary implication. This test is, however, not to be as 
stringently applied to the public right as it is for proprietary rights. Accordingly, the same 
words might abrogate the public right, but not proprietary rights or common law rights of 
a more fundamental nature. Consistent with Australian legal practice to statutory 
interpretation, what constitutes a necessary implication will vary form case to case.  Both 
text and context are important considerations. Guiding that assessment, some general 
principles are applied to specific types of legislation below. 
2. The Right and Legislative Interpretation  
a) Fisheries Legislation and Abrogation 
Where an Australian legislature regulates fisheries, by necessary implication to 
achieve its intended effect, the right must be partially abrogated. As Justice Brennan in 
Harper stated: 
The public right of fishing for abalone in State fishing waters is thus abrogated and 
private statutory rights to take abalone in limited quantities are conferred on the holders of 
commercial and non-commercial abalone licences. The Regulations thus control the 
exploitation of a finite resource in order to preserve its existence.1368 
In the pursuit of the goal of good natural-resource management, fisheries legislation 
may contain provisions intended to emphasise the breadth of the law’s powers to regulate 
a fisher’s take of fish. Legislation strictly regulating the use of marine resources does not 
necessarily intend the removal of rights of access to the marine domain. Potential gaps in 
the law governing the marine domain may in fact make effective natural-resource 
management more difficult to achieve. A key interpretative factor is the 
comprehensiveness of the relevant statutory scheme, including the degree to which the 
abrogation addresses questions of access and use across the marine domain. Other 
indications of legislative intent to wholly abrogate can be found in statutory provisions 
such as clear and explicit assertions of ownership of fish. The loss of the right can create 
uncertainty over the impact on public rights of access and use where no replacement 
scheme is in place. As noted in Chapter 1, ten years after the decision in the Blue Mud 
Bay Case no comprehensive replacement scheme integrating recreational commercial and 
proprietary rights had been put in place.1369  
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b) Non-Fisheries Legislation 
Where regulation of fishing is not an intended purpose of legislation, but an impact 
on public rights of use or access is obvious in the circumstances, then the right should be 
abrogated, but only to the extent this is required to achieve that obvious effect. This 
includes, for example, sea closures for defence purposes and closures of areas of harbours 
for public safety.  
Where the regulation of fishing is one of a range of legislative purposes, then the 
choice of the appropriate test for a necessary implication is less clear, with the potential 
applicability of either the test of intended effect or a stricter test of obviousness. Context 
is relevant to the question of whether legislative words are intended to emphasise control 
over natural resources1370 or abrogate or extinguish the right. In interpreting legislation, a 
court should prefer constructional choices that support coexistence with the right.1371 
Removing regulated common law rights of access and use under fisheries legislation can 
undermine practical arrangements for management, especially where no comprehensive 
replacement scheme has been implemented.  
3. Private Estates to the Low Watermark: 
The English common law position that the right has a ‘paramount’ status is 
inconsistent with general treatment of the right by Australian courts, including the 
classification of the right as a non-fundamental common law right. Furthermore, as there 
is no Crown Estate in the marine domain in Australia the legal context in which the right 
operates is radically different. Accordingly, in Australian legislation the creation of rights 
equivalent to a fee simple estate in the marine domain should generally be a sufficient 
basis for a finding the right has been abrogated by necessary implication.1372 The extent 
of this abrogation would still need to meet the test of being obvious. Adopting such a 
position would reduce confusion about the interaction between rights of the public and 
the rights of those holding a proprietary title, especially those holding a title that would 
otherwise have given exclusive possession.1373 This may already be the pragmatic 
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approach of the Australian lower courts.1374 
 
4. Revival of an Abrogated Right 
Consistent with the position in England, at the time of reception of English common 
law into Australian law, the public right is not a creature of the prerogative or, at the very 
least, not solely a creature of the prerogative. Where abrogatory legislation is repealed or 
amended, or an abrogatory event passes away on some other grounds, the right should 
revive. In other words, abrogation should not amount to extinguishment. Consistent with 
High Court authority that the presumption of necessary implication is applied more 
strictly to proprietary rights,1375 however, only very clear legislative intent would lead to 
the revived public right displacing displacement of proprietary rights gained in the 
meantime. This approach to the revival of the right preserves its character as a public, not 
proprietary, right and as a general background principle of the common law. The 
alternative to revival is extinguishment. The marine domain would then become a 
patchwork of areas, some covered by the right and others not covered. Assessment of the 
extent of the right would then require extensive historical analyses of rights granted and 
then repealed or expired and the history of repealed legislation.  
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